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ABSTRACT 
 
Vida Yao: Loving the Bad & Not Giving a Damn: A Defense of Psychic Disharmony 
(Under the direction of Susan Wolf) 
 
 
We tend to think that it is better that one loves what one believes good, and hates what 
one believes bad. Similarly, we tend to think that it is a mark of virtue or rationality that one does 
what she judges she ought to do, and refrains from doing what she judges she ought not do. I 
argue that these “akratic disharmonies”, which occur between one’s evaluative judgments and 
one’s emotional or motivational responses, need not indicate her irrationality or a defect in her 
character, and that in fact, that her mind is disharmonious may be a sign that she is fully sensitive 
to the features of her situation. Moreover, her willingness or ability to sustain certain kinds of 
akratic disharmony can be the basis of underappreciated virtues such as graciousness, humility, 
self-esteem, and solidarity with her fellow human beings. Not only, then, is it possible for one’s 
mind to be akratic in the ways that I have described, there may be goodness in knowingly 
desiring, loving, or intending the bad.  
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Introduction 
 
 
If I abstain from fun and such,  
I'll probably amount to much,  
But I shall stay the way I am,  
Because I do not give a damn.  
 
⎯ Dorothy Parker, “Observation” 
 
I will here focus on a familiar class of ways in which one’s soul can be disharmonious. 
These are cases in which one fails to feel, desire, or act, in accordance with one’s judgments or 
beliefs of value. Throughout, I’ll refer to this sort of disharmony as “akratic” disharmony. And I 
will be responding to two longstanding philosophical claims about akratic disharmony: the first 
we could characterize as ethical or normative, and the second we could characterize as 
descriptive.1 Both claims reflect the basic philosophical tendency of venerating internal harmony 
over internal discord.  
According to the ethical or normative characterization of the claim, it is a paradigmatic 
sign of irrationality, or of a bad human life or character, that one experiences this sort of akrasia. 
For Aristotle, the virtuous agent is not only able to get herself to perform the action she knows 
would be best to perform, she does so wholeheartedly, experiencing no conflict at all between 
                                                      
1 This is likely to be too neat of a way of thinking about these claims – and indeed, I will here argue against both in a 
way that in some respects elides this otherwise helpful way of distinguishing the claims in question. But it is useful, 
at the outset, to begin with this way of organizing the kinds of claims that have been made about akrasia. 
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her judgments of what would be best, and her motivations to do it. For a contemporary 
expression of this ethical perspective, take for example Michael Stocker’s observation that: 
One mark of a good life is harmony between one’s motives and one’s reasons, values, and justifications. 
Not to be moved by what one values – what one believes good, nice, right, beautiful, and so on – bespeaks 
a malady of the spirit. Not to [believe good, nice, right beautiful and so on] what moves one also bespeaks a 
malady of the spirit.2  
 
The idea of a unified or harmonious soul as an ethical ideal has a number of motivations 
speaking in its favour: the psychic painfulness of struggling to respond and act in a unified or 
simple manner; the lack of reliability in the performance of the best action when one struggles to 
do it; or the thought that there is something about integrity, or sincerity, that demands a person to 
feel in ways consistent with how they evaluate. Indeed, many of the struggles that any person 
may face in her life simply have to do with living up to the evaluative judgments that she makes, 
and we level charges of hypocrisy or duplicity should we find that a person claims to value 
something but fails to do anything about it.  
Distinct from this ethical claim is another. This position can also be traced back to the 
ancients, but can – at least without elaboration – be harder to see the appeal of. Indeed, it has a 
tendency of either seeming clearly false or trivially true. According to this claim, unification is 
not a rational or ethical standard, but is a description of human psychology or action. In several 
dialogues, Socrates seems to claim that it isn’t actually possible, in a clear-eyed manner, to fail to 
be moved by what one believes good, nice, right or beautiful and so on.3 In other words, clear-
eyed akratic action is impossible: when it appears as though one is doing or desiring something 
                                                      
2 “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories”, 453. To be fair, Stocker says that it is just “one mark” of a good 
life that one is harmonious in this way. In his later work, the claim is stronger: it is the sign of a non-defective 
character that one’s soul is harmonious.  
 
3 And as will be mentioned in the dissertation, claims of this sort are now taken as axiomatic in much meta-ethical 
discourse, especially by expressivists or quasi-realists. “Realists”, on the other hand, maintain the connection 
between one’s evaluative beliefs and one’s desires or emotions by claiming that it is a standard of rationality that 
they be unified, and so might be better understood as offering a normative claim about psychic harmony. 
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that one knows is bad or bad to do, one in fact either lacks the relevant evaluative knowledge, or 
she has lost control of herself and so fails, in some sense, to be an agent.  
One reason why this position is theoretically attractive is that it seems commonsense or 
truistic to think that our desires or our positive motivations and emotions generally, are responses 
to what we simultaneously take to be good in some way. To desire something just is to think it 
good, and so one cannot coherently desire something that isn’t good at all, and would 
presumably desire the most what they think best.4 Such attitudes are what I will call “value-
centric”: should they be intelligent responses to the world at all (and so able to give rise to full-
fledged action and other forms of rational response), they must be responsive to goodness. 
There are ways to allow for certain kinds of disharmony without giving up the value-
centric understanding of our positive attitudes. For example, if values are irreducibly plural, then 
somebody who has beliefs or motivations that reflect this plurality will be, in some sense, 
disharmonious.5 She may not know whether or not it would be all things considered best for her 
to volunteer at a soup kitchen, or work on her novel, or hang out with a friend; or she may know 
that it would be best to do one, but still feel emotional resistance to having to give up on the 
                                                      
4 Take, for example, how Donald Davidson summarizes Stuart Hampshire’s denial of the possibility of akrasia in 
“How is Weakness of Will Possible?” 
 
P1. If an agent wants to do x more than he wants to do y and he believes himself free to do either x or y, then he will 
intentionally do x if he does either x or y intentionally.  
P2. If an agent judges that it would be better to do x than to do y, then he wants to do x more than he wants to do y.  
P1 and P2 together obviously entail that if an agent judges that it would be better for him to do x tan to do y, and he 
believes himself to be free to do either x or y, then he will intentionally do x if he does either x or y intentionally. (p. 
28).  
 
Davidson takes P1 and P2 to be “self-evident”, and so rejects the thought that the puzzle about akrasia is a pseudo-
problem.   
 
5 This is how David Wiggins, for example, argues for the possibility of akrasia in, “Weakness of Will, 
Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire”.   
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other. The disharmony in her soul, we might think, simply mirrors the disharmony of value in the 
world.  
But the difficulty and tensions one might feel in negotiating plural and conflicting values 
is not the sort of disharmony that I will be interested in here. Rather, the sort of akrasia that I will 
be interested in here involve cases in which a person loves or desires or does something in ways 
that come apart from her beliefs about what things are good or worth doing. I will provide here a 
way of understanding how such cases are coherent and psychologically possible, by encouraging 
us to see the ways in which our motivations and emotions can be justifiably felt because 
responsive to the evaluative facts of one’s situation. Importantly, however, those facts themselves 
need not be identical to considerations of goodness or badness of any kind. It has, in other words, 
been a mistake to think that the domain of the evaluative is limited to qualities of goodness and 
badness even pluralistically understood. We should reject, or place substantive limits on, the 
goodness-centric assumption that has guided our thinking about our positive attitudes.  
I will also respond to the evaluative, or normative demand for unification. I will argue 
that there need not be anything significantly bad about a person should she be a clear-eyed 
akratic. And importantly, there need not be anything wrong with her even when her evaluative 
beliefs are true. So I will also not be discussing cases in which a person has mistaken beliefs 
about her situation. In those cases, we may just think that it’s a good sign of her character that 
she simply doesn’t feel the pull of the mistaken values that she holds. So for example, while it is 
true that Huckleberry Finn had false beliefs about what it is that he morally ought to do, we think 
the akrasia that he experiences when he finds he cannot turn Jim in to Miss Watson is a sign that 
 5 
he has a good character, after all.6 But while sometimes we turn out to be right in acting against 
our best judgment, other times we still end up doing something downright stupid. Even in these 
sorts of cases, I will argue, there may be goodness in knowingly loving, desiring, or intending the 
bad.  
 
 
 
  
                                                      
6 As Nomy Arpaly has argued in “On Acting Rationally Against One’s Best Judgment”, if Huck does turn Jim in – 
even though it is against his best judgment – we might nonetheless evaluate him as doing the right thing, and so 
deserving of praise.  
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Grace and Graciousness: Goodness in Loving the Bad 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the “Idea of Perfection”, Iris Murdoch provides a compelling image of a private moral 
improvement. A mother, M, feels hostile toward her daughter-in-law, D. M believes that that D, 
though good-natured, is “insufficiently ceremonious, brusque, sometimes positively rude, always 
tiresomely juvenile”.7 However, as time passes, M comes to question how she sees D and decides 
to look again. After reflecting and observing not only D but herself as well, M’s view gradually 
changes: D is discovered to not be “vulgar but refreshingly simply, not undignified but 
spontaneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful, and so on”.8 
M’s hostility, we imagine, blossoms into something else. And her progress is a powerful ideal. 
We tend toward impatience, narrow-mindedness, and self-absorption; we have difficulties 
recognizing let alone overcoming aspects about ourselves that limit our ability to see others, as 
Murdoch puts it, “justly”.  
Nonetheless, one might wonder what would have happened had M looked again, but 
found that her view did not alter – and not because of any failing on her part. What if, in short, D 
truly is brusque and positively rude? What then? Would M return to her “hardened sense of 
grievance,” now simply feeling more justified, and more hardened, than before? Murdoch herself 
                                                      
7 Murdoch, “The Idea of Perfection” in The Sovereignty of Good, p. 17.  
 
8 ibid, pp. 16-17. 
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does not entertain this possibility. And indeed, some might insist that to ask these sorts of 
questions is to already have a misguided understanding of the ideal that she is articulating. The 
point of seeing another in this loving, admirable way is not to be accurate, but to be moved to 
find the best in another, or recast her badness in a more positive light by adopting a more 
pluralistic understanding of the ways in which a person can be good: to be just, in a very 
particular sense of the word. Those who worry that this could lead someone into, as Murdoch 
suggests, “deluding herself”, are perhaps themselves already too cynical or severe to appreciate 
this ideal in the first place. 
But though this response is attractive, others may find it incomplete. In regards to cases 
that may be rare but not impossible, the questions I will take into consideration here could be put 
in the following manner: Is it possible for a person with a truly bad character to be loved, when 
careful attention would simply bring into sharper focus the ways in her character is flawed, even 
in light of a wide-ranging and flexible plurality of value? And, even if we can imagine such an 
attitude, would it simply be the sort of tragic, pathological affection that can attach hostages to 
their captors, or lovers to their abusers? Would it simply be perverse? These questions need not 
arise only because one is unwilling to see others in a rosier light. Rather, for some it arises when 
considering their own characters, and the limits of the love of others.  
I shall here argue that the answer to the first question is yes, and to the latter two, no. But 
to reach these conclusions, we must reject a common way of thinking about our emotions and 
motivations, in general, and love in particular. There is a tendency, tracing back to Socrates and 
Plato but widely assumed in both historical and contemporary philosophical literature, to think of 
these attitudes in a way that is goodness-centric: that is, to think that if such responses are 
 8 
intelligent responses at all, they are responses to, or projections of, goodness.9 Sometimes this 
thought takes the form of explicit moral, or rational standards: that such attitudes are rational or 
good to the extent that they are directed toward the good; irrational or bad to the extent that they 
are directed toward the bad. 10 Should a positive emotional or motivational response be 
insensitive to goodness, it must not really be sensitive to anything at all: it would be “blind” or 
arational, like a craving or compulsion.11  
But there is a particular attitude that, though puzzling, should not be understood in either 
of these ways. That attitude is grace: a form of love that is not exclusively responsive to the 
goodness of its objects and may even be enhanced by, or even grounded in, the qualities of the 
beloved that the lover simultaneously recognizes are bad. As I will argue, this is because grace – 
of the form I will discuss here – is sensitive not to considerations of goodness, but to 
manifestations of human nature, including aspects of that nature that are bad. This feature of 
grace, as well as its distinct phenomenology, renders it importantly different from other attitudes 
that seem similar, such as forgiveness or faith, as well as other forms of love that can be 
sustained in awareness of the bad, but are ultimately projections or appraisals of goodness.  
                                                      
9 The first view is sometimes expressed as the thought that all desires and intentional actions are sub specie boni, or 
under the guise of the good; I will address this position directly in Chapter 3. It is also what is assumed by the 
thought that the desirable or the lovable is synonymous with the good. A more general psychological view is 
Socratic intellectualism, which treats our positive emotional and motivational states as responses to goodness, thus 
leaving no room for the possibility of akrasia. In contemporary work, David Velleman argues that love is a response 
to the value of the beloved in “Love as a Moral Emotion”. In Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting it Right, Harry 
Frankfurt argues for a “projectionist” understanding of love, which takes love to be fundamentally a matter of 
bestowing value to the beloved through one’s love rather than appraising it.  
 
10 Gwen Bradford has recently christened the principle of this position amare bonum bonus: to love the good is good 
(to hate the bad is good, love the bad is bad, and that to hate the good is bad). Thomas Hurka is perhaps the most 
prominent contemporary defender of this second claim. Both Hurka and Bradford suggest that it can be found in the 
work of Aristotle, Brentano, Moore, and Nozick. And as mentioned in the Introduction, Michael Stocker, who 
notably defends the intelligibility of desiring the bad, elsewhere argues that it is a mark of a good life that one’s 
motivations and evaluations are in harmony with one another, and a sign of a “spiritual malady” should they not be 
so.  
 
11 For example see Gary Watson, "Free Agency”. 
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After characterizing grace and providing a conception of it that renders it both coherent 
and I hope familiar, I will then argue that one’s ability or willingness to sustain grace toward 
another person can be the mark of his possession of a set of virtues, including graciousness – a 
virtue in its own right – as well as humility, a deep-seated and informed self-esteem, resilience, 
and solidarity with one’s fellow human beings. Correspondingly, a person’s inability or 
unwillingness to experience or maintain such an attitude can mark his possession of certain 
vices, such as arrogance, a lack of self-esteem, an excessive demandingness, and a hostile or 
uneasy rigidity or harshness that may even take the form of misanthropy. The possibility of 
grace, and the virtues that can underlie one’s experience of it, stand in tension with a tradition 
that has long emphasized the good of only and always loving the good. I will argue that not only 
is there sense to be made of such an endeavor; there is goodness in knowingly loving the bad, as 
well. 
 
II. GRACE 
 
I will use the term grace in a different sense than may be usual. Most notably, I will 
characterize an attitude that can be understood in abstraction from any theological commitments 
– one that can be recognized and experienced in strictly human circumstances.12 Moreover, the 
kind of attitude I will discuss here is not identical to a form of universal love for all human 
beings that is sometimes upheld as a moral ideal. And though there is reason for treating grace as 
an aspect of all forms of love, and not a distinctive form a love in its own right, I will use the 
term in this latter way. This last point will mark my usage as distinct from, for example, Robert 
Adams’ use of the term. He writes that grace is: 
                                                      
12 In Forgiveness and Love, Glen Pettigrove also provides a conception of what he calls a “moral”, rather than 
theological conception of grace. I will note below how the understanding of grace I am offering here differs from 
his. 
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…love that is not completely explained by the excellence of its object. Within certain parameters, 
at any rate, it is not proportioned to the excellence of its object, nor conditioned on the degree of 
that excellence. To the extent that that degree can be measured, grace typically outruns it.13  
 
As Adams observes, when it comes to the love of friends and family, for example, love that was 
completely explained by, or strove to be perfectly proportionate to, the excellence of the beloved 
would be perverse, if even a form of love at all. In light of this consideration, he suggests that 
grace is a quality of all genuine forms of love. While I have no objection to this use, I will here 
use the term to pick out a particular subset of forms of love that, though genuine, are less familiar 
and more peculiar. Attitudes of grace, as I will discuss them, are peculiar precisely because they 
are not simply disproportionate with the excellence of their objects, but because they are not 
always grounded, explained, or conditioned on excellence or goodness at all, but something else 
instead.14  
This idea, especially given a philosophical tradition that emphasizes the good of loving 
the good, is no doubt apt to sound perplexing, if not straightforwardly incoherent. Take, for 
example, a case that is the inverse of M and D, in which one has affection for somebody, E, who 
appears to have good qualities of character. Imagine that upon carefully attending to E, you come 
to realize that what you took to be a sign of his benevolence was actually a sign of a calculating 
selfishness, and that what you took to be a sign of his love for his children was actually a sign of 
his need for control. It seems that you’ve lost exactly what grounded your affection for E – you 
may even wish that you had never learned the truth. With this sort of case in mind, how can we 
                                                      
13 Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics, p. 151. 
 
14 In “Must God Create the Best?” Adams suggests two different ways of understanding grace. First, that grace is a 
form of love that is not dependent on the merit of the person loved. Second, that the gracious person loves without 
worrying whether the person he loves is worthy of his love, or that the gracious person sees what is valuable in the 
person he loves, and does not worry about whether it is more or less valuable than what could be found in someone 
else he might have loved. I will here explore the first possibility: that grace is not dependent on the merit (or 
goodness) of the person loved, but on something else.  
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understand the psychological and conceptual possibility of maintaining one’s love, let alone 
having one’s love be enhanced by the bad qualities that one is now painfully aware of?  
It would be best for us to begin with a less typical example, and consider the resources 
that a goodness-centric tradition has to illuminate it, before proposing how a particular 
understanding of grace can. Consider a scene from Marilyn Robinson’s novel Home in which the 
main character, Glory, reflects on the quality of her brother’s soul while helping him wash up 
from a night of heavy, self-destructive drinking.  
 
Glory said, “You might rub your hands with shortening. That would probably dissolve 
the grease...” She took the can from the cupboard, scooped out a spoonful, and put it in his palm. 
She said, “Remember when you talked to me about your soul, about saving it?” 
[Jack] shrugged. “I think you may be mistaking me for someone else.” 
“And I said I liked it the way it is.” 
“Now I know you’re mistaking me for someone else.” He did not look up from the 
massaging of his hands.  
“I’ve thought about what I should have said to you then, and I haven’t changed my mind 
at all… your soul seems fine to me. I don’t know what that means either. Anyway, it’s true.” 
He said, “Thanks, chum. But you don’t know me. Well, you know I’m a drunk.” 
“And a thief.” 
He laughed. “Yes, a drunk and a thief. I’m also a terrible coward. Which is one of the 
reasons I lie so much.” 
She nodded. “I’ve noticed that.” 
“No kidding. What else have you noticed?” 
“I’m not going to mention vulnerable women.” 
“Thanks,” he said. “Very generous in the circumstances.” 
She nodded. “I think so.” 
He said, “I am unaccountably vain, despite all, and I have a streak of malice that does not 
limit itself to futile efforts at self-defense.”  
“I’ve noticed that, too.” 
He nodded. “I guess there’s nothing subtle about it.”15 
 
This scene marks an important moment in the novel: an affirmation of how Glory feels about her 
brother, Jack, who she has slowly grown to know after a long estrangement. Earlier in their re-
acquaintance Glory had remarked that she, as she puts it, likes his soul the way it is. Given the 
                                                      
15 Home, pp. 287-288.  
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sort of person Jack is, and the person Glory is16, she was puzzled by this; and at this point in the 
novel, her perplexity has not subsided. Instead, it is now accompanied by a certainty that simply 
compounds it. Indeed, she is expressing her sentiment explicitly within a context in which Jack 
has, once again, failed to live up to standards they both endorse. Though he tries to deflect the 
comment by suggesting that Glory doesn’t really know what his soul is like, the rest of the 
passage reveals that her affection toward him is paired with a discerning awareness of his vices 
and the distinctive ways in which they manifest in his behaviour.17  
 Glory is similar to M in certain respects. She is self-critical, well intentioned, and able to 
see beyond her own prejudices when she attends to Jack. But their assessments of the objects of 
their attention travel in different trajectories. Initially, Glory does see Jack in an optimistic, 
charitable light: for example, as pensive rather than cowardly, or as playful rather than sharp-
tongued. But as she attends more to Jack (with his encouragement to see him as he really is18) his 
flaws are simply brought into sharper relief. Nonetheless, her affection for Jack remains stable, 
and if anything, has been enhanced. 
In these respects, her reaction is also notably different from perspectives that are offered 
within the novel of other ways in which attentive and even well meaning people might react to 
somebody like Jack. These responses are less puzzling than Glory’s, as they are more in line with 
the goodness-centric understanding of love I described above. For example, Jack sees his own 
                                                      
16 Glory is both notably morally good, and pious; we have also learned by now that one of Jack’s greatest wrongs – 
fathering and abandoning a child – deeply affected Glory, who grew to love the child before she died of an infection. 
We also learn that Glory’s dreams of a simple family life had been dashed by a man who, like Jack, took emotional 
and monetary advantage of a “vulnerable woman”.   
 
17 The scene continues, with Jack testing the limits of her affection by elaborating on what he calls his “mortal sins”. 
He clarifies to Glory that for some time of their estrangement he was in prison, not jail, as he had her previously 
believe. The scene concludes with her response: “I don’t care if you were in prison.”  
 
18 When he asks her to reconsider how she feels about the sort of person she is, to really look at him and what he has 
done, she responds: “What can I say? You’re my brother”; to which Jack responds, dissatisfied, “You’re not being 
kind”. This has bearings on an interpretation I consider below: about whether her love is just the kind of love that 
one has for people because of the particular relationship they bear to one another. 
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flaws with a clear-eyed shrewdness, and as such a view would predict, has no love to give. He 
suffers from deep bouts of regret and self-loathing; he is destructive and self-destructive in 
response. And Glory’s reaction to Jack also differs importantly from their father’s reaction to his 
Prodigal son. His love is one that veers between affection accompanied by excuses and 
minimizations of Jack’s flaws, and harsh condemnation when those flaws are brought back into 
mind.  
Glory’s attitude is also distinct from another that is sometimes discussed alongside grace 
– that of forgiveness. Forgiveness too, is a positive attitude that knowingly outruns the excellence 
of its object, given that it would be a person’s flaws that he is being forgiven for.19 Indeed, some 
might think that forgiveness is necessarily an act of grace, or that grace is a particular species of 
forgiveness. But there are two important respects in which grace differs from forgiveness that 
will help us further characterize the former.  
The first is the sort of status that forgiveness presumes, and grace – at least when felt by 
one human being toward another – does not. In forgiving another, one presumes that one has the 
authority to do so, where this may involve being the person who was wronged or harmed by him, 
who is the source of the other’s obligations, or who simply stands in the right sort of relationship 
to him.20 Unlike her father, as well as the other “pious folk” that Jack has come across, Glory 
                                                      
19 Forgiveness, of course, is typically understood as an attitude that we take toward actions performed by others, but 
I mean here to discuss a form of forgiveness that can focus on the quality of a person’s character as well. 
 
20 This cursory discussion of forgiveness is meant only to serve as a heuristic. Nonetheless, contemporary 
discussions of forgiveness in contemporary Anglophone philosophy almost without exception treat forgiveness as 
presupposing that the wrongdoer do something (such as apologize, or compensate) in order to merit forgiveness. See 
Jeffrie Murphy, “Forgiveness and Resentment and John Wilson, “Why Forgiveness Requires Repentance”. In 
Forgiveness and Love, Pettigrove argues that such accounts fail to recognize that one can forgive for good moral 
reasons that have little to do with desert and or merit. I agree with Pettigrove that forgiveness is best when 
accompanied by grace, but that standard accounts are right to preserve the thought that forgiveness is connected to 
ideas of merit and dessert: one might forgive another in an ungracious manner.  
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does not take herself to have this sort of role in Jack’s life.21 However she conceives of their 
relationship, she is not predominantly or even minimally in the business of – as he puts it – 
“saving his soul”. Though she is already aware of the bad aspects of his character, she is taken 
aback when he first asks her if that is what she is trying to do: “Save your soul? Why would I do 
that?” And after Jack explains to her why she might, she replies, “I’m flummoxed. I’ll have to 
give this some thought”.22 She does not take Jack to unredeemable or hopeless; it is that it 
doesn’t occur to her to think about their relationship in this sort of way. Rather than looking 
“downward”, in the way that forgiveness does, her attitude is marked instead by a kind of 
egalitarianism. 
This aspect of their relationship also illustrates the second way in which grace differs 
from paradigmatic cases of forgiveness: grace need not focus on the goodness or good qualities 
of its object at all – not even its potential good qualities. Like faith in another, forgiveness is 
typically aspirational in a way that can preserve the basic thought that it is good to have positive 
attitudes toward the good, including the potentially good.23 Jack can be forgiven for his pettiness, 
for example, on the assumption that he will make sincere efforts at changing for the better, and 
the faith that he will eventually become a better person or see the light. But Glory’s love isn’t 
like this. Again, this is not because she thinks Jack is hopeless, but because she just does not 
                                                      
21 This is not to say that her disposition toward him is simply one of sanguine patience. She does get angry with him 
for particular things that he does – for example, she is initially furious at him for nearly killing himself in the 
episode she is helping him clean up from. But for other offenses that do not involve her, but which she does 
recognize as genuine moral failings, she does not take herself to have authority to forgive Jack – some of these are 
things that only the particular person he wronged (for example, his wife) would have authority to forgive him for.   
 
22 Home, 104. 
 
23 See Ryan Preston-Roedder, “Faith in Humanity”. In Home, such faith is expressed by another character (Lila) as a 
way of thinking about Jack: she suggests that God’s grace is a matter of understanding that everyone can change for 
the better. Perhaps as a way of answering whether this is what explains Glory’s affection, Jack immediately go off 
the rails once again, drinking himself into oblivion.  
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conceive of their relationship as one in which she has the standing either to forgive him, or see 
him as an inchoate version of the better person he will eventually become.  
Her love then, is not best understood on the model of forgiveness. But another plausible 
explanation of her love would focus on the value of her relationship with Jack, and not Jack 
himself.24 After all, Jack is her brother, and this can be enough to make sense of one’s love 
persisting in ways largely insensitive to the excellence of the beloved, given the value of one’s 
shared history or relationship. But while this form of love is no doubt genuine and valuable, it 
does not seem to fully capture Glory’s affection. Glory has other siblings, whom she all loves as 
her siblings. But upon reflecting on her affection for Jack, she notices certain striking differences 
that reaffirm the puzzle she faces. She contrasts her attitudes toward all three of her brothers to 
her love of her “irksomely mature and responsible” sisters, and also notes that, “fond as she was 
of [her two other brothers], it was hard to remember that they had ever seemed marvelous to her” 
in the way that Jack did, and does.25  
Perhaps it is in this last observation that we can find a goodness-centric explanation of 
Glory’s love, after all. While Jack’s character is composed out of various bad qualities that Glory 
can plainly see, when she assesses Jack as a whole, he achieves a kind of value that those bad 
qualities do not have on their own, nor the value they would have if simply added together. 
Jack’s cowardliness, meanness, and vanity are bad qualities – but we should not assume that the 
goodness of Jack is something that can be determined by adding up the value of these parts. As 
                                                      
24 Cf. Niko Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship”. 
 
25 Home, 71. The particularity of her love for Jack also doesn’t seem to be explicable by, for example, a universal 
love for humanity, and Jack as the person that she happens to direct her love toward in light of this more general 
love. But the question of what justifies love’s particularity is a difficult one that I will not fully address here.  
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what G.E. Moore calls an “organic unity”, Jack is “marvelous” – and this is why Glory loves 
him.26 
Moore was no doubt right to emphasize the complexity of the relationship between the 
value of a whole and the value of its parts. And we do seem to think that some undoubtedly 
excellent people, are excellent in part because of some aspect of their characters that, on their 
own, are bad. Being short-tempered may be a bad trait, but when it partly forms the organic unity 
that is Nina Simone, we see it as a necessary part of an overall excellent being.  
But while it is true that we do not, for example, determine the value of a piece of music 
or an excellent meal or a person by adding up the value of their constitutive parts, this answer 
only gets us so far. First, it leaves open the question of how it can be possible that some 
genuinely bad aspect of a person could enhance him in such a way that makes him overall, more 
lovable. Second, we might wonder what to do in cases in which, taken as a whole, the person 
doesn’t add up to something that is actually marvelous. Perhaps Michael Jordan’s excellence is 
partly constituted by his arrogance, or Emma Woodhouse’s excellence partly constituted by her 
snobbery, or Margo Channing’s excellence partly constituted by her petulance; but what about 
somebody like Jack? It is far from clear that he is actually good, let alone marvelous, even 
though he seems to be. This is precisely where Glory finds herself puzzled. And when we take 
the sort of question we began with seriously, and consider those people in our own lives who 
may stand in as our Jack, this answer depends on a possibility that simply seems incredible. So 
the question remains. 
 Maybe the answer lies in simply allowing for some forms of love to transcend 
justification or rationalization. These forms are arational, like emotional glosses that one 
                                                      
26 Moore, Principia Ethica. 
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experiences, regardless of what one is presented with and regardless of whether one’s response is 
warranted. After all, love, some think, is blind. And grace understood by Judeo-Christian 
traditions is precisely God’s puzzling and perhaps arational undeserved and undeservable love. 
Perhaps we need to make peace with the idea that love in general, as Adams puts it, simply 
“outruns reason”.27 And maybe this is all there is to Glory’s love, in particular.  
But I believe that there is more to be said, at least about some cases of love. An answer is 
made available should we conceive of grace in a certain way: as both clear-eyed, and informed 
or enhanced by qualities that the lover simultaneously recognizes as bad. This answer helps 
illuminate both why a bad quality can make some excellent people seem even more excellent, 
and why we may be able to love those who are far from it.  
This proposal will sound mysterious so long as we are still limited by the goodness-
centric tradition, so accepting it involves putting certain constraints on that way of understanding 
the justificatory nature our attitudes. My suspicion is that what this tradition tends to eclipse is 
that there are a number of different, heterogeneous qualities of objects that render our emotions 
appropriately or inappropriately felt, which can enhance or diminish those emotions, and which 
are not identical or reducible to considerations of goodness and badness. In advancing this point, 
I am setting certain limits on the “broad claim”, voiced by Rosalind Hursthouse but implicitly 
accepted by others, that “the emotions involve ideas or images (or thoughts or perceptions) of 
good and evil, taking “good” and “evil” [or “value” and “disvalue”] in their most general, 
generic sense, as the formal objects of pursuit and avoidance.” 28 Unless we are to read this claim 
as stipulative, rather than substantive, we should reject it.  
                                                      
27 Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics, p. 173.  
 
28 On Virtue Ethics, p. 111. Hursthouse is responding to a point made by Bernard Williams. In “Morality and the 
Emotions”, Williams suggests that the reason why relatively little attention is paid to the emotions in the moral 
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My ambition is not to propose an alternative, broad claim in response – this risks 
violating the spirit of a proposal meant to emphasize the heterogeneity of ways in which our 
attitudes may be justified. Rather, by focusing on particular emotions, we find that those attitudes 
are responsive not to goodness and badness, but to other evaluative qualities of their objects. 
Here, I shall focus only on grace, and propose one possible explanation for why grace, in 
particular, can be appropriately felt without being grounded in or informed by the goodness of its 
object. Grace is sensitive to aspects of a person that, though they may be bad, are nonetheless 
distinctively human. Grace is perhaps best understood as a love for human nature, and 
expressions of that nature. One might initially characterize grace as a love for humanity, but 
importantly, it is distinct from the ideas attached to that expression such as the thought that 
human beings are infinitely or incomparably valuable, or the thought that particular actions must 
be taken in order to secure or respect their value. Moreover, it is not love for one particular 
feature of our nature such as our rationality, or our capacity to set ends, or some abstract 
metaphysical mark of humanity. Rather, it is a love for the distinctive, concrete or phenomenal 
ways in which human nature exhibits itself in a person’s character and behaviour – including the 
bad ways. 
This proposal, I hope, illuminates grace as something more familiar, and more familiarly 
experienced and expressed. Take for example, Angel Clare’s first experience of Tess 
Durbeyfield’s beauty:  
                                                                                                                                                                              
philosophy of the time (1965), is because of an overly narrow concentration on highly general moral language such 
as the language of “good” and “right”. He writes that such a focus “[helps] to push the emotions out of the picture. If 
you aim to state the most general characteristics and connexions of moral language, you will find not much to say 
about the emotions; because there are few, if any, highly general connexions between the emotions and moral 
language,” (p. 208). He is not thereby endorsing, for example, non-cognitivism about the emotions – he clarifies that 
“there [is] no basic reason why a generous approach to the linguistic endeavor (i.e. richer, more specific evaluative 
language) should not have embraced those features of our speech about morality that reveal the parts played by the 
emotions,” (p. 207). Hursthouse, in response, is suggesting that such highly general connections do exist; like 
Williams, I am skeptical. 
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He had never before seen a woman’s lips and teeth which forced upon his mind with such 
persistent iteration the old Elizabethan simile of roses filled with snow. 
Perfect, he, as a lover, might have called them off-hand. But no — they were not perfect. And it 
was the touch of the imperfect upon the would-be perfect that gave the sweetness, because it was 
that which gave the humanity.29 
 
Or – for a more contemporary example – take comedian Ellie Kemper’s answer when asked what 
her favourite joke is:  
 
…Anytime anyone's umbrella turns inside out on a rainy, windy day — I can't stop laughing. It's 
like, who are we kidding? We're all just helpless babes in the face of nature. And we all just look 
so dumb.30 
 
While of course, neither a less than perfect smile nor a person’s inability to keep her umbrella 
inside in on a rainy, windy day, are aspects of a human being that are bad, the general sentiment 
expressed by both of these thoughts can be extended to things that more plausibly are.  
Return to Jack: he’s a drunk, a thief, a coward, a liar, a rake; he’s vain, and sometimes 
malicious, seemingly just for the sake of being so. While these are all flaws in a person’s 
character, they are distinctively or characteristically human flaws. Other contenders for 
characteristically human flaws might include such things as laziness, vanity, brattiness, and 
particularly human ways of being stupid. Grace does not try to re-conceptualize these qualities as 
good, or as better than they are commonly thought to be  – it rightly takes those that are bad as 
bad, but nonetheless also as the potential grounds for, or even enhancements of, its existence.31  
                                                      
29 Tess of the D’Ubervilles, p. 119, my emphasis. 
 
30 Fitz-Gerald, “61 Comedians Recall Their Favorite, First, and Life-Changing Jokes”. 
 
31 In suggesting that aspects of human nature are what can “rationalize” grace, or render it appropriate, I do not mean 
to endorse the stronger thought that such aspects rationally obligate love. As Adams puts this point, “It is a prejudice 
to be avoided that reasons that tend to justify a belief or action or attitude, in the sense of vindicating its rationality, 
must also tend to compel it, in the sense of rendering it irrational to abstain from it,” (Finite and Infinite Goods, p. 
163). A person who did not experience the attitude of grace toward a manifestation of human nature is not being 
irrational, but he may be being ungracious.  
 
 20 
This provides us with one way to understand Glory’s particular affection for Jack. While 
their brother Teddy is, by all accounts, a much better person than Jack is, and though Glory loves 
both Teddy and Jack equally as her brothers, Teddy does not inspire the same sort of love that 
she has for Jack who – though worse – more fully exemplifies the full range of human nature.32 
This proposal can also explain why people who, perhaps unlike Jack, are excellent, can be more 
lovable to us precisely because of their flaws. Why is it that Tess Durbeyfield’s overall beauty is 
made “sweeter” by an imperfection, or that one’s love for Nina Simone partly depends on her 
extreme and chaotic temper? On a goodness-centric approach to our attitudes, we may be 
tempted to revise our evaluative standards to make sense of these attitudes: such patterns in our 
affections suggest that these “flaws” are not really so, or that we do not really believe them to be 
so. Perhaps the lesson is that we need to recognize that there are legitimate standards and 
perspectives from which these aspects are genuine goods.  
While it is true that we should be skeptical of our evaluative standards, and that we 
should also be flexible and pluralistic in our considerations of value, the understanding of grace I 
propose supplements such standards. It allows that some flaws – even when they are genuine 
flaws – can humanize their possessors in a way that can endear us to them: it reveals to us that 
they are not actually angels, or (for different reasons) machines, but just particularly excellent 
human beings. 
Another way to further illuminate both the structure and the phenomenology of grace is 
to turn our attention to a set of attitudes that share the basic features that render grace puzzling, 
but with an added complication. These attitudes are particularly puzzling within a goodness-
centric tradition because at a certain level of abstraction, such attitudes can be understood as a 
                                                      
32 In discussing their very good brother, Glory remarks, “Teddy’s all right. He means well”, to which Jack replies, 
“Despite his virtues and accomplishments”. Glory considers this: “Yes, in a way that’s true”. (Home, p. 124).   
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love of badness for badness’s sake.33 I will here focus only on aesthetic examples of such 
attitudes, and common names for this sort of love is a love of kitsch, or camp – or more plainly, a 
knowing love of the tacky or the cheesy.  
One response to such attitudes is to think that if they are coherent, it is because they are 
not actually attitudes of sincere affection or love. They are instead the result of a cynical and 
arrogant sort of meanness – a desire to seek out the bad that involves taking pleasure in the 
failures of others in a condescending, petty way. Maybe this is how we should understand those 
who enjoy watching films like Showgirls or Battlefield Earth, or who delight in sincere 
expressions of trite clichés: I love you but I’m not in love with you; I thought I was there to teach 
the students, but soon realized that they were teaching me. On this interpretation, people who 
enjoy such things are tickled by the thought that those involved in the production of these 
enterprises and expressions had no idea they were creating something so awful, indulging in the 
kind of smug satisfaction one might get from watching other people make fools of themselves. 
This sort of attitude ridicules not just the creator, but looks sideways as well: it indulges in the 
thought that other people are being duped.  
This worry is illuminating, and it provides us with a legitimate explanation for why some 
people do desire to engage with badness for badness’ sake. But it is not the only explanation: 
grace makes another available to us. On one standard understanding, kitsch and camp appeal 
because such objects or performances are a presentation of something that produces reactions in 
us that are simulacra of a real emotional engagement with something actually beautiful, or good. 
                                                      
33 There has been relatively little philosophical discussion of such cases, perhaps because they are difficult to make 
intelligible within standard philosophical understandings of action and psychology. David Sussman is one 
exception: in “For Badness’ Sake” he discusses theses cases, arguing that such actions are in an important sense 
unintelligible, and that we have good reason to avoid their performance because of this. I do not think that they are 
unintelligible, and that even if they were, this alone would not be a reason to refrain from performing them. In Value 
in Ethics and Economics, Elizabeth Anderson also considers the idea that a person could knowingly enjoy kitschy 
art, but suggests that it is because attitudes of liking are arational.  
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The huge, pleading eyes of a Margaret Keane portrait, the schmaltziness of a pop song, or the 
mawkishness of a cliché tug at one’s emotions, not by way of presenting anything beautiful or 
good to the viewer, but by way of hijacking one’s weaknesses.34  
This illusory quality is one reason why some disparage kitsch – not simply for being bad, 
but for being manipulative. It tricks us in predictable ways by taking advantage of our shared 
aesthetic frailties. This is why it is often seen as “art” for the masses; for the lowest common 
denominator. However, in taking up a particular sort of stance toward kitsch and camp, one can 
realize that one is being deceived by such objects without thereby losing one’s affection for such 
things, or reacting with disdain for their creators, or condescension toward others. In doing so, 
one may be recognizing and acknowledging in herself a genuine affection for something, without 
at the same time endorsing or reinterpreting this affection as directed toward anything good. If 
she is mocking the object of her affection, its creator, or others who would enjoy it, she is 
mocking herself as well; it is delight paired with acknowledgment and love for the parts of our 
shared natures that are implicated in the deception. In other words, a knowing love of the bad in 
such cases need not always be the result of condescending elitist irony, but grace.35  
Finally, given this understanding of grace, we can see that it does have justificatory 
standards, and so, limits. It is unfitting or impossible to experience it toward beings that are 
distinctively inhuman, though they may be members of our biological species. Consider how 
Helen Prejean – the woman at the center of the book and film Dead Man Walking – characterizes 
                                                      
34 As Roger Scruton has put this point, “Kitsch is fake art, expressing fake emotions, whose purpose is to deceive the 
consumer into thinking he feels something deep and serious, when in fact he feels nothing at all.” Scruton probably 
does not mean that the consumer feels nothing, but instead, that what he does feel is an illusion of something else. 
See Scruton, "A Point of View: The strangely enduring power of kitsch". 
 
35 In “Notes on Camp”, Susan Sontag writes: “Camp is generous. It wants to enjoy. It only seems like malice, 
cynicism. (Or, if it is cynicism, it's not a ruthless but a sweet cynicism)… Camp taste is a kind of love, love for 
human nature,” (291-292). I hope that my discussion here further illuminates Sontag’s proposal. Thank you to 
Benjamin Bagley for encouraging me to clarify my thoughts about such cases. 
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her first visit to death row inmate, Patrick Sonnier. Prejean knows ahead of time that Sonnier has 
been convicted for the murder of a teenaged couple, and though she does not believe that he 
should be sentenced to death because she thinks it always unjust to do so, she does not doubt that 
he was indeed, responsible for this terrible crime. She writes of the encounter: “I am meeting him 
in a crucible, and I am surprised by how human, even likable, he is. Despite his friendly letters I 
had half expected Charles Manson – brutish, self-absorbed, paranoid, incapable of normal human 
encounter”.36 While it is difficult to know how and where to draw the boundary between the 
human and the inhuman37, we may nonetheless have a sense of what Prejean means when she 
draws a contrast between somebody who is recognizably human with a biological human being 
whose mind is so deranged or scrambled that we are not really able to understand him as having 
a human character with character traits, good or bad.38  
 
III. GRACIOUSNESS 
 
 Given this understanding of grace, we can now explore in more detail why it can be a 
good attitude for a person to exhibit, and why graciousness is a virtue. For some, it may be 
obvious why it is admirable to treat people better than they deserve, or to benefit others more 
than is merited. But why might this be so? Moreover, what is added to our understanding of 
grace if we see it as responsive to human nature, rather than simply that aspect of all forms of 
genuine love that outruns reason? These are two features of grace that can be discussed 
separately in light of understanding graciousness as a virtue: its content (that it is directed toward 
                                                      
36 Dead Man Walking, p. 31.  
 
37 I will say more about this distinction in chapter 3.  
 
38 Aristotle, too, seems to make this sort of distinction when he discusses the category of the “beastly”, or the 
“brutish” in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, suggesting that while brutish states are “less grave than vice”, 
they are “more frightening” (NE1150a37). 
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human nature) and its form (that it is a knowing love of the bad). Both aspects will help to 
illuminate why graciousness is desirable, as well as why, like other virtues, it is a corrective to 
certain natural tendencies.39  
 
Loving Human Nature 
Grace has two features that render it among some of the most desirable forms of love. 
Consider again Glory’s love for Jack. First, not only does Glory love Jack in the sense that she 
cares about his wellbeing, as well as in the way that siblings love one another as siblings, she 
also likes him. She is interested in his character in a holistic way that takes into account aspects 
of himself that are truly his, though truly bad. Second, her love is attentive and realistic about the 
kind of person Jack really is. It doesn’t mask, reinvent, or try to justify or excuse.  
While some might be satisfied with, or positively want forms of love that lack this second 
aspect, those of a more critical and self-reflective bent may find themselves in need of something 
else, as well.40 Jack falls into this latter group. He feels uneasy around his father, even when his 
father is affectionate toward him, precisely because he knows that such warm feelings are based 
on an inaccurate or incomplete understanding of what he is like. When others’ assessments of 
him are out of step with his own understanding of himself in this way, he experiences an 
isolating disorientation.41 In contrast, Glory can reflect and speak truthfully about Jack, but 
without the hostile attitudes that have made the truth so painful to him, and others. Because it 
both discerns his faults, and loves them as aspects of his character, Glory’s love is one that is 
                                                      
39 As suggested by Philippa Foot in, “Virtues and Vices”.  
 
40 Of course, it also depends on who the lover is, and what sort of love is in question: one might positively want, for 
example, one’s parents to always see the best in her, but not want this sort of love from her friends. 
 
41 For example, Jack rejects Glory’s attempts to excuse his past behaviour because of his youth: “No I wasn’t young. 
I don’t believe I ever was young. Excuses scare me, Glory. They make me feel like I’m losing hold” (p. 154).  
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directed toward Jack as he actually is in his entirety. And because of this, Jack can trust her love 
in a way that he finds unable to trust the love of others. In letting down his guard, he is given the 
rare chance to connect with another person who truly sees him as he is. This is one sense in 
which this kind of grace is analogous to its theological counterpart: it saves.  
Given the content of grace, graciousness has important connections with other virtues, as 
well. Above, I suggested that grace is different from forgiveness because it presumes no 
authority over its object. Indeed, grace can be inhibited by a tendency to hold oneself in a higher 
regard than the beloved – to “love” the flaws of others, either as an expression of one’s will to 
power, or in the condescending way in which one might “love” something that really, one simply 
pities or finds ridiculous. To counteract this tendency, a fully gracious person is likely to be 
disposed to direct her attitude not only toward others, but toward herself as well. Her affection 
for human foibles and shortcomings can be paired with, and enhanced by, an awareness of her 
own comparable flaws: her delight, for example, with a person’s clumsiness is inextricably 
paired with a recognition of her own. She acknowledges that she is, after all, a human being as 
well.  
This allows her to avoid the vices of condescension, arrogance, or self-righteousness. She 
instead manifests solidarity with other human beings in light of their shared nature – including 
the nastier and stupider bits of that nature. A gracious person does not think that the bad qualities 
of human beings are necessarily things to be simply rectified or eliminated; she does not suffer 
from the kind of hatred or loathing that some might experience when reflecting on or 
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encountering aspects of human nature that can be confining, or frustrating, or regrettable. She 
avoids, in short, the vice of misanthropy. 42  
Moreover, because the fully gracious person is able and willing to recognize and love her 
own flaws as well as the flaws of others, she exhibits a form of self-esteem that doesn’t depend 
on ignoring or being blind to her own faults. Having recognized their existence and nonetheless 
being able to love herself in a way that is informed by that recognition, she isn’t easily 
embarrassed or ashamed when those flaws are made apparent or manifest in her behaviour, 
though not because she has found a way of convincing herself that they are really not so bad, 
after all.43 Harry Frankfurt, in discussing the importance of “taking oneself seriously” by loving 
what one values wholeheartedly, he considers whether we can, after all, take ourselves too 
seriously. The advice he offers at the conclusion of his book: take yourself seriously, but if you 
cannot – “at least be sure to hang on to your sense of humor”.44 But a sense of humour – about 
oneself and about human nature, more generally – is no consolation prize, one to be relied upon 
when, desperately trying to close his umbrella on a rainy day, a person finds that he cannot live 
up to the demands of self-seriousness. It is good and worth aspiring to in its own right.  
                                                      
42 In a discussion on the defensibility of “speciesism”, Bernard Williams mentions misanthropy as one explanation 
for the philosophical motivation of always holding human beings to the justificatory standards of some “higher 
court”. He writes in “The Human Prejudice”: 
 
When the hope is to improve humanity to the point at which every aspect of its hold on the world can be 
justified before a higher court, the result is likely to be either self-deception, if you think you have 
succeeded, or self-hatred and self-contempt when you recognise that you will always fail. The self-hatred, 
in this case, is a hatred of humanity. (p. 152) 
 
43 There is a memorable scene from the recent film Silver Linings Playbook that illustrates the kind of confidence or 
self-esteem I have in mind, in which Tiffany rebukes Pat for a number of reasons (including calling her a “slut”), 
forcefully telling him, “There will always be a part of me that is dirty and sloppy, but I like that, just like all the 
other parts of myself”. It is also the sort of self-esteem that Dorothy Parker exhibits in the poem with which I began 
this dissertation.  
 
44 In The Reasons of Love, Frankfurt denies the importance of knowledge in love: on his picture, love is just a 
wholehearted endorsement of whatever it is that one finds one can love. Such a picture cannot capture what I think 
is distinctive about Glory’s love for Jack. 
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Knowingly Loving the Bad 
Having explored one aspect of grace – that it is a love of human nature – let’s now turn to 
another – that it is a knowing love of the bad. Though knowingly loving the bad – any bad – is 
often taken to be a sign of a familiar sort of weakness, it can in fact take a concerted effort to 
experience, and maintain. There are three sorts of natural impulses that the gracious person 
would need to resist. First, there is a sense in which she would, after all, be justified in turning 
away from or hating aspects of herself or others that she thinks of as bad. Second, should she 
find that her affection of the beloved is stable she must also resist recasting the object of her 
attitude in a more positive light. And the third would be to strive to improve the object to better 
match one’s desires and positive emotions. It is these different impulses that account for the 
vacillation in Jack’s father’s attitudes: either he can only lament the flaws that he plainly sees in 
his son, or he loves in a way that is blind to them.  
To illuminate the virtues connected with an ability to resist these impulses, it will be 
helpful to discuss more generally the sorts of virtues that are exhibited by those who knowingly 
love the bad, more generally. To guide this discussion, consider the following example: 
David Chang is founder and former chef of (among others) Momofuku Ko, a restaurant 
that was awarded two Michelin stars in 2008. Like many very excellent chefs, Chang is often 
asked what his own diet is like. In a number of interviews in which this question comes up, his 
response is consistent: fried chicken fingers. Are these good fried chicken fingers? No, he 
ensures us, he is not so discriminating: “Any processed chicken from any place—I'll order it in a 
heartbeat”.45  
                                                      
45 For an extended profile of Chang that illustrates (among other things) the aspects of his personality I am isolating 
here, see Larissa MacFarquhar’s “Chef on the Edge” in The New Yorker. 
 28 
I begin with the simple observation that I, at least, find there to be something 
immediately charming or likeable about Chang, given this bit of information about his appetites, 
as well as certain background assumptions about his character. These assumptions include first, 
that he possesses knowledge about what kinds of food are really truly good and excellent along 
the many dimensions that are relevant to evaluating food. Second, that given his skill and his 
resources, he would be able to pursue those foods should he desire them. But, third, that in spite 
of this knowledge and capability he desires to eat food that he recognizes is not good: food that 
isn’t good for him, is crude and bland, or garish, in flavor, and is (given exactly what goes into 
creating fried chicken fingers at most fast food places) even morally dubious. And he desires 
such things intrinsically: that is, for their own sake and not because they just happen to be cheap 
and easy to obtain. 
Notice that we might react differently to somebody who didn’t possess the relevant sort 
of evaluative knowledge: someone who desires fried chicken fingers because he hasn’t had the 
opportunity to or the interest in discovering food of better quality and taste, who believes that 
fried chicken fingers from any fast food place simply are good, or who simply doesn’t truck in 
the evaluation of food. We would also react differently to somebody who, though possessing the 
relevant knowledge but lacking intrinsic desires for chicken fingers, desires to eat them in certain 
circumstances only out of convenience or because of a lack of resources or ability to obtain 
something better instead. Perhaps in these sorts of cases, we might withhold judgment entirely, 
or our judgment will be sensitive to the considerations about how one’s perspective arose.  
And importantly, at least some of us would react differently to a person who possesses 
the relevant evaluative knowledge and resources, but whose desires are, unlike Chang’s, fully “in 
line” with that knowledge: a person who has no intrinsic appetite at all for anything that isn’t 
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good. In another interview, another excellent chef is asked whether or not she has ever tried an 
“Oreo, Twinkie, or gummy bear” just to see why it is that so many North Americans love these 
sorts of things, in spite of their obvious vices. She responds, “Oh, I have tried it. I mean I 
certainly tried it as a teenager. I have eaten at McDonald's once… I was surprised it didn’t have 
taste from my point of view — and, well, I was in and out in five minutes”.46 In contrast to this 
person who – at least in this interview – seems distant or detached, Chang seems decidedly 
likeable or relatable.  
These observations alone are not all that illuminating when it comes to the question of 
what could be substantively good about a person who knowingly desires the bad, and what may 
be bad about a person who always prefers the good to the bad. But I think that these initial 
reactions are indicative of our recognition of deeper and more widely recognized virtues 
possessed by those who knowingly desire or prefer the bad to the good.   
Take into consideration again how it is that a person might achieve more constancy 
between her evaluative beliefs and her desires. As suggested, there seem to be three ways for one 
to go about doing this. The first would be to change one’s evaluative beliefs to better match one’s 
desires. The second would be to try to change one’s desires to better match one’s beliefs. And the 
third would be to strive to change the object to better match one’s desires and positive emotions. 
The first approach risks taking too seriously that one’s own desires or felt positive 
attitudes have a kind of authority over the value of something. To illustrate, consider an example 
provided by Simon Blackburn, in discussing the various ways in which we can interpret a person 
such that her evaluative beliefs are consistent with her desires. He asks us to imagine a person 
who no longer experiences pleasure in drinking wine, but who nonetheless declares that a 
particular bottle is “good”. Blackburn suggests that given that she has no interest in actually 
                                                      
46 "Alice Waters on Talk to Al Jazeera." edited by David Shuster: Al Jazeera America, 2013. 
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drinking it, she cannot be sincerely judging that the wine is actually good. According to this 
person, Blackburn suggests, the wine “once merited” such a judgment, but no longer does, 
because it is no longer something that she enjoys.47 
But it seems that a sincere judgment of goodness should not be used simply as a way of 
reporting what one happens to enjoy, or desire. This isn’t a semantic point, nor is it one that 
engages directly with the expressivism that leads to Blackburn’s comments here. Rather, it’s an 
ethical one: to use “good” in the way that Blackburn suggests is intelligible, and indeed, in some 
contexts, we do sincerely mean to just report what it is that we’d desire or prefer. But depending 
on the context, it places too much epistemic authority on one’s own subjective preferences as 
determining, or as evidence of, the positive qualities of a thing. And when a person places too 
much emphasis on her own preferences or desires, it can be a sign of evaluative arrogance. The 
issue here isn’t simply a matter of unjustifiably assuming that one has a kind of authority that 
one doesn’t: even those who are experts about some domain, and who are justified in taking their 
judgments more seriously than the judgments of non-experts, would do well to consult 
something other than their own tastes when determining whether or not a given item within that 
domain is really good.48  
                                                      
47 Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 60. Unlike more extreme 
versions of non-cognitivism, Blackburn does not think that it is impossible for one’s beliefs about goodness and 
one’s “pro-attitudes” to diverge from one another, but he does think that these cases will necessarily be “out of 
joint” – that is, unusual enough to make us suspicious about their status. Indeed, it is important to his expressivism 
that this be the case. However, though such people might be unusual, this is not because they are impossible or in 
any way ethically suspicious.  
 
48 In “Goodness and Choice”, Philippa Foot argues against Hare’s prescriptivism by emphasizing how unusual it is 
to actually be in the sort of position where one’s choice at all determines the goodness of the thing in question. As 
she puts the point, to determine whether x is a good x is typically a matter of discernment and awareness of the 
standards relevant to assessing x’s. I am largely in agreement with her arguments there, and simply want to add that 
it may be a sign of arrogance should one fail to rely on such standards in one’s determination of the value of a thing. 
Foot, “Goodness and Choice,” in Virtues and Vices: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
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Consider then, the other way in which a person might attempt to eliminate his desires or 
affection for the known bad. Rather than re-assessing the quality of such things, he will try to 
modify his attitudes in light of his realization that they are directed toward things that are bad. 
However, depending on his motivations in doing this, he may exhibit another set of vices.  
To illustrate, bring into mind what it is like to realize that something that you happen to 
sincerely enjoy really is pretty awful. Perhaps this is a particular song on the radio, or a 
television show, or (like with Chang) certain kinds of food. Now, one might try to refine one’s 
tastes such that these things no longer appeal, and what does appeal now are only good or 
excellent music, reading material, and food. Or one would try to imagine up a certain perspective 
from which such a thing really is good, after all. But why would a person do either of these 
things? Why is she so concerned to only love the good, and to hate the bad? Is she unable to live 
with the idea that her motivations are not so pure? Is the possibility of this something that she is 
ashamed of, or embarrassed to discover in herself? Is she fixated on being immune from 
criticism? If any of these motivations ring true, then we should again remind ourselves of the 
comparative authenticity and self-esteem of her counterpart, who is able to simply enjoy what he 
enjoys, while simultaneously acknowledging that such things may very well be pretty lousy. 
Now of course, sometimes it doesn’t take effort to love the good rather than the bad. 
Sometimes loving the good and hating the bad can come quite easily – one begins to eat better 
food because she enjoys it, and eventually she just finds that she no longer enjoys what she once 
loved. So take into consideration a person whose positive motivational and emotional responses 
are wholly for goodness, not because she has actively cultivated these attitudes, but because it 
has just come naturally to her to love the good and hate the bad.  
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Imagine again Chang’s counterpart, this time considering that her distaste for “it” (that is, 
Oreos, Twinkies, gummy bears and McDonald’s) comes to her naturally. While we might 
appreciate and admire the knowledge and skill of this person – just as we admire Chang for his – 
some of us, at least, might notice that our responses toward the two differ beyond this 
admiration. Even though we might agree with this second chef that gummy bears and Twinkies 
truly are bad forms of food, and though we might be in awe not simply of her self-control (since 
she does not enjoy these things at all), but her wholehearted appetites for the good, the 
admiration or esteem that we might feel for her may be noticeably absent of the affection or 
warmth that we feel toward someone like Chang.  
Consider too, that the more dimensions along which a person loves only the good and 
hates the bad, the more distant she may become, and the less affection she may inspire. Imagine 
a person who has excellent taste in music but who cannot bear sitting through drunken karaoke at 
the bar, or a person who has excellent taste in movies but cannot stand any that are stupid or 
banal. Even though we might agree with the evaluative judgments that this person makes, we 
might also – if we’re at all inclined to be friends with her, which we might not be – want to 
encourage her to lighten up or take herself less seriously. Such a person is concerned with 
goodness in a way that can inhibit one’s affection of or attraction to her. She may be rigid, 
inflexible, uptight, or stodgy (at least in American English).  
Now, along with these two psychological tendencies, there is another aspect of our 
evaluative lives that can make it difficult to experience grace that is worth mentioning. 
Recognizing this aspect will reinforce this last point about friendship, as well as bring into view 
the third strategy one could adopt in order to achieve a more harmonious psychology: the 
strategy of, when possible, improving the objects of our affection so that they may become good 
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in a way that matches our love. And here, I want to discuss not just a less than gracious response 
to the world, but a tendency one can find in moral philosophy.  
When we engage in moral philosophy, or philosophical ethics more generally, we often 
assume what already amounts to something like a prescriptive mood. We look for what sorts of 
things a person ought to do, and how they ought to be. How, as legislators, ought we legislate? 
How, as members of a moral community, do we think our fellow members ought to conduct 
themselves? And even when we are less obviously prescriptive, our thoughts about one another 
can nonetheless be informed by considerations that encourage a similar stance. When 
considering what the virtues are, for example, we are often asked to wonder what sorts of 
qualities we would want our children to have. This gets us in the prescriptive mood once again, 
given that it is a guiding, if not constitutive goal of parents to raise their children to be good, for 
their children’s own sake as well as for the sake of those who form one’s community. 49  
The sort of attitude that I am discussing here is one that can get easily overshadowed by 
those we take on when we reflect from these more prescriptive perspectives. One response to this 
tendency to moralize in moral philosophy is to think that we should do away with evaluative 
evaluation, entirely. But I think that this would be a mistake – it would encourage us to be less 
sensitive to important features about one another and ourselves that are good to be aware of, 
even when we aren’t in the business of moralizing about them.  
An alternative perspective that we often occupy, and which better encourages the attitude 
I’ve described, is perhaps best illustrated – for several reasons – by turning our attention away 
from reflecting on the qualities we’d want our fellow citizens, community members, or children 
to have, toward reflection about what sorts of characters we would want our friends to have. Our 
                                                      
49 It might be this that makes it difficult for Jack’s father to experience grace toward him: he occupies a particular 
sort of role that Glory does not – as his parent it was his responsibility to raise a good child.  
 
 34 
friends are beings whom we love, whom we love as our equals, but whom we need to view in a 
way that puts limits on what genuinely well-intentioned actions and thoughts done and had for 
their sake, or for the sake of others, could be appropriate. 
In a recent article, Benjamin Bagley has made a point that is similar to what I am 
suggesting here. In objecting to the idea that we can understand love as just a blanket desire for 
another’s wellbeing, he writes,  
I care about my close friends, and would do a lot for them if they asked me (and in some cases 
even if they didn’t). But there are a lot of helpful things I could do for my friends that I feel 
absolutely no desire to do: their laundry, for instance, or their grocery shopping. It’s not that such 
desires are overridden by others, or that my friends would find it off-putting if I acted on them… 
It’s rather these sorts of things just aren’t what friendship is about.50 
 
The basic thought here – that friendship just isn’t centrally about helping one’s friends do well – 
is one that I think should be extended to the characters of one’s friends, as well. I’d neither 
expect nor want my friends to do my laundry or buy my groceries, and when it comes to the bad 
aspects of my character – though I prefer that they be well aware of those aspects – they would 
be right to set limits on their willingness to do my chores as well.  
This suggests that it is important for us to supplement, or limit, ways of thinking and 
evaluating that are more imperatively-minded, at least when we are just in the everyday business 
of having certain sorts of relationships with one another. We need to allow ourselves and others 
the space from which we might better be able to appreciate, and not just monitor, hope to 
improve upon, or even police the characters of others, even when genuinely for their sake. This 
need not indicate a failure in one’s love – instead, it may be a manifestation of it.  
 
 
                                                      
50 Bagley, “Loving Someone in Particular” p. 482. Bagley’s article discusses the puzzle about love that I have not 
tried to handle here: that of how we can be justified in loving one person in particular.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 I’ve argued that there are virtues to knowingly loving the bad, including at least one way 
of understanding the virtue of graciousness. But one might justifiably wonder whether there are 
limits to what could count as an exhibition of these virtues, given just how bad some people can 
be. Are there examples of people or qualities of character that are just so terrible that love of 
those people or those qualities would not underwritten by virtue, but something else? It is instead 
a question about the limits of grace, itself. Perhaps Glory’s love for Jack is something 
commendable or admirable, but what if Jack were considerably worse than what he is actually 
like? Would we not begin to wonder whether she is, after all, projecting something where there is 
nothing, or being insensitive to just how bad he is?  
 Related to this question, there is of course the important practical question of what to do 
with such people. If Jack’s “streak of malice” were, for example, directed toward Glory, 
presumably this would give her a salient reason to give up continuing in her relationship with 
him. The problem becomes more serious when we think of the ways in which people are 
seriously harmed and wronged by those whom they love. Does it follow from concluding that 
graciousness is a virtue that it is a good and sane thing for people to put up with or endure those 
who seriously abuse them, or others?  
Two minor suggestions is that graciousness, like all virtues, may have vices of deficiency 
and excess, and must be balanced with others, including prudence and self-respect. But these are 
rather flimsy points: it is a good question how far the limits of grace itself might go. I don’t here 
have an answer. But in wondering about this, we might, as a starting point, return again to the 
example of Helen Prejean, and her love of Patrick Sonnier. This is, undoubtedly, a difficult sort 
of case to use as a guide, given what Prejean knows about Sonnier, and given that Prejean is 
working within a theological background that is not widely shared. We may be tempted to see 
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her love for Sonnier simply as the sort of love that doesn’t focus on his particular character, but 
rather, on him as simply the human being who happened to cross her path and who is equally 
deserving of a kind of universal love.  
But we might try to imagine that instead, she loves Sonnier in a way that is informed by 
what he is like – having met him, and having found that though he is bad, his badness is 
nonetheless a kind of human badness. And in considering our reactions to her love, we might 
remind ourselves about what graciousness is like, and what its connections to other virtues are. 
We might consider what exactly it is about ourselves that makes it difficult for us to love such a 
person, and look again. It may be helpful to remind ourselves that love is not inconsistent with 
thinking that the beloved deserves to be punished for the bad things that he does; and that 
reactive attitudes of anger and blame are appropriate and warranted with those we may in fact be 
closest to. Indeed, when I reflect on the aspects of my own character toward which my friends 
exhibit their graciousness, I find it most familiar that their reactions are a mix of both affection, 
and exasperation. There is no inconsistency or incoherence in this.  
And it also coherent to love a person even if one must extricate oneself from an ongoing 
relationship from her, or while allowing her to extricate herself. Perhaps this is why – as I 
suggested above – grace is perhaps most easily experienced from the perspective of friendship, 
rather than other relationships. These other relationships, such as the relationship between a 
parent and a child, or the relationship between romantic lovers or spouses, are characterized by a 
kind of active involvement with that need not define even the very excellent friendships. These 
other sorts of relationships involve moving forward together, and certain vices and bad 
tendencies are simply inimical to that kind of development. You cannot move forward with 
another if, for example, she is emotionally closed off, or because she consistently harms herself, 
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or others, or you. Of course, sometimes our friends are like our family, in which case the tension 
arises; but friends may love another without always having the same sort of involvement that 
other kinds of relationship call for.   
Given the kind of answers that I have provided to these worries, one might begin to 
wonder: what is the good of this form of love if one could feel it without having to do anything 
for the beloved? Why should one bother with it if it does not even demand that one continue on 
in an ongoing relationship with him, or that one must be centrally concerned with his wellbeing? 
Indeed, Robinson’s novel concludes with Jack leaving home once again, unable to involve 
himself in the life of his family any longer, thinner and wearier than before. From a certain 
perspective, one might think that Glory’s love made no difference.  
In light of these questions, perhaps it would be best to return to the larger discussion in 
which Murdoch provides her example of M and D, in the first place. There, Murdoch is not 
simply illustrating a particular kind of moral achievement. She is responding to a certain 
paradigm of ethical thought that she believes we should resist, or at least, place certain limits on. 
Such a paradigm, in focusing exclusively on action and public states of affairs, cannot 
accommodate the fact that M’s shift in perspective toward D is an important one, and that it is 
important even if it results in no difference in her outward behaviour toward D, and even if there 
is no way – either through death, or distance – for their relationship to continue.51 A shift in 
perspective and attitude toward another and the world may be entirely private, but no less 
profound because of this.  
 
 
                                                      
51 “Let us assume for purposes of the example that the mother, who is a very ‘correct’ person, behaves beautifully to 
the girl throughout, not allowing her real opinion to appear in any way. We might underline this aspect of the 
example by supposing that the young couple have emigrated or that D is now dead: the point being to ensure that 
whatever is in question as happening happens entirely in M’s mind” (p. 17). 
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3 
 
The Undesirable and the Adesirable 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last chapter, I argued that those who can knowingly love the bad – in particular, the 
badness of human beings – might be exhibiting the virtues of, among others, graciousness and a 
form of self-esteem. But one might wonder whether I’ve really shown that conclusion, because it 
seems to depend on a rejection of the thought that our desires, loves, and other positive attitudes 
can correctly aim at something that isn’t good at all. Surely there must be something good about 
an object that makes sense of our loving or desiring it – otherwise it is hard to see what could be 
different between these sorts of attitudes (which I’ve suggested can be intelligent responses to 
the qualities of an object), and a blind or compulsive attraction.  
 Indeed, persistent throughout philosophical history is the claim that we necessarily desire 
or intend in light of some goodness, apparent to us, in what we desire or intend. I will here refer 
to this as the guise of the good thesis. Not only is some version of the claim recognizable in the 
thought of figures such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Aquinas, Hobbes, Kant, and Sartre, 
it has recently re-emerged in contemporary philosophy, defended in some form by, among others, 
David Gauthier, Dennis Stampe, Warren Quinn, Barbara Herman, Christine Korsgaard, Thomas 
Scanlon, Sergio Tenenbaum, and Joseph Raz.52  
                                                      
52 David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). Dennis Stampe, “The Authority 
of Desire,” The Philosophical Review 96 (1987), 335–81. Warren Quinn. “Putting Rationality in Its Place,” in 
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A glance at these lists and one may be stuck by the ubiquity of the claim across 
philosophical outlooks that are otherwise vastly divergent. This might suggest to some that the 
thesis is undeniable – indeed, Donald Davidson once wrote that it has “an air of self-evidence”.53 
But, as with any sweeping philosophical claim, there are others who are just as certain of its 
falsity. Michael Stocker, for example, reports that the seeming pervasiveness of the claim that we 
only desire the believed good “affords [him] no pleasure, since that view… is clearly and simply 
false”.54 The rest of us may find ourselves wavering somewhere in between – perhaps sensing 
that there is something about the thesis that seems right, while also having some inkling that it 
seems altogether too neat. 
Much hangs on the issue, outside of showing the conceptual and psychological possibility 
of the sort of attitudes I described in my first chapter. The thesis sets limits on how to understand 
the phenomenon of akrasia, as well as cases in which people seem, perhaps perversely, 
motivated to do something because it would be bad to do. Moreover, many of those who endorse 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Warren Quinn (ed.), Morality and Action, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Barbara Herman, 
“Making Room for Character” in Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty, Stephen Engstrom 
& Jennifer Whiting (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of 
Normativity, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). Sergio Tenenbaum, Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the 
Nature of Practical Reason, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Desire, Practical Reason, and the 
Good, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 65–81. Joseph Raz, “The Guise of the Good,” in Tenenbaum 
(2010).  
 
53 Donald Davidson, “How is Weakness of Will Possible?” in Essays on Actions and Events. Davidson himself took 
it to be self-evident that we desire the believed good, and that this commitment is part of a standard denial of the 
possibility of akrasia.  
 
54 Michael Stocker, “Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology,” The Journal of Philosophy 76, 12, (1979) 
738–53, 739. Gary Watson, Peter Railton, and David Velleman, either explicitly argue against the thesis, or have 
developed views about the nature of human motivation that entail its denial. Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” The 
Journal of Philosophy 72, 8 (1975), 205–20. Peter Railton, “On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in 
Reasoning about Belief and Action,” in G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 53–79. Velleman, David, “The Guise of the Good,” Noûs 26, 1, (1992) 3–26.  
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the thesis do so because it serves as a premise in certain attractive theoretical projects.55 And as I 
will discuss, it gives rise to a certain way of understanding the justificatory nature of our 
motivational states, and our relationship to goodness as possessors of those states.  
But the terrain forward can be rough going. The seeming ubiquity of the thesis is partly 
explained by the fact that there are many ways to interpret it, each differing in content and 
plausibility. There is the growing sense that the trading of examples and counterexamples has 
been dissatisfying, or that the debate is best deflated. And there are methodological divisions that 
need to be kept in mind: at least some of those who defend the thesis see it as one piece of a Neo-
Aristotelian picture replete with natural goodness and teleology that many who deny it cannot 
stomach.   
In what follows, I shall outline a conciliatory alternative. Part of what is unsatisfying 
about a straightforward denial of the thesis is the nagging sense that cases in which there is 
nothing apparently good in what one purports to desire strike as involving not desire and action, 
but inclination, compulsion, or mechanism, instead. Proponents of the guise of the good thesis 
account for this difference by maintaining that the mental states that are intelligible as desires are 
sensitive to considerations about the desirability or undesirability of their objects, understood in a 
normative sense. Defenders of the guise of the good thesis are right to claim this but, as I’ll 
argue, the evaluative properties that they are sensitive to needn’t be identical to goodness and 
                                                      
55 Raz writes, and Tenenbaum concurs, that the guise of the good thesis is, “the keystone, keeping in place and 
bridging the theory of value, the theory of normativity and rationality, and the understanding of an intentional 
action” (2010, 134). It has also been used in some arguments to show the rationally obligatory nature of moral 
demands. And one might be attracted to the thesis’ potential role in establishing what some call the “unity of the 
normative”. For example, if desires “aim” at goodness in the same sense that beliefs “aim” at truth, then perhaps we 
will be able to reach some general normative principles that govern both beliefs and desires, and epistemology and 
ethics can be brought together under a broad “meta-normative” project. For a recent paper that relies on the 
parallelism of desire and belief as evidence for the truth of the guise of the good thesis, see Karl Schafer, 
"Perception and the Rational Force of Desire." I take the phrase “the unity of the normative” from “The Unity of the 
Normative” by T.M. Scanlon, who there expresses his hope that “the normative domain [consists] simply of truths 
about reasons, including reasons for actions and reasons for belief and other attitudes” (p. 443).  
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badness. Indeed, assuming this identity threatens to overlook the dimensions of an important, 
ethical evaluation – one to which our interpersonal reactions and attitudes are sensitive. 
We must distinguish between two substantive senses of desirable. One may be 
synonymous with the good or the apparently good, but the other simply refers to those things that 
human beings, given their nature, are able to desire. In drawing this distinction, we should resist 
the thought, encouraged by G.E. Moore, that there are only two senses of “desirable” available to 
us: one that refers to the good, and another that is purely descriptive, naming anything that we 
happen to find actual human beings striving for.56 There are normative constraints on what 
human beings can desire, constraints that are imposed by human nature – just as Neo-
Aristotelians suggest. But those constraints are not identical to considerations about apparent 
goodness. Our desires, I will argue, are under the guise of the naturally attractive, not the good. 
Likewise, the “undesirable” (that is, the bad) is not identical to what I will here call the 
adesirable: those things that cannot be the objects of human desire, at all. 
 
II. WHAT IS THE GUISE OF THE GOOD THESIS? 
 
Though many accept something like the basic thought that our intentions and desires are 
under a guise of goodness, it can be difficult to isolate a particular claim that is both plausible 
and substantive. Indeed, one might suspect that the alternative thesis that I will argue for – that 
human desires are under the guise of the naturally attractive – is either veering on truistic 
emptiness or is simply a slight variation of the thesis if distinct from it at all.  
The thesis that desires are under the guise of the naturally attractive is not empty, and is 
importantly different from the guise of the good thesis. In order to demonstrate these points, as 
well as get a sense of what it could mean for our desires to be “under a guise” at all, I will begin 
                                                      
56 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 67. 
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by articulating and motivating the guise of the good thesis. In light of the reasons that speak in its 
favour, as well as the reasons for finding a certain common way of rejecting it unsatisfying, it 
will be easier to see what my alternative position amounts to.  
An initial, rough statement of the guise of the good thesis is this: that when a human 
being desires something, or performs an intentional action, she must be doing so in light of 
something good she takes there to be in what she desires or intends to do. But this is very rough, 
indeed. What sort of phenomena are we picking out, and what are we contrasting them to, when 
we isolate “desire” and “intentional action”? In what sense “must” a human being take there to 
be something good in what she desires? In what sense must she “take” there to be something 
good in what she desires? And in what sense of “goodness” must she take something to be?  
While different variants of the thesis will provide different answers to these questions, I 
will provide those that keep in mind a particular, central motivation for the thesis. This is the 
thought that we can only understand an agent’s motivations and behaviour as intelligible desires 
and actions as opposed to tics or compulsions or mechanistic operations, should there be some 
good, apparent to her in the object of her desire and intention, by which she is motivated. The 
thesis is no mere standard by which it would be appropriate to assess or criticize a person’s 
desires or actions. Rather, in order to understand a person’s motivation as a desire and the 
resulting behaviour as an action, there must be some aspect of what she desires or intends that 
strikes her as good. Anscombe memorably illustrates this line of thought, writing:  
 
It will be instructive to anyone who thinks [that anything can be the object of a desire] to 
approach someone and say: ‘I want a saucer of mud’ or ‘I want a twig of mountain ash’. He is 
likely to be asked what for; to which let him reply that he does not want it for anything, he just 
wants it…”57  
                                                      
57 Anscombe, Intention, p. 70. It is a good question whether Anscombe actually endorses the guise of the good thesis 
in Intention, as she also states that intentional actions can be done “for no reason”, and so (we can safely assume) for 
no reason that consists in some apparent good (25). For my purposes, it is enough that she is canonically read as 
endorsing the thesis.  
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She then suggests that as long as we are taking this man seriously, there are two ways for us to 
go on. One is to determine what it is that this man takes to be good, or desirable, about having a 
saucer of mud, or twig of mountain ash. But if we can find no such “desirability condition,” we 
will have to defer to our second option and conclude that this man is, as Anscombe puts it, “a 
babbling loon”.58  
One central lesson we are meant to draw from her discussion is that our desires are not 
simply brute and blind; rather, they are sensitive to considerations for or against desiring things. 
And in particular, Anscombe suggests, they are sensitive to considerations about the goodness of 
what is wanted or intended. When a person’s desire seems utterly indifferent to such 
considerations – when the man who wants a saucer of mud simultaneously sees nothing good 
about having it, he “just wants it” – we encounter a certain kind of difficulty in understanding 
him. We may get the sense that to think of the man as having a desire isn’t right, perhaps 
concluding instead that he is experiencing a blind urge. A person suffering from OCD, for 
example, who washes her hands seven times before leaving home, need not see this as something 
good to do – nor would we think of her motivations as desires.59  
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
58 ibid, p. 70. 
  
59 One could motivate a similar argument by assuming a more Kantian approach to the mind. For example, one 
might start with the basic thought that desires are in some sense necessary for action, but in order to understand an 
agent as acting freely, or (to avoid the connotations of that terminology) without being compelled by her desires, she 
must also have the capacity to act only on those desires that are also for something that she reflectively endorses, or 
takes to be good in some sense. Should a person fail to “act” under such a guise, this “action” is really, again, best 
understood as a kind of compulsion or determination by her desires or inclinations. For Andrews Reath, Christine 
Korsgaard, and Alan Gewirth, the guise of the good thesis is one step along the way to showing that moral demands 
are rationally overriding, as acting against them involves acting against commitments one already endorses (simply 
in virtue of being a rational agent). This is one way to understand how Kant argued for such a conclusion, but 
Thomas Hill has argued that while Kant certainly endorses the claim that one must act under the guise of some 
personal good, it is an open question whether the stronger version of the claim defended by Reath and Korsgaard 
(that the object must be taken to be in a sense, objectively good) is true. There is a way to apply the arguments I will 
give here to this neo-Kantian defense of the guise of the good thesis, but I will not do so explicitly. Gewirth, Reason 
and Morality, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980). Korsgaard, “Kant’s Formula of Humanity”, Kant-Studien 
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This argument in favour of the thesis relies on a rough, intuitive sense of a distinction 
between those motivations that are intelligible as desires and those that are not. It is worth 
considering why this distinction is important for our assessments of one another more generally. 
This will help us maintain a clearer sense of what sort of “intelligibility” here is at stake. As 
Anscombe elaborates on this point, when we encounter this kind of unintelligibility, we are not 
“excluding a form of words from the language; we are saying ‘we cannot understand such a 
man’”.60 Moreover, we should notice that encountering this form of obscurity in another person 
brings with it a shift in our reactions towards him. Rather than criticizing or correcting him for 
his purported “desire”, we may find ourselves withdrawing such reactions. As Peter Strawson 
puts the point, “Seeing an agent [as one whose picture of the world is an insane delusion; or as 
one whose behaviour, or a part of whose behaviour is unintelligible to us]… tends to inhibit 
ordinary interpersonal attitudes in general”.61  
These ordinary interpersonal attitudes, as Strawson elaborates, include but are not at all 
limited to: resentment and indignation, gratitude and forgiveness, certain forms of love or 
affection, and whatever other unnamed emotional responses we have towards a person when we 
view him as participant in a human relationship and life, rather than as an object of management, 
treatment, training, or scientific observation.  
Where we might criticize a person’s desire to do something cruel, or praise someone’s 
desire to do something kind – using standards that are relevant to assessing one’s desires, but not 
constitutive of them – we withdraw either sort of reaction when his motivations and behaviour 
                                                                                                                                                                              
77 (1-4), 1986. Reath, “Did Kant Hold that Rational Volition is Sub Ratione Boni?” in Robert Johnson and Mark 
Timmons, eds. Reason, Value and Respect: Kantian Themes from the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, forthcoming).   
 
60 Intention, p. 27 
 
61 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment”, pp. 16-17.   
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are unintelligible. Rather than criticize or correct him, we are instead inclined to manage him, 
treat him, study him, or simply keep our distance. We take what Strawson calls the objective 
stance towards him – at least in regards to this aspect of his psychology. The emotional reactions 
that we have from this stance, if any, will include “non-reactive” ones like pity, fear, and even 
forms of annoyance – but not indignation or resentment. And if we cannot restore a certain level 
of intelligibility to his mind and behaviour, it is difficult to so much as raise the question of 
whether he is justified in doing what he is doing, or whether he is appropriately subject to other 
sorts of thick ethical evaluations. Such reactions and evaluations have as a basic background 
supposition the intelligibility of the object of our assessment. Intelligibility of this sort, then, is 
not a “normative” category in the sense that is supplies agents with prescriptive reasons to desire 
or act in intelligible ways; but it is “normative” in (1) the sense that it is important, if not 
indispensible, for our ethical reactions to one another in light of our motivations and actions, and 
(2) that what it is sensitive to (at least according to the guise of the good thesis) are 
considerations that are themselves evaluative.  
Given this basic motivation for the guise of the good thesis, we can now begin to sharpen 
the very rough statement I began with. The “must”, as we have seen, is one that refers to a 
constitutive norm that governs which of our mental states count as desires and which do not. 
Moreover, we can disentangle the thesis from others that are sometimes discussed in tandem. We 
can isolate it from a similar, but distinct claim – a version of motivational or judgment 
internalism – that apparent goodness always attracts. And a defender of the guise of the good 
thesis need not be committed to the claims that she takes the object as good overall, or that a 
person cannot knowingly or willingly do or desire something that is on balance worse than his 
other options. Rather, she can allow for certain forms of akrasia, simply adding that when a 
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person acts against his judgment about what would be all-things-considered best, it is because he 
nonetheless still desires, chooses, or acts in light of something good that he sees in the worse 
option.  
 
IN WHAT SENSE MUST THE AGENT TAKE THE OBJECT AS GOOD? 
Another question we were left with is in what sense must the agent take there to be 
something good in what she purportedly desires, or intends to do? Different variants of the view 
answer this differently. One might think, for example, that the agent must have a belief that the 
object is good in some way. 62  But the thesis is more plausible without this particular 
commitment, for at least two reasons. The first is the familiar worry that this would be 
implausibly demanding. Presumably there are some beings that have desires and perform actions 
without possessing the cognitive and conceptual capacities needed for forming evaluative 
beliefs: non-human animals and very young children come to mind. The second is that this 
version of the thesis seems to distort, or conflate, ordinary cases of desire in ways that 
proponents of the thesis should recognize. A person might desire a saucer of mud because, for 
example, his friend has dared him to eat it, without at the same time possessing the belief that 
this is good to do this thing. And somebody who did this because he believed that it was good to 
do so, or good to act on dares, would have a different sort of character or evaluative outlook on 
                                                      
62 David Velleman (1992) argues against several different versions of the thesis, first focusing on a version that 
relies upon the agent’s capacity to use evaluative concepts, before then moving to a version that attempts to capture 
the thesis in terms of direction of fit. His arguments against both versions rely upon defenders of the thesis 
simultaneously maintaining certain commitments that I will not hold them to: in particular that justifications of 
actions takes a specific, inferential or deductive form. As Velleman shows, these further commitments lead 
proponents of the thesis into difficulty, but his discussion may leave us wondering whether some essential core of 
the thesis – stripped of certain theoretical ambitions and without commitment to that particular view of justification 
– is nonetheless right. 
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what it is to act on a dare than the first. Such a person would be a bit more fastidious, or neurotic, 
or just plain weirder than the first person; and we should be able to mark that difference.63  
Given these worries, we should interpret the relevant “guise”, or “taking” as a quasi-
perception, or appearance, or construal of goodness, rather than as a conceptually laden 
evaluative belief or judgment.64 Some might worry that this is too opaque: what does it mean to 
construe or quasi-perceive something as good, if this means something more than finding it 
attractive? There are a number of ways we could spell this out, each depending on what 
substantive conception of goodness a defender of the claim has in mind. Rather than exploring 
those options, I suggest that we interpret this commitment in the following manner that is neutral 
between them: that should a human being desire something or perform an action that in fact has 
nothing good about it, or which may be positively bad, we should conclude that she is making a 
kind of mistake about the evaluative qualities of the object, or action.65 This is because, 
according to the thesis, the target or aim of intelligible human desires and intentional action is 
something good. Moreover, this perception or construal of goodness is what gives rise to one’s 
                                                      
63 In “Desiring the Bad Under the Guise of the Good”, Jennifer Hawkins makes a similar point, using a case of a 
child who engages in a kind of ritual when she eats her food – switching between each individual item between 
bites, so that her lunch “comes out even”. Hawkins writes, “To say that she values the ritual, or has some belief 
about its worth, would seriously distort the case” (249). I do not think that a defender of this version of the thesis 
would have to commit to the thought that the child values the ritual, but I do think that it already distorts the case to 
suggest that the child has a belief that it is good. Beyond worries about whether she has the conceptual resources to 
form this sort of belief, she would, if nothing else, be a little stranger than her counterpart who simply engages in 
this simple ritual.  
 
64 This is consistent with a general thesis in the philosophy of emotion that our emotions are not composed of beliefs 
about the evaluative landscape, but rather, construals of goodness and badness. It is also what particular defenders 
of the thesis have explicitly endorsed. See for example Stampe (1987), Tenenbaum (2007) and Graham Oddie’s 
Value, Reality, and Desire. 
  
65 This makes it especially difficult to understand the guise of the good thesis as a substantive claim when 
maintained by those who would also deny that evaluative judgments could be mistaken, perhaps because of a 
commitment to a radical sort of subjectivism or anti-realism about evaluative facts. But perhaps this is just as things 
could be: as others have noted, such views would be committed to a trivial version of the thesis because they 
maintain that desires just are claims about goodness. Indeed, as Tenenbaum argues, one way to deny that there is a 
substantive guise of the good thesis is to endorse subjectivism about value. 
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desire, precisely because according to this thesis, it is what desires are themselves sensitive to. 
While this answer does not alone address the difficult question of what it is for an agent to 
construe something in a certain way, and how she could do so without making use of concepts, it 
nonetheless allows us to see how the guise of the good thesis provides both constitutive 
standards on desire, as well as a standard of correctness. 
Moreover, these two elaborations help us get a firmer grip on what hangs on the truth or 
falsity of the guise of the good thesis, and also capture one important historical motivation for it: 
the thought that when one desires or intends something that is in fact bad, it is the result of a 
hazy, confused, or otherwise less than ideal perceptual or cognitive grip on the facts of one’s 
situation.66 And this provides us with some resources to understand what is going on in certain 
cases of akrasia: I might judge, or even know in some sense that I ought not attack my squash 
opponent after an ignominious defeat, but in the grips of my frustration and embarrassment, I 
cannot but suffer from the illusion that doing so would be something good to do. 
 
IN WHAT SENSE MUST THE AGENT TAKE THE OBJECT AS GOOD? 
The final question we are left with is in what sense must the agent construe the object of 
her desire as good? While again, there are different ways in which this aspect of the thesis could 
be spelled out, some proposals are more plausible than others. For example, we should reject 
theses which propose some singular, substantive good that the agent is acting in light of, such as 
her own wellbeing, or moral goodness. Instead, the thesis should be paired with the most 
plausible, pluralistic understanding of value we have available to us.  
                                                      
66 For example, Socrates’ denial of the possibility of akrasia, and Aristotle’s claim that akrasia is the result of a 
person’s having a deficient sort of knowledge of the badness of what she is doing, both reflect this basic idea.  
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However, this flexibility must be constrained once we recall what sort of work 
desirability conditions are meant to do. Notice that it doesn’t help our puzzlement, for example, 
to learn that Anscombe’s man perceives or construes the having of mud or the having of saucers 
of things as intrinsically good. A successful desirability condition does not just involve the 
thought that he views the desired object or action as good in any empty sense: it must reference 
some aspect of the object or action that a person could plausibly take to be good.67 This condition 
of plausibility helps us retain the guise of the good thesis as a substantive claim, disallowing for 
trivial or empty citations of goodness, and so, trivial or empty versions of the thesis. 
Let me summarize the key points from these last three sub-sections before considering a 
common and illuminating objection to the thesis. The central motivation for the guise of the good 
thesis is that the difference between desires and intentional actions on the one hand, and 
behaviour like tics or compulsions (and the mental states that give rise to such things) on the 
other, is that the former are “under a guise of goodness”, while the latter are not. This “guise”, 
I’ve argued, is best understood as a quasi-perception, or a construal of goodness, rather than a 
belief or judgment, where the apparent goodness of the object is what gives rise to a person’s 
desire. And importantly, it follows from this commitment that should a person desire something 
that is in fact not good, she is thereby making a mistake akin to the mistake one makes when 
suffering from a perceptual illusion. Even if one knows that the Müller-Lyer lines are even, for 
example, one’s perception is still misleading – so one can know (in the same sense) that what one 
wants is not good, but that one desires it intelligibly is a sign that one’s “perception” of it is 
misleading. Finally, the sort of goodness that the agent sees must be something that it is plausible 
for a person to find good. Without being able to determine such a desirability condition, we will 
                                                      
67 This is why, as Anscombe suggests, we can understand the desires of a Nazi officer. We do not think that 
genocide is plausibly good, but we do think that it is plausible that a human being would think it good, mistakenly.  
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– as Anscombe suggests – have to conclude that the supposed agent is in this respect 
unintelligible, where importantly, such a verdict brings with it a shift in the kinds of attitudes that 
it is fitting to have towards him, at least in regards to this particular aspect of his psychology. 
 
III. AN ILLUMINATING OBJECTION  
 
With this elaboration of the thesis in mind, we are in a better position to see why a 
common denial of it should strike us as dissatisfying. This particular denial emerges from an 
allegiance to an alternative theory of human desire and action. Perhaps the standard alternative is 
one that is best labeled (though not for reasons of historical accuracy), Humean.68 According to 
the Humean, there exist two basic mental states with two different functions: one 
representational (Humean “beliefs”), and the other motivational (Humean “desires”). Humean 
“desires” are necessary for the performance of an action, and although they may have certain 
formal constraints (such as a direction of fit, and that they take as their objects states of affairs), 
they need not specify that what is to be brought about has qualities that the agent sees as good. 
Indeed, such states lack representational content, and so would a fortiori lack that particular 
representational content. While Humean “beliefs” might contain this content, they are 
motivationally inert and need to be paired with a desire in order for an agent to perform an 
action.  
Moreover, no such guise is needed for a person’s desire to be intelligible as such. For 
example, take a discussion from Michael Smith’s original defense of the theory. There, he 
suggests that knowing of a man who has a “yen” to drink a can of paint that he has always had 
                                                      
68 There are, of course, various versions of “Humeanism” about action, mental states, and practical reasoning, etc. 
and I do not mean to conflate them here. This is instead meant to serve as an illustration of a general sort of 
objection that one might have to the guise of the good thesis, rather than an argument against any particular version 
of Humeanism. 
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this yen is enough to lend him a “partial justification” for drinking the paint.69 For Smith, this 
“partial justification” lies in the agent’s having a motivating reason that, unlike a normative 
reason, explains the action in terms of the agent’s possession of a motivational state, rather than 
justifying the action according to some independent requirement.70  
When considering this example in abstraction from any background detail, we may find 
appealing the thought that this episode of paint drinking really is no different from other actions, 
given that it shares with them a certain formal structure. An agent desired or had some “pro-
attitude” toward x and did whatever it was necessary to have or bring x about. But it is difficult to 
find this a satisfying response to the particular challenge raised by defenders of the guise of the 
good thesis. If we do not find a person’s drinking of a can of paint intelligible, learning that he 
has always had this “yen” to do so doesn’t provide us any illumination when he finally takes a 
gulp. Likewise, that a person has a motivational disposition to eat clumps of hair or scratch 
herself until she bleeds doesn’t help us to understand her behaviour. 71 The “partial justification” 
                                                      
69 This example is originally given by Davidson in “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”. He writes, “…a man may all his 
life have a yen, say, to drink a can of paint, without ever, even at the moment he yields, believing it would be worth 
doing” (p. 4).  
 
70 Michael Smith, “The Humean Theory of Motivation”. There, Smith seems to endorse some version of the guise of 
the good thesis, as he writes that the man is justified “from a perspective that assigns value to the drinking of a can 
of paint” which he occupies “only to the extent that he has a yen to drink [it]” (p. 39, my emphasis). I think, 
however, that this is all a bit too obscure to amount to a clear endorsement of the guise of the good thesis, and in any 
case, the Humean Theory need not be committed to it. For a more recent discussion of the Humean Theory, see Neil 
Sinhababu, “The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended”. 
 
71 Kieran Setiya offers an alternative theory of action that denies the guise of the good thesis, but seems to run into 
the same problem as the Humean theory. He argues that we do not need to act under the guise of a “normative” 
reason, but only an explanatory one. In response to a case of Thomas Nagel’s (of a person trying to put a coin into a 
pencil sharpener in order to get a drink from a nearby vending machine) Setiya suggests that learning that this 
person has been conditioned to have this motivational disposition does make his behaviour intelligible to us as an 
action, as we now have an explanation for his behaviour (65-67). He then suggests that such cases are “rare”, but not 
impossible. But his assessment of the case repeats the unsatisfying point that makes the guise of the good thesis 
compelling. I agree with Setiya that we should not think that these cases are impossible, but that we face a kind of 
difficulty seeing this behaviour as an exercise of agency. Such cases can be made intelligible with enough of a 
background story – but importantly, this background story is needed and furthermore, is precisely what defenders of 
the guise of the good thesis will argue must reveal a desirability condition if this person is to become intelligible to 
us. The mere motivational disposition, even when we are aware it has been brought about by conditioning or 
 52 
that she has to satisfy these urges, whatever it amounts to, is not one that is relevant to addressing 
the concern that defenders of the thesis raise. In other words, the notion of “desire” used in such 
views is so thin that we are left without a way of distinguishing – of all our motivationally potent 
mental states – which are expressions of the sort of human agency that can merit our 
interpersonal attitudes and our ethical assessments, and which can do nothing of the sort. If we 
want to retain this thinner notion of desire, we will have to supplement our psychological 
theories with the desires that defenders of the thesis are trying to account for – in which case the 
thesis re-emerges as a potential analysis of this important subset of our motivational attitudes and 
behaviour. 72 In short, the Humean theory of motivation erases the distinction that the guise of the 
good thesis is trying to capture. 
Perhaps there is a way to mark this distinction that is consistent with the basic Humean 
framework. But there is a dilemma that defenders of the guise of the good thesis should press on 
attempts at doing so. There are, of course, Humean views that rely on further formal constraints: 
for example, we might try to distinguish these bizarre cases of motivation from intelligible cases 
of desire by relying on coherence between an agent’s desires, or a kind of second-order 
endorsement. And Humeans sometimes claim that agents whose psychologies satisfy particular 
                                                                                                                                                                              
training, fails to do the work – it may even deepen our sense that this person is operating mechanistically. Setiya, 
Reasons Without Rationalism, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).  
 
72As an illustration of this dialectic, consider James Lenman’s recent criticism of Anscombe’s discussion. Lenman 
grants that there is something unintelligible about a man who wants a saucer of mud, but argues that this only 
suggests the existence of a formal constraint on desire: “For bare intelligibility we don’t need a desirability 
characteristic, just an explicit specification of propositional content”. Tenenbaum echoes this point: “…a saucer of 
mud is neither an action nor a state of affairs. The fact that one cannot want a saucer of mud is arguably no more 
surprising than the fact that one can not believe a saucer of mud; ‘saucer of mud’ is simply not a proper complement 
to ‘wants (to/that)’ or ‘believes (that)’”. But the sense of intelligibility that I am focusing on here won’t be provided 
in these cases by merely restating their content in propositional form. We can specify the “desire” of the compulsive 
hand washer in this way – I want that I wash my hands seven more times, or of the mud-wanter – I want to eat a 
saucer of mud, but this does not help us understand this motivated behaviour as a desire in the relevant sense. 
Lenman, “The Saucer of Mud, the Kudzu Vine and the Uxorious Cheetah: Against Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism in 
Metaethics,” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (2); 37–50. Tenenbaum, “Guise of the Good”, The 
International Encyclopedia of Ethics, First Edition, Hugh LaFollette (ed), (Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2013). 
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Humean-friendly standards of rationality, including full non-normative information, will turn out 
to lack these sorts of bizarre motivational states.73 But either these added constraints will include 
something that amounts to an endorsement of the guise of the good thesis, or they will not do the 
trick. For example, learning that the paint-drinker’s “yen” is one that he also identifies with, or 
desires to be effective in his actions, renders him even more bizarre, not less so. If paint-drinking 
(or wanting a saucer of mud or twig of mountain ash) is not the right sort of object of a desire in 
this sense (so a defender of the guise of the good thesis will point out) it is not because it fails to 
cohere or conform with an agent’s other interests or because he doesn’t endorse it all the way 
down: it’s because there is something about paint-drinking that cannot be fully captured by the 
non-normative facts about it that makes it so. It’s because there’s nothing plausibly good in doing 
this sort of thing. The worry, in short, is not that these alternative views cannot put constraints on 
what is desirable and what is not – it is that the constraints they place are either not of the right 
kind, or will be an endorsement of the very thesis that is being resisted. 
 
IV. THE HUMAN BEING & THE HUMAN GOOD 
 
  One explanation for why this last sort of view fails to make contact with the guise of the 
good thesis is because of a large methodological difference between views of human mental 
states that seek to reduce and naturalize, and those that operate by introducing notions that are 
already, in a certain sense, normative – or at least, difficult to square with a reductive, naturalistic 
                                                      
73 In defense of the Humean theory, Derek Baker writes (in considering the importance of intelligibility): “Since 
agents will typically (perhaps necessarily) meet some minimal threshold of rationality, most of their choices will 
conform to their background beliefs about what they ought to do.” He also suggests that, “since the Humean can 
hold that desires have a (nonrepresentational) phenomenology, they can explain any default intelligibility of our 
actions in terms of feelings of excitement, pleasure, and distress that the potential satisfaction and distress of our 
desires brings” (22). But this point suggests to me that we must be trying to capture different sense of intelligibility. 
I very well know that a person with a compulsion to eat her hair may be distressed if she is prevented from doing so, 
but this does very little (if anything) to achieve the sort of intelligibility under discussion here. Baker, “The 
Abductive Case for Humeanism over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire,” Journal of Ethics and Social 
Philosophy, 8, 2 (2014). 
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enterprise. Indeed, the guise of the good thesis is perhaps at its strongest when underpinned by a 
philosophical outlook that appeals to a robust conception of human nature, the human good, and 
a teleological model of explanation that renders our activity intelligible only when understood in 
light of those concepts. I will refer to this as the neo-Aristotelian defense of the guise of the good 
thesis. Not all defenders of the guise of the good thesis also maintain these neo-Aristotelian 
commitments, but discussing the thesis with such commitments in mind may illuminate the 
motivations that others may have, as well as clarify certain aspects of the thesis that can be 
otherwise opaque.74    
This defense of the thesis can be stated in the following manner. Begin with a robust, 
substantive conception of human nature. This conception can include facts about human nature 
that seem purely biological or descriptive in other ways. For example, the fact that we are born, 
that we have certain sorts of emotional and intellectual capacities that can be developed and 
exercised to varying degrees; that we age, and that we die. It also includes the fact we need 
certain things, which begins to sound less purely descriptive: that we need to be raised and cared 
for by other human beings, that we need shelter, food and drink, to exercise our bodies and 
minds, to learn a way of communicating with one another, and to live in communities with one 
another. And this conception also includes psychological observations such as the fact that 
human beings, or normal human beings, have an aversion to hunger, thirst, solitude, being 
deprived of bodily mobility, and death; or that human beings, or normal human beings, enjoy 
                                                      
74 Other defenses rely on claims that are quasi-conceptual. As Scanlon puts the point in What We Owe to Each 
Other, a mere disposition to act, “does not in fact fit very well with what we ordinarily mean by desire” as “desiring 
something involves having a tendency to see something good or desirable about it” (p. 38). Others try to derive the 
guise of the good thesis from observations about linguistic patterns (by attempting, for example, to form Moore’s 
paradoxes for desires), or by simply relying on the analogy that desires aim at the good in the same way beliefs aim 
at the truth. These sorts of observations about what we ordinarily mean are helpful, but limited. When it comes to 
understanding the ways in which the thesis should be elaborated and why, it can be difficult to know how the 
investigation should go. Situating the thesis in this neo-Aristotelian background helps with this, as I will illustrate 
below.  
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pleasant bodily sensations, the use of their senses, and have some concern for other human 
beings. These latter claims are not wholly descriptive, nor are they biological; they are claims 
about what it is to be a normal human being, where the standard of normalcy here is not a 
statistical mean.75 From this conception of human nature, or human life, we derive (in a way that 
I will not elaborate on here) a conception of the human telos: the human good. And once we 
have done this, we can compare particular human beings against this standard. Should a human 
being fail to achieve his telos, he is defective in a way central to his existence; should it seem 
like he is not aiming at his telos, he may not be a human being, at all, regardless of his biological 
species membership.76  
Invoking the category of human nature has a long and unhappy past, and it may be best 
to address a set of worries one might have right off the bat. For many, this language may bring to 
mind claims about the “unnaturalness” of masturbation, or homosexuality, or women working 
outside the home. Some might observe that it is a category most readily used by cultural 
conservatives, or those wedded to certain metaphysical views about our place in the universe that 
are no longer widely shared. Moreover, not only has this distinction been used in these dubious 
                                                      
75 Though idea of “human nature” may have such connotations, Martha Nussbaum and Rosalind Hursthouse, 
emphasize that they do not mean to restrict their claims to the metaphysical. 
76 Consider, for example, a recent discussion of the guise of the good thesis by Matthew Boyle and Douglas Lavin in 
“Goodness and Desire”. They write: 
 
On the [neo-]Aristotelian view, what underlies the fact that rational agents must desire under the guise of 
the good is a general point about the explanation of any self-movement or self-change... What these various 
kinds of explanation have in common is that they all have a teleological structure; and it is characteristic of 
the Aristotelian tradition to claim that, quite generally, this sort of structure applies only to a subject that is 
the bearer of a certain sort of form, a form that constitutes a standard of goodness for the subject in 
question, but that is equally implicated in any explanation of what the subject itself does.... This, it will 
emerge, is why rational self-movers [e.g. human beings] must desire under the guise of the good. 
 
Boyle and Lavin conclude that the guise of the good thesis is best understood as true of the desires of good and non-
defective people, but that “defective” desires are not under the guise of the good. Michael Stocker argues that the 
most plausible interpretation of the thesis is one against the background of a neo-Aristotelian framework, and 
concludes that the good, virtuous non-defective agent will desire under the guise of the good – but that the rest of us 
will not because we are defective. And Barbara Herman (1996), too, offers a general picture of how to think about 
the thesis when she incorporates Aristotelian elements into a Kantian framework to arrive at what she takes to be a 
more realistic conception of human psychology and development.  
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ways, it has also been used to justify atrocious forms of treatment of people who have simply 
been misunderstood. But though our understandings of human nature can be mistaken, though 
we are prone to set the limits of the intelligible at the limits of our imaginations, and though we 
often fail to understand people and cultures because of a failure to look more closely at what they 
are actually up to, these worries do not alone suggest that the concept does not, or should not 
inform our evaluative practices. We need to arrive at more accurate understandings of our 
natures, not to deny the sort of role such assessments play in our evaluative lives. Moreover, as I 
will discuss below, it is also a mistake to think that the unnaturalness of a person’s desires or 
actions necessarily says anything about his moral character, or straightforwardly justifies any 
particular actions taken towards him at all. Similarly, a claim that something is natural – even if 
true – does not serve as a way of isolating it from moral objections, and the justified anger of 
others.  
Returning to contemporary philosophical discourse, arguments that rely on constitutive 
norms of human nature are perhaps most familiar when it comes to questions about why human 
beings, regardless of what actual ends they may actually have, nonetheless always have reason to 
be moral. But one can see how the line of thought used in such arguments extends to 
investigations about the nature of our mental states, as well. In particular, it adds content to the 
idea that our parts, including our mental states, have certain aims, or goals – that they are meant 
to function in particular ways, independently of the goals that their particular bearers may have. 
Given our natures, and given what is good for us, our hearts are meant to pump blood through 
our circulatory system. Should a heart do this poorly, it is a bad heart; if it fails completely, it is 
no heart at all. Likewise, our beliefs are meant to get at truth, and our desires are meant to get at 
goodness. But unlike the failures of our organs, it is of central importance to our understanding 
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of ourselves as rational agents, who are responsive and intelligent in a way that non-human 
animal and plants are not, that our mental states like our beliefs and desires “get it right” through 
some kind of rational activity. This is the sense in which our desires are under a guise of 
goodness: if we end up desiring something that is in fact no good at all, our desires are making a 
kind of mistake central to their purpose; if a motivational state doesn’t seem responsive to 
considerations of goodness at all, it is not really a desire, but something else.  
Understanding the guise of the good thesis in light of this neo-Aristotelian picture also 
explains what I called the “plausibility” of successful desirability conditions. Recall that it 
doesn’t help to learn that the mud-wanter wants the saucer under the guise of the intrinsic good 
of having saucers of mud, but that it does help to add a desirability condition like, “I want it 
because it’s medicinal”, or “I want to play with it”. This is because on this picture, the sort of 
teleological explanation that provides illumination here is one that references some substantive 
human good, or at least, something that a human being could plausibly see as a substantive good. 
It is not illuminating to learn that the mud-wanter wants the saucer of mud under the guise of the 
intrinsic goodness of saucers of things because we (currently) have no plausible conception of 
human life in which saucers of mud have that sort of status. As Talbot Brewer puts the point in 
his defense of the guise of the good thesis, “[The idea that actions are expressive of one’s 
conception of the good] carries the interesting implication that when we attempt to bring agency 
into view, we must assume a partial community of shared or at least mutually intelligible 
values”.77 
This basic picture is no doubt powerful. And indeed, I will accept much of it here. I will 
accept the indispensability of teleological explanations of human behaviour and normative 
conceptions of human nature, and I will accept that our mental states have irreducibly normative 
                                                      
77 Brewer, The Retrieval of Ethics, p. 24. 
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and constitutive functions or aim. I will even accept that our desires, in particular, are sensitive to 
the desirability of their objects. My objection is to the thought that our desires have as their aim, 
the good. Rather, they are under the guise of the naturally attractive, and those things that are 
naturally attractive need not be, in any way, good. Should a human being desire something that is 
in fact not good or valuable, but is nonetheless naturally attractive, her desire need not be making 
any sort of mistake. There are two senses in which something can be “desirable”, and the things 
that it would be unintelligible to desire, the adesirable, are not identical to things that are 
undesirable.  
 
V. THE DESIRABLE, THE UNDESIRABLE, AND THE ADESIRABLE 
 
In order to decisively establish that conclusion, however, one would also have to 
decisively establish the truth of a complete conception of human nature, according to which 
some things that are naturally attractive to us (and so, the proper objects of well-functioning 
human desires) are not in any way good. Part of the difficulty of doing this is that the benefits of 
such a conception of human nature lie in its vast explanatory power, and its ability to make sense 
of aspects of our lives that are otherwise left mysterious. This project would involve a very 
broadly empirical outlook, and involve philosophical investigation paired with results from other 
disciplines, including other humanities. In short, it is no task for me to take on here. 
 So instead of proposing a complete conception of human nature, I will limit my 
discussion here to one potential aspect of human nature that is difficult to square with the idea 
that our desires aim for the good, rather than the naturally attractive, and which is very likely to 
be part of an accurate and complete conception of our nature. The aspect I will focus on here is 
that of human aggression. And in order to guide this discussion, it will be best to illustrate it with 
several examples. But importantly, these examples are not meant to serve as counterexamples to 
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the guise of the good thesis. Plenty of purported counterexamples to the thesis already exist, 
without having their intended effect: Stocker argues that a man might deliberately set himself on 
fire; a proponent of the thesis either references some good this man saw in doing this (the good 
of knowledge or, in certain contexts, the good of political dissent), or point out (rightly) that a 
person who did this “just because he wanted to” would be insane.78  
The point then, of such examples is not to add to this list. Rather, they will serve as a way 
of demonstrating how the guise of the naturally attractive thesis supplements our understanding 
of such cases in a way that the guise of the good thesis rules out. They illustrate that certain 
desires can be made fully intelligible with reference to a conception of human nature that 
includes aggression as major aspect of human motivation, and the evaluative qualities of the 
desired object – namely, that it is something naturally attractive to us. Moreover, given this 
conception of human nature, should a person desire something out of aggression, he may be 
doing so intelligibly and without suffering from a kind of illusion, even if that thing is in fact not 
good at all. But this does not mean that one can desire anything – there are substantive limits on 
what sorts of objects can be intelligibly desired, where those limits too, are informed by our 
conception of human nature. Desires and actions are under the guise of the naturally attractive, 
but not the good. 
To see how these are in fact two different theses, I need to establish two claims: (1) that 
one’s desires can be rendered fully intelligible given some conception of human nature and the 
evaluative qualities of the object, and (2) that such a desire need not be mistaken (in a kind of 
quasi-perceptual way) when that object is not in fact good. Consider first an example from the 
television show, Friday Night Lights, which focuses on an American high school football team. 
In other words, it focuses on rather ordinary kinds of agents and rather ordinary desires. The 
                                                      
78 Stocker (1979).   
 60 
example we can use has, nicely, exactly the sort of shape that Anscombe’s original case does. 
Fullback Tim Riggins is asked about his reputation as one of the most aggressive players on the 
team, “What do you find appealing about that?” His answer is simply, “I just like to hurt people; 
I like to take them down”. Now, given a plausible, substantive conception of human nature that 
recognizes aggression as an important aspect of human nature, Tim’s desire is fully intelligible.  
This conception of human nature can also serve to explain cases of desire and agency in 
which the agent is less aware of what has happened. Take for example, how Joel Feinberg, in a 
discussion on the unintelligibility of doing something bad for badness’ sake, describes a personal 
experience in which he did something, but not under the guise of the good and so – for him – not 
something he can fully understand: 
 
I had known Hal East [not his real name] for about a dozen years… Hal was remarkably kind and 
helpful to me and my family, arranging housing, transportation, introductions, and so on. For 
years after that, I saw Hal every couple of years, usually at social functions during the annual 
meeting of the American Philosophical Association… 
 
One year I happened to meet Hal at one of the APA receptions… Suddenly I turned to Hal, and in 
all seriousness proceeded to insult him in a gross and vulgar way. (“Hal, you are a stupid son of a 
bitch.”) Hal was taken aback and puzzled. After a considerable pause he asked, “Are you 
serious?” There was nothing at all jocular in my manner. That gave me a chance to recover, and I 
did. “No,” I said. We both withdrew in a state of puzzlement, I am sure, and relief. But will either 
of us ever understand what had happened?79 
 
For Feinberg, this episode is just like the case of Anscombe’s mud-wanter: he cannot 
understand his own motivations and behaviour in an intelligible way. He is not even able to 
attribute to himself the sort desire or intention that could make what he does seem like an action 
at all. This is because, as Feinberg suggests, there was nothing even apparently good about 
insulting his friend in this way.  
                                                      
79 Feinberg, Problems at the Roots of Law: Essays in Legal and Political Theory, pp. 162-163.  
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But if this episode was simply an expression of aggression, there is a way to understand 
why Feinberg did what he did. On this interpretation, he wanted to hurt Hal’s feelings, and he 
wanted to do that because human beings are naturally aggressive who find hurting one another’s 
feelings attractive.80 Thus, with this conception of human nature in mind, we are able to provide 
more possible, and plausible, understandings of our desires – rather than simply withdrawing in 
puzzlement from behaviour that can otherwise seem simply mechanistic, or compulsive.81 And it 
can serve to illuminate more general phenomena, as well: it is this picture of human psychology, 
for example, that motivates Nietzsche’s suggestion that at the very heart of certain practices of 
justice is just the human intrinsic desire for domination and violence.82 
These observations are not yet enough to show that the guise of the good thesis is false. A 
defender of the guise of the good thesis may agree that human beings naturally desire violence 
and domination, and do so in ways that are fully intelligible. But when they do so, it is because 
such things appear to be good to human beings, though they are actually not. And so, when a 
person desires violence or domination, she is still desiring “under the guise of the good” – such 
                                                      
80 I should emphasize that this is just one, possible interpretation of what happened here. There are even other 
explanations, even purely causal ones available.  
 
81 This gives us an alternative reading of cases like this that is typically offered. In “For Badness’ Sake”, David 
Sussman treats Feinberg’s actions as “perverse” – as done for the sake of badness. While I do think that such actions 
are possible as well (though I won’t argue for this here), Feinberg may have bullied Hal for the sake of hurting his 
feelings. And this need not be done for the sake of badness, nor for the sake of some goodness there is in hurting 
other’s feelings.  
 
82 For example, his suggestion in The Genealogy of Morality that creditors are willing to accept their debtor’s pain 
as payment, not as punishment for failing to pay back a debt, because it allows the creditor to experience “the 
pleasure of inflicting power on the powerless” and “the joy of sheer violence”. Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, p. 
40. 
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things come to us as disguised as goodness, already.83 To desire such things is to always already 
be subject to a kind of illusion.  
No doubt this is one plausible interpretation of someone like Tim Riggins: on this 
interpretation, he is not just attracted to bringing about the pain of his opponents, but he also sees 
this as something that is good.84 And it is plausible that a human being would think that violence 
is good, and so, have that appearance give rise to a desire to pursue it. I would not deny that this 
is a sound understanding of such cases, instead, I would insist that another is possible. While 
Tim might be suffering from an illusion, he might not be. Given the substantive conception of 
human nature proposed, his desire is sensitive to the sort of thing it is meant to be sensitive to. 
This is not just a causal explanation, in the way that referencing a burst of chemicals in his brain 
as the cause of his outburst. Rather, that tackling an opponent in a brutal way, or insulting one’s 
friend in a “gross and vulgar way” would hurt those people is exactly the sort of thing that makes 
these actions naturally attractive; and so if one desires such things, one’s desire is responding to 
exactly what it is that aggressive desires are supposed to respond to.  
And so, someone like Tim Riggins may very well be aware that hurting people for the 
sake of doing so is not something good to do; he may very well know that it is something bad. 
Should we try to emphasize to him the various ways in which it is bad, and find that his desire 
does not diminish or show sensitivity to those considerations, is no evidence that his mental state 
is not a desire, in the way that should a person’s belief-like state be utterly insensitive to 
                                                      
83 A different response would be to insist that such things, given that we are naturally attracted to them, actually are 
good. But this seems, at least for some cases, a bad result. Moreover, even if those cases did involve some kind of 
goodness, it doesn’t seem to be evidence for that claim that we are naturally attracted to such things. 
 
84 One might insist that the intelligibility of Tim Riggins’ desire is due to the fact that he believes that hurting people 
is good, or that hurting people gives him pleasure and that pleasure is good. But this need not be the case, and in any 
case, would only salvage the version of the guise of the good thesis understood as a claim about an agent’s 
evaluative beliefs – and as I’ve discussed above, there are other reasons for thinking that that particular 
interpretation of the view isn’t right.  
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considerations that bear on its truth, this is some evidence that that state is not really a belief. Nor 
must we conclude that he is simply being irrational. 
This is because his desire needs only to be sensitive to the naturally attractive, which, 
given a certain conception of human nature, causing pain in another is. If such a person is 
“defective”, he is defective according to moral standards, or prudential standards, or some other 
standard. Given this alternative conception of human nature on which our aggression itself aims 
at violence and domination, he is not defective as a human being, and his desire is not defective 
as a desire. Moreover, this conclusion would explain and reinforce the reaction that some of us 
may have to Tim’s answer: that it may be an honest expression of a person’s clear-eyed and 
perceptive understanding of his own (fully intelligible) desires, not simply the result of a 
stubborn illusion.85  
As mentioned, I cannot argue here that this conception of human nature, one that posits 
aggression as source of human motivation, is decisively correct. It is instead meant to illustrate 
how considerations of natural attraction diverge from considerations of plausible goodness a 
once we take it into account. But there are other ways to motivate this claim: one is that our 
reactions to one another seem to already implicitly assume this distinction. Consider, for 
example, one’s reactions upon learning that serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer not only murdered and 
sexually violated his victims, but also that he carefully labeled and stored their organs; or that as 
                                                      
85 Nietzsche, apparently, finds amusing Augustine’s attempt to re-describe an event in which he and some fellow 
teenagers stole pears from a neighbor, seemingly for the badness of doing so. He writes to Overbeck: 
 
…I was just reading the Confessions of Saint Augustine with great regret that you are not here with me. 
What a highfalutin wordsmith! Such tear-jerking phoniness! How hard I laughed, for example, over a “pear 
theft” of his youth, made the basis for his account of student days. 
 
Augustine cannot understand how it could be in his nature to be attracted to this sort of mischief. After attempting 
many different explanations of why he did what he did, eventually decides that he stole the pears out of the goodness 
of companionship. Nietzsche, always quick to emphasize and even embrace the meaner parts of our nature, finds 
Augustine’s whole rigmarole amusing and “phony”, given what (according to Nietzsche) we are actually like. This 
passage is from Gary Wills, “Augustine and the Nature of Sin” (though he doesn’t cite where in Nietzsche’s letters it 
is from). 
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a child he was delighted by the sound of his father removing the bones of a dead animal from 
underneath their home. Rather than feeling inclined to resent or demand a justification from 
Dahmer for the things he did, one might find oneself withdrawing these attitudes and the 
emotional vulnerability they presume, and cultivating the objective stance toward him instead. 
There is something that we just cannot understand about Dahmer’s mind and motivations, and 
this lack of transparency – so the defender of the guise of the good thesis may contend – is 
straightforwardly related to the badness of the things that he desired, and did. The worse the 
object of a person’s desire, the less intelligible we will find him; the badness of what he seems to 
desire renders his motivations “beyond the pale”. 
But notice that one can have desires for objects that are much worse, in a number of 
important respects, than wanting to listen to the bones of a dead animal rattling together, but 
which are more intelligible as the objects of human desires. Again, if we accept that it is in 
human nature to enjoy hurting or dominating others, we can find fully intelligible – while 
morally objecting to – the desires of somebody who rapes and murders vulnerable members of 
society, or (much less seriously) who desires to bully or belittle his friends or colleagues. And we 
understand these people more than we understand a person who desires to hear the sound of 
rattling animal bones, or endlessly count blades of grass, or drink cans of paint, even though 
those particular motivations – though unquestionably weird – are not for things that are worse.  
We have so far seen that there are plausible conceptions of human nature that support the 
thesis that we desire under the guise of the naturally attractive, and that this is distinct from the 
claim that we desire under the guise of the good. Furthermore, the dimensions of our reactive 
attitudes, and in particular, when it is fitting to take on the objective stance towards someone, 
better cohere with this result. And there is a third piece of evidence in favour of marking the 
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distinctions as I have done so here. In Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle observes 
that along with akrasia and vice, another bad sort of state for a human being to be in is thêriotês, 
translated as the “bestial”, “beastly”, or “brutish”.86 Such states, he suggests intriguingly, are 
“less grave than vice, but more frightening”.87 Another notable feature about this category of 
evaluation, as Pavlos Kontos notes, is that Aristotle’s examples of beastly desires are “puzzling”, 
in that – even keeping in mind cultural differences between the ancient Greeks and ourselves – 
they “hardly have any moral relevance”88. Indeed, they do not seem to exist along one dimension 
of badness, moral or otherwise: Aristotle includes examples of things that are terrible, such as 
ripping a child from a womb; but he also notes relatively benign things like plucking hairs and 
eating dirt.  
We can make sense of Aristotle’s categories in the follow manner. When a person’s 
desires are beastly, or when she performs a beastly action, we cannot understand what she is 
doing, and because of this, we cannot evaluate or react to her in the same ways that we can 
evaluate a person who desires or does something that we find intelligible to desire or do, even 
when that thing is bad, and her actions vicious. Though the distinction between the human and 
the bestial is important, it should not be conflated with a distinction between the moral and the 
immoral, or the virtuous and the vicious. While it may be crucial for our evaluations of a person 
that we find her motivations intelligible, it may not at all reflect a person’s bad moral character 
                                                      
86 None of these terms, I think, are ideal: all suggest that we should link this state with non-human animals. But the 
distinctions, at least as I am conceiving of them, can be applied to some non-human animals – a cat can intelligibly 
desire to chase a mouse or bat at a shadow, but cannot intelligibly desire to eat shards of glass or its own tail. 
Perhaps our ability to apply these categories depends on how similar their natures are to our own: it is not as clear 
how one should apply them to very simple reptiles, or insects.  
 
87 NE 1150a37, my emphasis.  
 
88 Kontos, “Non-Virtuous Intellectual States in Aristotle’s Ethics”, in Oxford Studies In Ancient Philosophy, XLVII, 
Brad Inwood (ed.), p. 224, fn. 39. 
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that she has unintelligible ones. As Aristotle writes, “One sort of vice is human, and this is called 
simple vice; another sort is called vice with an added condition, and this is said to be bestial or 
diseased vice” (1149a17). Human or “simple” vice, though indeed sometimes directed towards 
things that are bad, is less opaque to us than bestial, or diseased “vice”.89 And we react to a 
beastly person in a way that reflects this: we will not characterize or assess her behaviour in a 
morally robust way; she is not subject to the same attitudes, such as indignation or resentment, 
that are natural responses to (humanly) vicious desire or action. Aristotle observes that we react 
to the beastly person with fear; Strawson would add other, non-reactive emotions such as 
revulsion, and pity.  
A defender of the guise of the good thesis may respond that she is able to account for this 
category as well, perhaps by suggesting that the bestial just includes those things that are not 
apparently good, at all. Though I have no exegetical motivations in this paper, I nonetheless think 
there another interpretation is available. Consider again the list of items that Aristotle uses to 
illustrate the category of the bestial, where what is salient in each of the examples does not 
simply seem to be a shared lack of value. The beastly person has desire-like attitudes towards the 
adesirable, but the adesirable is not simply all those things that are not plausibly good. They are 
instead things that Aristotle deems not “naturally pleasant” to human beings, or what I have been 
                                                      
89 There has been relatively little written on this aspect of Aristotle’s moral psychology. But in “Aristotle on 
Brutishness,” John Thorpe has reached a conclusion that is very similar, I think, to the one that I have suggested 
here. On his reading of Aristotle, “…normal people have normal desires; but desires can diverge from the norm in 
two ways, either in their intensity, or in the naturalness of their objects. Sinners with normal desires function in the 
ethical realm of vice; those with unusually intense desires function in the realm of akrasia; those who desire 
abnormal objects function in the ethical realm of brutish vice; and finally, sinners whose desires are abnormal in 
both ways function in the realm of brutish akrasia” (p. 682). Thorpe makes a point to emphasize that “normal” here 
neither means statistically normal, nor non-vicious, as it is precisely the “sinner” who has normal, but vicious 
desires. He also suggests Aristotle means to provide us with what he calls a “polymetric” system of evaluation.  
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calling “naturally attractive” to human beings.90  The bestial person is not “beyond the pale” 
because what he wants is extremely, horribly bad – it is just not naturally attractive. The person 
with a vicious desire, in contrast with a brutish impulse, wants something that is naturally 
attractive, although it may be something that is naturally attractive and bad – indeed, it may be 
much worse than what the brutish person wants. While Aristotle, given certain other of his 
commitments, has difficulties accounting for how this sort of vicious person is able to act in a 
clear-eyed manner91, with a particular conception of human nature in mind, we are able to fill in 
the details.  
Finally, although I have discussed a guise of goodness as a necessary condition on the 
intelligibility of human desire and action, I now want to consider an implication of the position I 
have argued for here. Though I will not fully defend this claim, it can help illuminate further how 
it is that considerations of natural attraction come apart from considerations of goodness. The 
implication is that not only is a guise of goodness not necessary for intelligibility, in some cases 
it isn’t sufficient. This is easier to notice in cases where we are suspicious that a particular person 
could really desire or be doing something good, for that reason, given what we know about her. 
If she is, for example, a particularly conniving or tyrannical sort of person, we will not find 
plausible the idea that she is truly motivated by the guise of somebody else’s good. If we’re to 
find her intelligible at all, we may have to interpret her as acting in a way consistent with the 
kinds of desires we know she has – “she’s buttering you up,” “she’s manipulating you”.  
But if what I have argued here is right – that given a certain understanding of human 
nature, the distinction between the naturally attractive and unattractive is orthogonal to the 
                                                      
90 I am not endorsing the claim that the naturally attractive is also literally “pleasant”. There are forms of pain that 
are naturally attractive to human beings – such as the pain that accompanies rigorous physical activities or 
achievements. 
 
91 In particular, of his suggestion that agents who act against their best judgment have only a degraded form of 
knowledge or grasp of the relevant evaluative facts. NE 1147a10–24.  
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distinction between the good and the bad – this point may be generalizable. There may be some 
objects that we find plausibly good, but not intelligible for human beings to desire because not 
naturally attractive. If we came across a person who reports having a desire for a plausibly good, 
but adesirable, thing, we would experience the same sort of withdrawal of the reactive attitudes – 
but this time, the positive ones. One example may be of a person who sincerely “desires” to 
determine through rigorous and methodologically sound empirical testing whether pigeons prefer 
to eat red bell peppers or green bell peppers. Another may be of a person who “desires” that the 
world’s mosquito population not go hungry with a successful global distribution of mosquito 
netting. In such cases, a person may be able to easily cite what strikes them as good about what 
they desire, and we may even find such citations plausible: for example, it’s for the good of 
scientific knowledge, or for the good of mosquitos. But nonetheless we may get the sense that we 
don’t understand what it could mean to truly desire these things, just as we don’t understand 
what it means to truly desire a twig of mountain ash. 
In more realistic cases, we feel an urge to learn more about why somebody wants what 
they say they want, even when we think that what they want is good. When we hear, for 
example, of a couple’s desire to adopt as many children as possible, or a person’s desire to take a 
job as a high-paid corporate lawyer in order to give more money to charity, we may be able to 
quite clearly see what is good about what these people want to do.92 But rather than 
straightforwardly praising them, one might experience a kind of befuddlement, or estrangement, 
instead. We are confused; we need to hear more. This is not to suggest that such people are not 
worthy of praise, or that this confusion cannot be alleviated. It is instead to suggest that we don’t 
                                                      
92 Larissa MacFarquhar’s recent book, Strangers Drowning, provides in-depth profiles of what she calls “extreme 
do-gooders”. That we find these people puzzling is a premise of the book; but we need not find them puzzling 
because we do not believe that what they want to do is good. Rather, at least one explanation of why we find them 
puzzling because given human nature, it is hard to understand why they want what they want.  
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know yet what to think about them: it is to acknowledge a tension that should simply not arise 
should we think that the good just is naturally attractive.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
There is one important motivation that drives at least some people to deny the guise of 
the good thesis, which I have not yet explicitly discussed here. It is the thought that not only is it 
in the nature of our desires and our emotions to resist rationalization, but that we should resist 
rationalizing them. One might find appealing - not simply for meta-ethical reasons, but for quasi-
ethical ones as well – the thought that sometimes a person simply wants what he wants and that 
to accuse him of making a mistake in wanting what he wants is not only to misunderstand the 
nature of desire and its relationship to reason, but to try to level a particular kind of criticism of 
him that is misguided, or even excessively moralistic.93  
But we should not conflate these two different interpretations of the relationship between 
our desires and reason. Doing so encourages two camps: one that treats desires as insensitive to 
evaluative considerations, and one that argues that we must treat desires as sensitive to evaluative 
considerations, but which then assumes that the desirable is synonymous with the good. And 
here again, a person with the sort of concern just mentioned might balk: sometimes I simply 
want what I want, not what is good. But, the rejoinder goes: you cannot “simply want” saucers of 
mud, or twigs of mountain ash; you cannot “simply want” to drink cans of paint, endlessly count 
blades of grass, or rub your face along the northeast sides of buildings.   
                                                      
93 This seems to underlie, for example, Harry Frankfurt’s various discussions on love in Contours of Agency: Essays 
on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. For Frankfurt, it is not “unreasonable” to love (and desire, etc.) things that are 
(morally) bad because they are bad – if it is unreasonable to do so, it is because of the consequences that doing so 
will have on other things that one cares about.  
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I have argued here that there is a third way available to us that can accommodate 
concerns raised by both sides. This is to accept, contra the Humean, that desires have desirability 
conditions: there are limits to what sorts of things human beings can desire, because there are 
limits to what sorts of things human beings can be attracted to, and those limits are sensitive to 
the evaluative qualities of those things. A person who “desires” something that is adesirable isn’t 
exactly irrational, but she is opaque to us in a very important way, nonetheless – and we must be 
able to make sense of this opacity. And the limits on what sorts of things are desirable are not 
simply accidental – it is not as though to determine such limits we need simply to observe what 
human beings exhibit motivated behaviour towards. These constraints are, I’ve argued, informed 
by a substantive conception of human nature. 
However, this position denies, contra defenders of the guise of the good thesis, that 
everything that is desirable for human beings is in some way even plausibly good, or that all 
human desires aim at the plausibly good. A person who wants something that isn’t plausibly 
good may be imprudent or cruel, but as long as it is something that is naturally attractive to 
human beings, he might not be making a mistake in desiring it, nor failing to desire at all.  
But I have also hoped to emphasize that there is much to be gained from taking seriously 
the concerns of defenders of the guise of the good thesis, in particular, from its neo-Aristotelian 
adherents. They are, as I have argued, right to emphasize the normative limits of human desire. 
They are also right to suggest that when we consider what things are good, and how it is best for 
us to live, it is important that we take into consideration a substantive, realistic account of human 
nature and psychology. However, though both our conceptions of human nature and our 
conception of the good will no doubt be informed by one another in certain important respects, 
we should not assume that harmony between these two conceptions is somehow guaranteed – as 
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though all that is needed is some improvement in our empirical circumstances to forge a link 
between us, and goodness. Rather, we must take into consideration the real possibility that, given 
our natures, the good is not simply made for us, nor we for the good. 
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4 
 
Boredom & The Disharmonious Mind94 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 I’ve argued that our desires, when intelligent responses to the world, need not be 
intelligent responses to considerations about goodness. I will now bolster the two main 
conclusions that I have been arguing for: that akrasia is psychologically coherent, and possible, 
and that it is not always a bad thing that a person is akratic. I will engage directly with the 
Aristotelian thought that psychic harmony is necessary for virtue, and I will focus on forms of 
akrasia that have been under-explored: those that are best explained by a person’s experiences of 
boredom and interest. I will conclude by suggesting that while wholeheartedness may be 
characteristic of certain virtues, we need a more pluralistic approach to the virtues in general. 
 
II. BOREDOM & PSYCHIC DISHARMONY 
 
According to a standard conception of virtue, rooted in Aristotle, the virtuous agent not 
only knows what action would be all things considered best to perform95, but in lacking “base 
                                                      
94 This chapter previously appeared as an article in Res Philosophica. The original citation is as follows: 
Vida Yao, “Boredom & The Divided Mind,” Res Philosophica 4 (2015) 937-957 (Special issue on 
Virtues and the Emotions). 
 
95 Hereafter, simply whatever action would be “best” or “right”. Importantly, I do not mean to mask the 
fact that there important reasons (even within the domain of morality, which I will not be limiting my 
discussion here) for not conflating the language of good and bad with the language of right and wrong. 
See, for example, Robert Adams’ discussion in A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being For the Good, 
and Susan Wolf’s “Above and Below the Line of Duty”.  
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appetites” and finding “nothing pleasant against reason”, he performs the best action 
wholeheartedly.96 This unity of his motivations and emotions is taken to be the feature that 
distinguishes him from the enkratic or continent agent, who performs the best action but not 
without overcoming some reluctance in doing so. More generally, there has been a long 
philosophical tradition of viewing inner harmony as a mark of the ideal human being; in 
contemporary philosophical literature, one way in which this tradition has taken shape is by a 
tendency to regard inner harmony or coherence as essential to rationality, or by taking the 
standards of virtue and the norms of practical reason to coincide with, or reinforce one another.97 
Against this background, genuine excellences of character, so it seems, cannot be constituted by 
or based upon an agent’s motivational or emotional divergence from what she knows would be 
best to do: the gaps that can arise between one’s awareness of that action and one’s motivations 
to do it is precisely where vice or weakness take hold of one’s character. 
In spite of its attractions, I shall argue that we need to reconsider whether 
wholeheartedness deserves this lofty status. I suspect that our theoretical attraction to it has been 
encouraged by first of all, an overly narrow focus on what it takes to be a paradigmatically 
excellent agent when considering what it takes to be a paradigmatically excellent person98, and 
second of all, by taking for granted that cases of motivational or emotional ambivalence toward 
                                                      
96 NE1152a. 
 
97 See, for example, Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem. In “Does Rationality Consist in Responding 
Correctly to Reasons”, John Broome argues for a more restricted claim that he calls the “enkratic 
condition”: rationality requires that an agent intend to do what she believes she ought to do. And R. Jay 
Wallace, in “Three Conceptions of Rational Agency”, puts the point this way: “If agent A has reason r to 
perform action X, and A is properly aware that r obtains, then A must be motivated to do x, on pain of 
irrationality” (pp. 217-18).  
 
98 In other words, our conception of a good person has been too heavily shaped by one’s ability to 
successfully perform the right action in the right way. This might be the result of moral philosophy’s 
predominant interest in providing theories that are “action-guiding” – an ambition that I believe has been 
made too central to ethical theorizing.  
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what one knows would be best to do are always indications of one’s irrationality. Given these 
standard assumptions of philosophical investigations in practical reason and moral psychology, 
we too hastily assume that there is nothing left worth either exploring or appreciating about the 
distinct ways in which a person’s psychology can be divided.99  
I propose we look again. When we examine more carefully why it is that some souls are 
divided, in the particular way in which they are divided, we will find that ambivalence toward 
the best action need not be evidence of an undesirable or unattractive quality in a person’s 
character. On the contrary, as I have argued in chapter 1 and as I will reinforce here, this 
disharmony may be the very foundation of, or partly constitutive of, certain qualities of character 
that we enjoy and appreciate in one another, and which we might ourselves wish to possess.  
Here, I shall focus on another explanation for this disharmony, which involves the 
contrasting emotions of boredom and interest. Both emotions are notable for the ways in which 
they tend to influence our motivations, and – important for my discussion here – for the ways in 
which they can lead us to act, or be inclined to act, against our better judgment. In particular, we 
can be reluctant to perform those actions we know would be best to perform precisely because of 
how boring we find them; and out of occurrent feelings of boredom, we can become interested in 
or attracted to performing actions we don’t think would be good to perform at all. But I shall 
argue that given the relationship between one’s patterns of boredom and interest, and certain 
positive character traits, the bored enkratic or akratic may be no less excellent given this 
disharmony in her soul. While there are many negative character traits commonly attributed to 
                                                      
99 One important difficulty in stating the difference between the disposition of virtue and the disposition 
of continence is that given a plurality of values, we would expect the virtuous agent – in being sensitive to 
this plurality – to be divided among conflicting but good options. My arguments here will not focus on 
emphasizing how the virtuous agent might be internally conflicted given a plurality of value. So a more 
precise way to characterize the difference between the virtuous agent and the continent agent would be to 
emphasize that the continent agent is ambivalent toward performing the best action, in spite of there being 
no, or comparably little, competing value in the other option available to her.  
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those that are easily bored – such as shallowness, or a lack of gratitude or appreciation – there 
are a number of positive ones that are perhaps best exhibited by bored enkratics or akratics, in 
particular.  
In light of the fact that there seem to be other genuine virtues that necessarily depend on 
wholeheartedness even in the face of extreme boredom, these observations should not lead us to 
the conclusion that being divided is somehow better than being wholehearted. But should the 
conclusions I draw here be compelling, neither should we accept the converse. Instead, I hope 
my discussion encourages moving away from an understanding of the virtues that lends itself to 
this sort of ranking, and toward adopting a more flexible, or pluralistic approach to delineating 
and describing the virtues: one that allows for the appreciation and celebration of virtues that 
may conflict with the requisites for others. 
 
III. WHOLEHEARTED ACTIVITY 
Let’s begin by taking into consideration what this particular kind of wholeheartedness or 
unity looks like when instantiated in a person, and some reasons for why the standard conception 
of virtue emphasizes its importance. We can start with a suggestion from Julia Annas, who writes 
that the distinction between the disposition of virtue and the disposition of continence, self-
control, or “encrasia”, is one that we should be familiar with. According to Annas, it is:  
 
…the everyday contrast between someone who does the right thing, but has to battle with his 
feelings to do so, and thus acts reluctantly and with a sense of pain and loss, and the person who 
does the right thing and whose feelings endorse the action, and who thus acts gladly and with 
pleasure. We all do recognize (mostly in our own case) the difference between the merely self‐
controlled… and the person who does not have to be self‐controlled. And we take pleasure or the 
absence of it in acting to be the chief mark of this distinction. Aristotle draws the distinction in 
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these terms, but it is clearly present in later authors even if they do not use the word, since it is 
regarded as a matter of common sense.100 
 
Granting that this is a familiar and commonsense contrast, we can nonetheless imagine at 
least two different interpretations of what it would take to maintain unity, or wholeheartedness, 
in doing the right thing. The first would be to take Annas at her literal word here and conclude 
that the virtuous agent always experiences pleasure, or positive interest, in doing the right or best 
thing. The enkratic agent, in contrast, experiences no pleasure in doing the right thing – and this 
is why she must exercise self-control in order to do it.  
 The worry with this first interpretation is that there are cases in which we might think that 
the virtuous agent shouldn’t take positive pleasure or interest in doing the right thing. Taking 
Old Yeller out back to be shot might be the right thing to do, but it would seem callous or 
insensitive, if not insane, should one literally “act gladly”, or take pleasure in doing this. So we 
should supplement this initial interpretation in order to accommodate cases like this, while still 
preserving the thought that is a more “wholehearted” way of shooting Old Yeller, and a less 
wholehearted way.101 I propose the following: depending on the details of the particular action in 
question, while the enkratic experiences pain, or reluctance, or some other negative reaction that 
must be overcome, the virtuous agent – though not experiencing positive interest or pleasure or 
enthusiasm – at least does not experience these negative reactions, or at least does not experience 
them to the extent that she must rely on self-control in order to do what is right. 
Now, why think that wholeheartedness is a defining mark of virtue? One rather 
straightforward reason is that the wholehearted agent will more reliably perform (or at least 
                                                      
100 Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness, p. 53.   
101 One might think that the distinction between the virtuous agent and the enkratic agent collapses in 
cases like this – but if this is so, we’ll already have some reason to think that wholeheartedness is just not 
as essential to virtue as the standard conception maintains. 
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attempt to perform) the best actions, for the right reasons: she is just less susceptible to acting 
against her better judgment, while the enkratic seems to always skirt the edge. But another 
consideration is that the wholehearted agent will not be subject to the inner turmoil and pain 
experienced by those whose emotions are less unified with their knowledge of what actions are 
best to perform, and the avoidance of this tension makes the disposition of wholeheartedness 
preferable. As Annas puts the point, it is this tension that renders the state of self-control, or 
enkrasia, a “lower stage” than the state of virtue, even though both the virtuous and the self-
controlled agent may ultimately perform the very same actions. She writes, in approval:  
 
What the ancients stress [in stressing the importance of wholeheartedness] is just the common 
thought that conflict and stress are signs of something’s failing or going wrong, and that a state 
where these are absent is preferable to a state where they are present. Virtue is not just different 
from self-control; the harmony in the virtuous between action and feeling makes it preferable to 
self-control.102 
 
In contrast to the inner harmony of the virtuous agent, the enkratic is susceptible to at least three 
distinct forms of psychological disharmony: first, she is motivationally divided between the 
better and the worse in the first place; second, she must exercise self-control in order to do the 
thing that is better; and third, because she is motivated to do the worse thing to begin with, she is 
likely to feel some regret or dissatisfaction even when she successfully does the better thing – the 
discontent that one can feel in turning down, for example, a desired drink or helping of dessert, 
even while knowing that it was better that one did so. 
The virtuous agent, having no motivation to do the worse thing in the first place, 
gracefully transcends this inner conflict and stress. As John McDowell describes her, she 
                                                      
102 Annas, The Morality of Happiness, pp. 53-54.   
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renounces other options “without struggle”, achieving a kind of alluring “sublimity” or 
“serenity”.103  Furthermore, we may even think of her as possessing substantive qualities of 
character, such as autonomy, self-confidence, sincerity, integrity and a distinct lack of self-
alienation, in virtue of the harmony that resides within her soul.104  
Moreover, there is, as mentioned, a widely shared assumption that there is an important 
connection between rationality and inner harmony. Rosalind Hursthouse, for example, 
emphasizes the desirability of this inner harmony by making explicit its connection to norms of 
practical rationality, and the connection between practical rationality and human nature. Denying 
that the virtuous agent’s excellence over the merely continent agent consists in the reliability of 
his performance of the best action, she writes:  
The Aristotelian view of human nature is that, qua rational, it can be perfected by getting our 
inclinations into harmony with our reason. If my inclinations are not in harmony with my reason, 
and if getting them into harmony is something that human rationality can achieve, then the people 
whose inclinations are in harmony are, ceteris paribus, better human beings, closer to excellence 
(virtue), than I am.105 
 
Nonetheless, as I proposed earlier, we need to look more closely at the distinct ways in 
which a person can fail to be wholehearted before concluding with Annas, Hursthouse, 
McDowell and the ancients, that inner harmony is not only different from but in itself preferable 
to or more excellent than inner division.106 Echoing Aristotle, while there is only one way for a 
                                                      
103 John McDowell, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" (p. 27-28).  
 
104 One need not maintain a rationalist picture of human psychology to take this inner harmony to be 
essential to a good human life. See, for example, Harry Frankfurt’s discussions on the importance of 
wholeheartedness in The Reasons of Love. 
 
105 Rosalind Hursthouse, "Are Virtues the Proper Starting Point for Morality?" (p. 104). 
 
106 It might be suggested that we admire the person who must struggle to do the right thing more than the 
person who need not struggle, given that it shows an admirable strength of will or a full sensitivity to the 
considerations that weigh against him. This is a different line of thought than I will pursue here. Annas 
rejects this proposal, suggesting that although we do admire the disabled for overcoming their disability, 
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person to be virtuous there are a variety of ways in which human beings can miss the mark, and 
our evaluations of a person will differ depending on the particular way in which he falls short of 
this standard in particular.107  
In philosophical discussions of this variety, the opposing experiences of boredom and 
interest have been largely overlooked as explanations of why an agent may not be 
wholeheartedly motivated to perform what she knows to be the best action. Typically, our 
attention focuses on the misalignment or disproportionality of one’s appetites, or on “hotter” 
emotions like anger and fear. This should strike us as a surprising omission once we reflect on 
how, in our everyday lives, boredom typically effects our motivations.108 It seems that we are 
often disinclined to do what we know would be best simply because it is also something boring 
to do: we halfheartedly wait at the DMV to renew our licenses, politely endure conversations 
with the self-absorbed, and plod through the routine steps it takes to maintain an orderly home or 
office. And similarly, it seems that we are often positively interested in doing things that we 
                                                                                                                                                                              
it would be confused to infer from this that the state of being disabled is preferable to, or as preferable as, 
the state of being able-bodied.  
 
107 “… there is only way to be correct. This is why error is easy and correctness is difficulty, since it is 
easy to miss the target and difficult to hit it. And so for this reason also excess and deficiency are proper 
to vice, the mean to virtue; ‘for we are noble in only on way, but bad in all sorts of ways’,” (NE1106b28-
33). Aristotle was sensitive to the fact that our evaluations of one another will differ depending on the 
way in which we fail to be virtuous: he proposes, for example, that being overcome by one’s appetites is 
more shameful than being overcome by one’s spirit (NE 1149b).   
 
108 What is boredom? I won’t attempt to provide an analysis of it here. Instead, we can borrow from 
Wendell O’Brien’s, recent article, “Boredom”. He writes that boredom is:   
 
(1) a mental state of 
(2) weariness, 
(3) restlessness, and 
(4) lack of interest in something to which one is subjected,   
(5) which is unpleasant or undesirable,   
(6) in which the weariness and restlessness are causally related to the lack of interest.   
 
My discussion will emphasize the consequences of features 3-6.  
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simultaneously recognize are of very little value, or no value at all, to do. Think of a person who 
knows that it would be best to get a good night’s rest before an important meeting she has in the 
morning, but finds herself engrossed by the inane television show she just put on. She may not 
believe that the show itself is any good, or that it would be good for her to continue watching it, 
but nonetheless be absorbed enough to stay up an hour or two longer than she knows would be 
best. Furthermore, one notable feature of the experience of boredom is its tendency to give rise to 
motivations to do things that we simultaneously recognize are not good to do, at all. Boredom 
renders us restless; out of boredom, people eat though they are not hungry, fiddle with things 
until they break, vandalize just for the sake of it, and pick fights with one another.  
But perhaps this omission is justifiable. Perhaps these cases are not really best understood 
in the way that I’ve described them – as instances in which considerations of interest and 
boredom conflict with considerations of value and disvalue, respectively. This thought would be 
consistent with the particular kind of boredom that tends to draw both philosophical and literary 
attention: one that is typically associated with the experience of disillusionment or 
disenchantment that accompanies a sort of widespread evaluative nihilism.  
For example, this is how we might interpret Henry, the narrator of John Berryman’s 
poem, “Dream Song 14”, who begins by stating that, “Life, friends, is boring”, before 
elaborating: 
…Peoples bore me,  
literature bores me, especially great literature,  
Henry bores me, with his plights & gripes  
as bad as Achilles, 
who loves people and valiant art, which bores me.  
And the tranquil hills, & gin, look like a drag  
and somehow a dog  
has taken itself & its tail considerably away  
into the mountains or sea or sky, leaving  
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behind: me, wag.109  
 
Henry’s boredom, we might think, is a result from his seeing the world as empty of anything of 
genuine value. Even supposedly “great” literature turns out not to be so great, after all. And his 
general withdrawal from the world of value, we might think, just is, or is essentially 
characterized by, the experience of boredom.  
If this were the only sense of boredom familiar to us, then it would be natural to conclude 
that an agent cannot be properly understood as being bored by what she really believes is best, or 
is best, for her to do: that it cannot sustain her interest is itself a sign that it lacks value for her. 
Harry Frankfurt suggests something like this in his discussion of why it is particularly bad for 
human beings to be bored. When we are bored, Frankfurt claims, this is an indication that we do 
not find the objects of our boredom valuable or important.110 This suggestion nicely pairs with 
and is explained by a more general position that what gives something value is a person’s finding 
positive interest in it.111  
Consider an implication of this understanding of the relationship between boredom, 
interest, and value. It suggests that a person’s life would be unquestionably improved if she were, 
                                                      
109 Berryman, John. "77 Dream Songs.". 
 
110 As Frankfurt writes, “We do not care about any of it; none of it is important to us. As a natural 
consequence of this, our motivation to stay focused weakens; and we undergo a corresponding attenuation 
of psychic vitality”, The Reasons of Love, p. 54. 
 
111 “It is true that the beloved invariably is, indeed, valuable to the lover. However, perceiving that value 
is not at all an indispensable formative or grounding condition of the love. It need not be a perception of 
value in what he loves that moves the lover to love it. The truly essential relationship between love and 
the value of the beloved goes in the opposite direction. It is not necessarily as a result of recognizing their 
value and of being captivated by it that we love things. Rather, what we love necessarily acquires value 
for us because we love it,” The Reasons of Love, p. 38.  
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no matter her actual circumstances, unborable.112 If her positive interests and cares can 
themselves give rise to and create value for her, then a sustained interest in anything would 
create and maintain one’s contact with some form of goodness.  
But rather than being clearly attractive, there is something unsettling about the idea of 
being unqualifiedly unborable that this picture seems to leave unexplained. Consider John 
Rawls’ example of a mathematician who takes pleasure in counting blades of grass in “various 
geometrically shaped areas such as park squares and well-trimmed lawns”.113 Rawls points out, 
quite rightly, that we would find such a person, as he puts it, “surprising”. And he is surprising in 
a particular sort of way: it is difficult to imagine what it is like to be him, persistently engaged in 
this activity. There are a number of features about grass counting that we might cite in an attempt 
to explain our puzzlement. Undoubtedly, part of the explanation may be that this activity is 
pointless, or valueless. But the strangeness of the grass-counter cannot be wholly explained by 
these considerations alone. Stamp collecting and jigsaw puzzle solving may be pointless, but we 
understand a person’s interest in doing either, even in light of his and our awareness of the 
pointlessness of these activities. And there may be nothing valuable about smashing the icicles 
that have been growing on the windowsill, or pulling a mean-spirited prank on one’s colleague, 
but again, it is no stretch of imagination to understand a person being positively engrossed by 
these activities, in spite of their lack of value. Counting blades of grass stands out as distinct and 
                                                      
112 I borrow this neologism from David Foster Wallace’s novel, The Pale King, in which a character 
remarks: “To be, in a word, unborable.... It is the key to modern life. If you are immune to boredom, there 
is literally nothing you cannot accomplish”. Wallace presents the view that this is not only the key to 
modern life, but constitutes a kind of virtue: “Enduring tedium over time in a confined space is what real 
courage is”. I’ll elaborate below on the particular sort of admirable “unborability” that Wallace seems to 
have in mind and why it differs from the form of unborability that I will discuss first, and which is more 
normatively suspicious.  
 
113 A Theory of Justice, p. 42. 
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surprising because not only is it in itself pointless and valueless to do, it is also – if any activity is 
– boring to do.  
Given the dullness of grass counting, we might wonder whether Rawls’ mathematician 
could really be fully attending to what he is doing, or whether his concentration is actually 
directed toward something else. Maybe his mind is elsewhere: contemplating proofs, or 
recollecting childhood memories. And so, although some small part of his mental energy is 
focused on the actual task of grass counting, the bulk of his attention is really directed elsewhere. 
Or perhaps he is – as Rawls suggests – a neurotic who uses grass counting to avoid the 
frustrations of engaging with other people.  
But if we cannot explain his ability to sustain an interest in counting blades of grass in 
these ways (which each suggest that it isn’t the task itself that he actually finds engaging), we 
may begin to suspect that – unless there is something interesting about grass counting that we 
haven’t taken into consideration – it is his experience of that activity that is impoverished. This is 
because, as Bernard Williams has put the point, the experience of boredom can be “not just a 
tiresome effect, but a reaction almost perceptual in character…”114 And given this, it can – like 
other emotions such as anger and fear – have what amount to veridicality conditions: that is, a 
person’s experience of boredom can be an indication that she is accurately perceiving the 
features of her situation or her activity, and furthermore, that in some cases, her failing to find 
certain things boring can suggest a lack of perceptual connection with her environment. In these 
latter cases, either one’s attention must really be directed elsewhere (again, perhaps turned 
inwards), or one is failing to experience the activity as it really is.115  
                                                      
114 Williams, "The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality," p. 95. 
 
115 By claiming that boredom is perceptual, or “quasi-perceptual”, I mean to suggest that – at least for 
well-functioning human beings – there it is sensitive to the features of one’s circumstances and because of 
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Williams’ own discussion of boredom in incorporates this quasi-perceptual aspect of 
boredom by emphasizing how the experience of boredom can kill off a person’s desires to 
engage in the world by being an experience that is responsive to the features of her 
circumstances. On his reading of the case of Elina Makropulos – a woman who is given the 
capacity for an immortal life – EM doesn’t become less and less invested in her life for no 
reason, as if her interests and cares have simply petered out over time. Nor is her boredom 
necessarily a matter of her no longer finding things to be of value. Rather, she becomes more and 
more emotionally withdrawn because after living too long as herself she senses that, “in the end, 
it is the same”.116 And it is this thought, Williams thinks, that not only explains but also justifies 
EM’s boredom with her unending life.  
I will not evaluate Williams’ argument that it would be intolerable because too tedious for 
any human being to be able to maintain her identity while living an unending life. Instead, I want 
to highlight just two features of his discussion that are germane to mine. First, that boredom isn’t 
blind: it is an experience that one can have in response to the features of one’s situation. This 
explains why there is, at least without further specification, something unnerving about the idea 
                                                                                                                                                                              
this, there are limits to what it is that we can find interesting. This differs from a standard dispositional 
analysis of an emotion, because it involves a particular kind of normative standard – a person’s 
experience of boredom can be merited or not, given features of her circumstances or her activity. While I 
committed to any particular theory of the emotions, there are some what seem consistent with what I 
suggest about boredom here. For example, in “The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or anti-
quasijudgmentalism”, Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson offer the view that “base emotions”, such as 
amusement, anger, contempt, and disgust as the products of “relatively discrete special-purpose 
mechanisms that are sensitive to some important aspect of human life” (p. 138). Jealousy, for example, 
“monitors the social environment for potential losses of affection or allegiance” (p. 140). On this picture, 
we can understand interest and boredom as monitoring one’s environment for things like novelty, and 
repetitiveness. For D’Arms and Jacobson, this picture of the emotions supports the thought that such 
responses are governed by what they call “norms of fittingness”: “considerations of fittingness are all and 
only those considerations about whether to feel shame, amusement, fear, and so forth that bear on whether 
the emotion’s evaluation of the circumstances gets it right: whether the situation really is shameful, funny, 
fearsome, and so forth” (p. 132). Something like this norm is what I will rely on when I discuss the idea 
that a person’s boredom, or interest can be “veridical”, or “justified”. 
  
116 "The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality," p. 82 (my emphasis). 
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of being unborable – constantly engaged and fascinated, regardless of the features of one’s 
circumstances. We seem to at least want some assurance that if one is unborable, it is because 
one is engaged with things that actually merit one’s interest. Second, that boredom need not 
always be a response that one has in recognition of a lack of value. Rather, it can simply be a 
response that one has when what one is doing is no longer interesting – perhaps it has become 
lifeless and insipid in the way that an excellent song can fail to move us simply because we have 
heard it too many times.  
Importantly, this allows for the possibility of a person’s finding boring the very thing that 
she simultaneously recognizes would be good, or even best for her to do. Her present sense that a 
certain activity is boring need be no indication that it isn’t something worth doing, or that she 
doesn’t sincerely believe it to be so. Along the same lines, we can understand why an occurrent 
experience of boredom can lead to a person’s interest in doing something she sees as not valuable 
to do. The descriptions that I offered above, in which a person’s akrasia or continence is due to 
their patterns of interest and boredom, can thus be vindicated.  
Moreover, this also makes available an alternative interpretation of people like the 
narrator of Berryman’s poem – one that I think is just as plausible as the first. Rather than simply 
reading him as an evaluative nihilist who is bored in response to his belief that the world 
contains nothing of genuine value, we might also interpret him as somebody who sincerely 
believes there to be good things in the world – genuinely great literature, as he suggests – but 
who finds himself, perhaps to his dismay, uninterested in engaging with such things any longer, 
in spite of their goodness.   
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IV. VIRTUES AND VICES OF THE EASILY BORED 
I have so far argued that a person’s experience of boredom can be justified in a quasi-
perceptual manner when the object of her boredom is genuinely boring. One reason why we find 
somebody like Rawls’ grass-counter so unnerving is because he seems to be able to maintain 
positive interest in something that just isn’t interesting. Again, perhaps his attention is directed 
inward, or perhaps he sees something that we don’t: but importantly, these thoughts simply 
reinforce the idea that both reactions are reactions to something, and that to be unborable 
regardless of one’s external circumstances suggests either a lack of engagement with, or a 
distorted perception of, those circumstances.  
 One might nonetheless wonder whether a person would live a better or more attractive 
life, or be a better or more appealing person, if she were never bored by, in particular, those 
things that she recognizes is best for her to do. Wouldn’t it be preferable to be fully engaged by 
these actions and activities, rather than bored by them, and because of one’s boredom, at least 
partly disinclined to do them? To answer these questions, I want to more fully explore what a 
person’s patterns of boredom of interest can say about the sort of character or mind that she has, 
in general. 
A common thought is that a notable predisposition toward boredom always reveals 
unattractive or regrettable qualities of character and mind. A person who is easily bored may 
have this tendency because she is deficient in imagination, creativity, curiosity, or perhaps other 
forms of intelligence; or we might think that though she possesses these capacities, her occurrent 
boredom is a sign that she is currently failing to exercise them. This latter thought in particular is 
one that we are likely to have of children who complain of boredom, but it can be extended to 
adults just as well, accompanying either advice or even criticism. And this criticism can 
sometimes tend toward a moral criticism about one’s inability to be fully grateful for what one 
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has been provided. We might think that she is simply overlooking something that deserves her 
attention, and her oversight is an indication of a shallow, or ungracious character.117   
In some cases, this sort of evaluation seems exactly right. For example, a person may at 
first find the New Mexican desert maddeningly boring. But perhaps a friend claims that she has 
just been too dismissive, so she attempts to scrutinize it more carefully the next time she drives 
through. As she pays closer attention to its details, she begins to notice certain streaks of colour, 
patterns that have been carved into rock by the wind, and formations of clouds she hadn’t noticed 
before, which a less attentive or perceptive person might never appreciate at all, and which she 
may not have noticed without taking her friend’s suggestion seriously. She might conclude that 
really, she was mistaken in thinking the landscape so dull; it is in fact, quite interesting. We can 
also think of activities that may at first appear boring but are revealed to be interesting upon 
closer inspection and more serious engagement: weeding a garden, bird-watching, or 
memorizing baseball statistics come to mind.  
But although we are right to think that boredom can sometimes indicate a regrettable lack 
of attentiveness or perception on the part of the person who is bored, a person’s particular 
patterns of boredom and interest can also be explained by a basic difference in taste, rather than a 
failure to possess or exercise certain mental capacities, or because of ingratitude or shallowness. 
Another person, preferring the bustle and grit of urban landscapes, might have noticed the very 
same details of the Nevada desert that her friend now finds interesting, and nonetheless still find 
                                                      
117 For example, in a memorable passage from Marilynne Robinson’s Gilead, John Ames writes to his 
son, “I wish I had paid more attention to [water]. My list of regrets may seem unusual, but who can know 
that they are, really. This is an interesting planet. It deserves all the attention you can give it” (p. 28). In 
another part of Berryman’s poem, Henry remarks how his mother had told him never to confess to being 
bored, as it indicates a lack of “inner resources”. And in an episode of the television show Louie, Louis 
CK responds to his four-year-old’s complaints of boredom with the following remark: “…you live in a 
great, big, vast world that you've seen none percent of. Even the inside of your own mind is endless; it 
goes on forever, inwardly, do you understand? The fact that you're alive is amazing. So you don't get to 
be bored." 
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it a bland backdrop only to be endured or ignored rather than enjoyed. Some people simply 
cannot find the natural world to be of any interest, and it seems possible that in at least some of 
these cases, it is not because of a lack of attention or shallowness in their values. Some become 
engrossed by their colleague’s fantasy football league; others just cannot bear the thought of 
participating in this sort of activity. In such cases the suggestion that one pay more attention to 
what one is bored by may only make things worse: perhaps the more some people scrutinize a 
stand of pine trees, the more dull they find it; the more some people attend to the minutiae of 
baseball statistics, the more their eyes glaze over.  
And importantly, if a person isn’t bored by what it is that she is doing, or the situation that 
she finds herself in, it is sometimes because she hasn’t scrutinized or attended to her activity or 
her environment enough. For example, a person may be able to watch and enjoy an episode of a 
boring sitcom that she has seen before only because she is presently exhausted, or mentally 
depleted. And we should not forget that, as a matter of empirical circumstance, there are also 
plenty of occasions in which the activity or the environment that a person is faced with is itself 
boring: ill-equipped, or not equipped at all, to provide an engaged and lively human mind with 
anything of interest. If the world that a person experiences is an interesting place, it is only 
contingently so; if it is not interesting, heightened attentiveness or perspicacity is likely to only 
exacerbate one’s boredom. And as we found in the case of Rawls’ grass counter, if a person were 
to exhibit sustained positive interest in something that is itself boring, we may be tempted to 
conclude that he is not completely or fully perceiving his activity or his environment. 
So, while a person’s experience of boredom may sometimes be an indication that he isn’t 
fully aware of the features of his situation, is lacking in creativity, curiosity, gratitude; or hasn’t 
sufficiently reflected on what it is that he is doing, it can also – in cases where it his environment 
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or activity itself that has very little of interest to offer – indicate that his mind is both discerning, 
and acutely attuned to the way that the world presently is. His mental capacities may be of good 
quality, and he may be primed to exercise them; it is the world that yields nothing in return. And 
if such a person is unable to turn his attention toward something else, being bored by his activity 
or environment seems to be a perfectly warranted response. The advice or injunction to pay 
more attention to what one initially finds boring in order to alleviate one’s boredom, if good or 
plausible, must take for granted that there is something there, after all, for an attentive and 
perceptive person to be engaged by.  
This brings us to considerations about the virtues of mind and character that are 
connected to a person’s susceptibility to boredom. Sometimes a person is easily bored precisely 
because his mental capacities are of a particularly high quality, or because rather than being 
incurious, apathetic, or lacking in imagination, he is especially curious, inquisitive, or 
imaginative. Rather than failing to be discriminating or alert, his capacities for discrimination 
and his alertness may be quite refined. So, in recognizing that boredom can be responsive to 
features of one’s environment or activity, we arrive at a result that is the inverse of the one we 
began with – both of which seem to me to capture different truths about the relationship between 
a person’s character and mind, and her susceptibility to boredom. A person’s disposition may be 
such that what can keep others fascinated for longer just cannot sustain her interest, because it 
takes more for her mind to be placated. She may be more easily bored than others because her 
capacities of discernment are so acute, and her mind so quick, that she can speedily observe and 
absorb the details of something, recall similar instances of that thing, more quickly arrive at the 
desire for something novel, and so be more susceptible to (and perhaps more averse to) the 
feeling of boredom when nothing novel avails itself. It is a familiar observation that while some 
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students are bored in class because unable to grasp the material or unwilling to engage with it, 
others are bored precisely because of a quick grasp of the material, and a subsequent desire to 
move on to something new. And we recognize this positive set of characteristics in some people 
that we greatly admire: Sherlock Holmes’s susceptibility to boredom – a feature of his character 
that Watson describes as a major, defining difference between them – is inseparable from the 
sharpness and intensity of his mind, and his high level of intellectual energy.118 
These different relationships between a one’s tendencies toward boredom and the quality 
of one’s character can explain why it is that we are often ambivalent, rather than simply critical, 
in our assessments of people who seem easily bored. We wonder whether there is something 
more that they could do to more carefully perceive or appreciate their present circumstances, and 
whether they are being too hasty in finding them uninteresting; we may even disapprove and 
chastise them when their boredom leads them to do silly or reckless things. But nonetheless, it 
seems that simultaneously, we can also be sensitive to the possibility that a person’s 
susceptibility to boredom may be evidence of either her (perfectly acceptable) tastes, or even of 
qualities of mind and character that we appreciate, enjoy, and even admire.  
As an example of this, take the reactions that one might have toward the protagonist of 
Jane Austen’s Emma. We recognize that Emma Woodhouse’s meddling in others’ affairs is 
largely the result of the fact that she is (though she herself doesn’t seem to realize this) frequently 
bored by her life as a caretaker for her aging father. And we are primed by Austen to see her 
tendency toward boredom as a consequence of certain flaws in her character: her impatience with 
tasks that take time and persistence to complete, as well as her lack of interest in developing any 
                                                      
118 In “The Singular Experiences of Mr. John Scott Eccles, Sherlock remarks: “…you know how bored I 
have been since we locked up Colonel Carruthers. My mind is like a racing engine, tearing itself to pieces 
because it is not connected up with the work for which it was built. Life is commonplace, the papers are 
sterile....” (p. 224).   
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of her talents seem to confirm that, being “handsome, clever and rich”, she has gotten away in 
life without having to develop the qualities of fortitude or persistence.119 Impatient with more 
acceptable tasks, she becomes idle; her idleness feeds her imagination, and her imagination gets 
the better of her, making it difficult for her to see people as they really are, rather than as pieces 
in her matchmaking schemes and invented narratives. Given all of this, we are ready to find her 
heedless, immature, and irresponsible.  
But at the same time, we may also suspect that her scheming and impatience may in fact 
be the consequences of her possession of rather good qualities of mind and character such as 
cleverness, playfulness, sharpness, and liveliness. We are told, for example, how Emma has from 
a young age grasped things much more quickly than her older sister; and how with her governess 
and friend, Miss Taylor, married and moved away, Emma finds herself “in great danger of 
suffering from intellectual solitude.” Austen continues, “She dearly loved her father, but he was 
no companion for her. He could not meet her in conversation, rational or playful.”120 In other 
words, Emma has a certain spark or vivacity about her; she’s a firecracker. We sense that she has 
been placed in circumstances that though perhaps another person (reserved and placid Jane 
Fairfax, for example) would find sufficiently absorbing, a person with Emma’s qualities of mind 
would not. Given her qualities of mind and character, she is “in danger”, too, of finding her 
circumstances boring, and her boredom intolerable – no wonder, then, her tendencies toward 
mischief. 
 
 
 
                                                      
119 Emma, p. 1.  
 
120 ibid, 6-7. 
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V. AKRATIC GRASS-COUNTING 
 
So far, I have argued that though there may be forms of boredom that one feels in 
response to a lack of value in the object of one’s boredom, we should nonetheless recognize that 
sometimes boredom is simply a response to the boringness of an activity, and not necessarily its 
lack of value. This leads to the result that sometimes we are enkratic or akratic because of our 
experiences of boredom, and interest. And in the last section, I argued that though we often think 
of the susceptibility to boredom as being revelatory of a vice or some other character flaw, that 
this is too limited an assessment to capture the variety of ways in which we assess easily bored 
people. Under certain circumstances a person’s boredom may be the result of a simple difference 
in taste, or her accurate assessment of her circumstances; moreover, her tendencies toward 
boredom may be inseparable from certain attractive qualities of mind.  
I shall now make explicit the results we reach from bringing these two conclusions 
together. A person’s ambivalence toward performing the best action, when explicable by her 
finding that action boring, as well as the motivations that she has to perform bad actions because 
of her occurrent experiences of boredom, need not be indications of a defective or unattractive 
mind or character. On the contrary, the positive qualities of character that a person’s 
susceptibility to boredom can be indicative of may also be present – and may even be properly 
conditioned in a way I’ll elaborate on – in those who are bored by what they know would be best 
to do.  
To illustrate this, let’s consider two alternative cases of grass counting. Wholehearted 
Harriett and Enkratic Edith, both graduate students in biology, are counting blades of grass for a 
research project. So, unlike a grass counter who simply – somehow – finds this task engrossing in 
itself, Harriett and Edith are engaging in this activity because it is instrumentally valuable for 
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them to do so. Let’s imagine also that in order to do this task successfully, neither can 
simultaneously distract themselves from what they are doing, in the way that a person might 
listen to the radio or daydream in order to alleviate the boredom they might otherwise 
experience. If they are to count blades of grass successfully, they must exert their full attention to 
what it is that they are doing. 
Edith, in finding this task exceedingly boring, experiences some motivational resistance 
toward performing it. Though she recognizes that she has decisive reason to continue counting 
blades of grass, her boredom with grass counting renders her less than whole-hearted about 
doing it. While she loves her work in general, she cannot love this aspect of it. Half an hour into 
the day, she finds that she must muster self-control in order to resist the temptation to get up and 
stretch her legs, get another cup of coffee, or check her email on her phone, all the while 
recognizing that she has little or no reason to do these things. After all, it is not as though her legs 
really are cramped, or that she really wants a cup of coffee, or that she needs to check her email; 
and she is fully aware that these actions will just delay the work that will have to be done 
anyway. 
Harriett, like Edith, knows that the best thing for her to do is to count blades of grass, but 
unlike Edith, she is not motivationally divided. Rather than being strong-willed in resisting the 
temptation to do something else in order to avoid this boring task, she isn’t tempted, to begin 
with. She does the best thing, emotionally and motivationally undividedly, for the right reasons. 
She is a wholehearted grass counter, lacking the desires that Enkratic Edith has to stop counting 
and do something else instead.121  
                                                      
121 I want to address a worry that one might have at this point. Though in this example, what is best for 
both Edith and Harriett to do is instrumentally best for them to do, we shouldn’t be misled into thinking 
that it is only actions with instrumental value that can be both boring and good to do, as though good 
actions and things are more susceptible to being boring when their goodness is purely instrumental. There 
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At least initially, I think we are likely to find Wholehearted Harriett’s psychology 
puzzling in a way that we don’t find Enkratic Edith’s, whose experience is likely to be more 
familiar to us. How exactly does Harriett experience this activity? In trying to imagine the 
virtuous psychology in a charitable manner – one that yields to us a clearly attractive human 
psychology – we will want to accommodate that she perceives her circumstances accurately, so 
she must be able to appreciate that grass counting is, after all, a boring activity. And as discussed 
earlier, given her appreciation of the boringness of what she is doing, it would be bizarre if she 
were utterly engrossed by the task; this would suggest at least some sort of insensitivity to what 
she is up to. So her wholeheartedness, in this sort of case, should not be understood as a matter of 
taking pleasure or being positively enthused by what it is that she is doing. 
So consider the supplemented view that I began with, which allows that unity or 
wholeheartedness doesn’t demand positive enthusiasm or pleasure. Rather, the virtuous agent 
                                                                                                                                                                              
are intrinsically good activities, as well as intrinsically good things, that are also boring, which can be 
experienced as boring even by those who are interested in the kind of goodness that is in question. For 
example, it is a familiar remark of philosophers that Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics is both good and 
boring. It has also been suggested, plausibly, that these two features are inseparable from one another: 
that some of the properties that make the Methods good are the very same properties that make it boring. 
Here is C.D. Broad’s description in Five Types of Ethical Theory, of his experience of reading the 
Methods (which he also describes, at the top of the chapter in which this quote appears, as “on the whole 
the best treatise on moral theory that has ever been written”): 
 
[Sidgwick’s] style is heavy and involved, and he seldom allowed that strong sense of humour, 
which is said to have made him a delightful conversationalist, to relieve the uniform dull dignity 
of his writing. He incessantly refines, qualifies, raises objections, answers them, and then finds 
further objections to the answer. Each of these objections, rebuttals, rejoinders, and surrejoinders 
is in itself admirable, and does infinite credit to the acuteness and candour of the author. But the 
reader is apt to become impatient; to lose the thread of the argument; and to rise from his desk 
finding that he has read a great deal with constant admiration and now remembers little or 
nothing. (p. 144) 
 
My point here isn’t to bring up the virtues and vices of pieces and styles of philosophical writing (one 
might point out, after all, that philosophy can be made worse off by being boring). Instead, it is just to 
highlight the possibility of something’s being both intrinsically good and boring. Again, that something 
good makes no promise of also being interesting, and that something bad makes no promise of also being 
uninteresting is precisely why it can take a concerted effort to attentively read Sidgwick’s writing on the 
one hand, and to refrain from gawking at train wrecks, both literal and figurative, on the other.  
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appreciates that grass counting is boring, but the consideration provided by the boringness of 
grass-counting plays no other role in her response to it. She does not positively enjoy this 
activity, but she does not find it painfully boring, or boring enough that it would disincline her 
from doing it.  
While I think that this proposal is initially difficult to fully imagine, there are resources 
that we can rely on to make her psychology more vivid. For example, we might think that by 
focusing on the nobility or fineness of her ultimate goal – advancing scientific knowledge – she 
is able to recognize that what she is doing is boring, but have that boredom be completely 
“silenced” so that it does not at all impact her motivations.122 Perhaps the most plausible 
rendering of her psychology is that she experiences a mental state akin to a meditative 
tranquility, which is capable of resisting the experience of grass counting boring in any way that 
would leave her anything less than wholehearted about doing so, without compromising her 
perception of her circumstances.123  
No doubt being able to maintain this inner calm is an attractive capacity – and one that 
we are right to admire. And it is likely supported by a number of virtues, such as patience, 
calmness, or a kind of stoicism. The question that remains is whether it is a capacity possessed 
by those with a mental life clearly more attractive than or preferable to the enkratic’s, whose will 
is divided by her aversion to performing boring tasks. Though it is true that Edith must struggle 
in a way that Harriett does not in order to do what she knows would be best to do, though her 
experience of this activity will be subjectively unpleasant in a way that Harriett’s may not be, 
and though there is the risk that she might opt to do something else in order to avoid her boring 
                                                      
122 This psychological capacity is highlighted by McDowell (1978).  
 
123 In the psychological literature this sort of state is referred to as “flow”, or “zone”.  
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task, I propose that the fact that she is motivationally divided rather than virtuous in regards to 
this activity need not be any indication of a character or mind that is worse off. Moreover, she 
may possess certain positive qualities that Harriett does not.  
First, Edith’s boredom with grass counting – and her robust experience of it as such – is a 
perfectly worthy response for her to have, given what the activity of grass counting is actually 
like. Second, as I’ve suggested, that a person is particularly susceptible to boredom may indicate 
that her mind is particularly lively or discerning, or that she may possess certain forms of 
intelligence that make it difficult for her to be patient and persistent with dull tasks.  
This second observation holds, I propose, even in cases where the action that the agent 
finds boring is also the action that would be best for her to perform. In fact, that Edith knows 
what would be best to do124, and nonetheless still desires to either stop, or do something else 
entirely, seems to be important to the thought that her experience of boredom may be indicative 
of these positive qualities of mind. This is why, as I suggested, the enkratic’s susceptibility to 
boredom is properly conditioned in a way that renders it unlike the vices associated with 
boredom. Her boredom is not best explained, for example, by a failure to appreciate the value of 
something – the way in which we might explain and criticize the boredom of a child, or a 
misguided or shallow adult. Again, recall our ambivalence about Emma’s susceptibility to 
boredom: it isn’t immediately obvious whether her boredom is brought on by a failure to fully 
appreciate what the world has to offer, perhaps because she has mistaken beliefs about the value 
                                                      
124 Perhaps this is something that a defender of the virtuous agent will push back on: Edith couldn’t 
possibly fully understand the value of what she is doing – and this is precisely why she feels resistance to 
grass-counting. If only she really knew how valuable scientific inquiry was, she’d be wholehearted about 
doing it. There are several difficulties with this line of thought. It’s hard to see exactly what it is that 
Edith lacks, and Harriett has (vis a vis evaluative knowledge). And this would make the conditions for 
knowledge of value implausibly high – in a way that seems plainly unrealistic. But most importantly for 
my purposes, it is hard to see, even if we grant that Edith has some “lower grade” of knowledge, how this 
would actually help settle the question of whose psychology is more preferable, or attractive.  
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of the activities that she finds interesting and those she finds boring, or whether it is just a result 
of her positive qualities of mind placed in limiting circumstances. But if Emma really does know 
the value of such things – if we don’t think that she’s simply being shallow or imperceptive – 
we’re more likely to see her in this second, more positive way.125  
However, one might be worried by my proposal that Edith’s disharmony may be 
something worth preserving, given that by hypothesis, what she is bored by is what she has most 
reason to do. Her motivations, we are to imagine, are out of proportion with or fail to cohere with 
what would be best, and so are necessarily partly in favour of doing something that would be 
worse: and in this circumstance in particular, it’s simply to just not do what she should do. Surely 
the virtuous person experiences boredom in a way that disinclines her from certain actions as 
well – just not when she has decisive reason not to. And furthermore, we might recall at this 
point boredom’s tendency to give rise to motivations to not only perform actions that aren’t the 
best, but actions that are positively bad, pointless, silly, or stupid. So being easily susceptible to 
boredom, which I have been highlighting as something potentially positive, is the very same 
disposition that, when possessed by the bored enkratic, necessarily involves a person’s being 
motivated to perform actions that are either not the best she could perform, and are sometimes 
positively bad to perform. And if such a person were to actually perform such an action 
                                                      
125 This emphasis on the importance of evaluative knowledge as a condition on virtue renders the qualities 
I’ve focused on psychologically importantly similar to those that a standard Aristotelian account of the 
virtues would defend, and deeper than the qualities of character that count as “virtues” on certain more 
minimalistic theories of virtue, such as Hume’s. While I think Hume is right to turn our attention to the 
wide variety of qualities that we appreciate in ourselves and one another, I think that Aristotelian accounts 
are right to emphasizes that there is an important difference between the qualities of character that would 
count as virtues on Hume’s account, and thicker qualities of character that reveal to us more about what 
the virtuous agent’s mental life, and capacities, are like.  
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akratically, citing her boredom would not serve as any justification for her doing so – it would 
only serve as an explanation. 
Nonetheless, given the connection that this susceptibility has to certain other 
characteristics of mind that we admire and appreciate, it’s not obvious to me that we would wish 
for others, or ourselves, to be less vulnerable to boredom – even when that vulnerability leaves 
us bored by things we also recognize are valuable and good. While I think that we are right to be 
ambivalent about the enkratic’s susceptibility to boredom, our ambivalence rather than our 
outright disapproval marks that we nonetheless would not be so quick to rid ourselves and one 
another of it as we might be encouraged to by an antecedent commitment to the thought that the 
virtuous agent’s psychology as clearly and obviously preferable to the enkratic’s. Holmes’ 
tendency to become easily bored is inseparable from other excellent qualities of mind and 
character that we positively admire. And so, we should appreciate his susceptibility to boredom 
even if – to Watson’s concern – it is the very same tendency that nourishes his cocaine habit 
when he is left with nothing interesting to do.126 He wouldn’t be who he is, with the kind of 
attractive and appealing character he has, without it. And because of this, I think it would be 
natural to see his tendency toward actually performing akratic behaviour in a more positive light, 
overall: one that presents it as an essential and charming feature of a vibrant and brilliant soul. 
If this is right, then we must reconsider whether it would be obviously better, preferable, 
or more ideal should someone like Edith become more like Harriett, Holmes to become more 
like Watson, Emma to be like Jane, and in general, whether bored enkratics would possess more 
                                                      
126 As Watson reports in “A Scandal in Bohemia”: “My own complete happiness, and the home-centered 
interests which rise up around the man who first finds himself master of his own establishment, were 
sufficient to absorb all my attention, while Holmes… remained in our lodgings in Baker Street, buried 
among his old books, and alternating from week to week between cocaine and ambition, the drowsiness 
of the drug, and the fierce energy of his own keen nature” (p. 5).  
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excellent characters if only they were more wholehearted, and less bored, by what they know 
they should do. Given that there need be not be anything defective about the bored enkratic’s 
perception of the situation in these cases, and given that her susceptibility to boredom may be 
inseparable from, because the direct result of, her possession of certain positive and attractive 
qualities of character, it may in fact be something that we would, I think rightly, regret.127  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
If what I’ve argued here is right, we should re-examine the extent to which we’ve 
privileged the psychology of the wholehearted over those who are more susceptible to enkrasia 
or akrasia. Sometimes the disharmony we experience is simply the result of an intelligent 
response to the features of one’s environment. Again, this is not to suggest that there isn’t 
something attractive or desirable about a person’s ability to be wholeheartedly committed to the 
best action, no matter how boring, or otherwise unattractive, that action is. If it is psychologically 
possible for a person to be able to fully appreciate the boringness of something while still 
remaining wholehearted about it as long as one also fully appreciates the goodness of what one is 
doing, then perhaps this is a capacity possessed and reliably exercised by the more patient, 
steadfast, and stoic among us – one worth admiring and respecting for its own sake. Rather than 
denigrate this capacity and the virtues it underlies or is supported by, my hope is to encourage a 
                                                      
127 One might argue that while the positive qualities of character that I have highlighted may be 
important, that should they be subversive to a person’s moral character, we have good reason to disvalue 
or disregard them; and perhaps this is why the virtuous person’s character is more attractive. Here, I 
would emphasize that these qualities need not be incompatible with a person’s moral virtue, but that 
furthermore, even when they are, we might remind ourselves of just one point argued for by Susan Wolf 
in “Moral Saints”: that upon reflection on the sorts of people that we love, and the relationships we 
cherish, the qualities of character that we find of deep importance are not identical to, and may even 
conflict with, the moral virtues. It is important to note, however, that while Wolf focuses on a person who 
is maximally morally good, I have focused on the question of the importance of wholeheartedness to the 
virtues, whether or not those virtues are best understood as “moral” in nature.  
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wider investigative scope, and a pluralism when it comes to the philosophical project of 
delineating the positive qualities of character and virtues: a scope that includes, and a pluralism 
that recognizes and celebrates, those excellences that depend on or are inseparable from a 
person’s emotional ambivalence or aversion toward what she knows would be best to do.  
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5 
 
Fearsome Goods 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
I will here discuss a dogma that has come to shape much philosophical discussion about 
the nature of value: a conception of value which reinforces, or relies upon, the basic 
philosophical approach toward our motivational and emotional responses that I have been 
resisting over the last three chapters. It can be expressed by two parallel claims: for something to 
be good is just for it to be something that it would be fitting or appropriate to have a positive 
attitude, such as desire or admiration, toward; likewise, for something to be bad is just for it to be 
something that it would be fitting or appropriate to have a negative attitude, such as hatred or 
antipathy, toward. This connection between value and our appropriately held emotional and 
motivational responses has been taken by many to be the most promising way to think about the 
nature of goodness and badness. It is, after all, more illuminating than the intuitionist’s 
conclusion that goodness is simply unanalyzable.  
Claims of this basic form serve as the foundation of a family of views that have recently 
been dubbed fitting-attitude theories of value.128 Such views hope to reduce and explain value in 
                                                      
128 Contemporary work on “fitting” attitudes includes D’Arms & Jacobson (2000), Zimmerman (2011), Rabinowicz 
and Rönnow-Rasmussen (2004), and Anderson (1993). Fitting-attitude theories of value are often attributed to 
historical figures such as Brentano, Ewing, and Sidgwick. Scanlon (1998) also endorses a version of a “fitting 
attitude” account, embedded within his “buck-passing” view of value. According to a buck-passing view, to say that 
x is valuable is to say that x has some other “natural” property that gives us reason to have some positive attitude 
(typically one with practical implications) toward x (p. 96). The fitting-attitude claim – just about the connection 
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terms of appropriately held human attitudes.129 But one need not share these theoretical ambitions 
in order to find the original analysis intuitive: realists, too, may be committed to this intimacy 
between value and our appropriately held emotions and motivations without feeling the need to 
be able to reduce one to the other.130  
These claims are taken as uncontroversial in other debates, as well: both non-cognitivists 
and cognitivists about evaluative or normative judgment take pains to accommodate or establish 
this intimacy; others have defended the view that should a person desire something (that is, 
should he possess a paradigmatically “positive” attitude toward it), he must be doing so under the 
auspices of its goodness. And even those who defend the possibility of a person’s motivations 
and emotions diverging from her evaluations are quick to point out that there are pressures on her 
to eliminate this tension or division – and this last observation is precisely what might be best 
captured by the notion of the “fit” or “appropriateness” of one’s responses.131 These 
psychological and normative claims are consonant with, and supportive of, the thought that the 
structure of value is perfectly isomorphic with the objects of our positive and negative attitudes, 
correctly held.  
There is, no doubt, something that this basic picture gets right. There are many contexts 
in which to state that something is good or bad is just to recommend, or expect the formation of a 
                                                                                                                                                                              
between something’s being good and having a reason to have a positive attitude – can be separated from the claim 
about the “naturalness” of the reason-giving property.   
 
129 For example, in “Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods”, Elizabeth Anderson endorses and attributes to 
Kant what she calls a “pragmatic theory of value”, according to which “value judgments are constructions of 
practical reason that guide our reasoning about what to do and what to care about… instead of saying that it is 
rational to value something because it is good, pragmatism says that it is good because it is rational for us to value it. 
Claims about what is rational to value determine claims of value” (p. 92).  
 
130 Moore, for example, writes, “The desirable means simply what ought to be desired or deserves to be desired; just 
as the detestable means not what can be but what ought to be detested…” (Principia Ethica, pp. 66-7). 
 
131 Among others: Smith (1987), Stocker (2004), Hurka (2003), Anderson (1993), Sussman (2009). 
 
 103 
certain attitude toward it; in many cases, to ask whether something is good or bad is just to ask 
how one should feel, or what to do about it. Furthermore, should a person fail to have a certain 
emotional or motivational response toward something we think of as good or bad, we may think 
that they do not have the same perceptual or cognitive grasp of the thing that we do. We often 
urge one another to look again, and in so doing, invite a new response – one that resonates with 
the value that we see, and the emotions that we feel. 
These observations can lead to the impression that the relationship between evaluations 
and our appropriately held emotions is a truism that any successful philosophical view about 
value or human psychology must accommodate. Nonetheless, even though these claims are able 
to capture much of our thought and discussion about value, it is important that we recognize their 
limitations. Unchecked, these claims threaten to distort our understandings of our own attitudes 
and the reactions we have to one another in light of those attitudes. Moreover, they place 
objectionable limits on the imaginative possibilities of goodness and badness, closing off the 
possibility of asking certain important philosophical questions for the sake of theoretical 
simplicity.  
 
II. THE CLAIMS 
 
I will focus my discussion on two claims. For ease of discussion, I present them as two 
bi-conditionals: 
 
x is good iff x is a fitting object of a positive or pro-attitude 
 x is bad iff x is a fitting object of a negative or con-attitude   
 
Let me begin by briefly elaborating on a few preliminary clarifications about how best to 
interpret these claims. First, let’s grant that the basic thought behind these claims is capable of 
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accommodating the distinctions between, for example, intrinsic and instrumental value, as well 
as personal and impersonal value. It should be no difficulty for a view that supports these claims 
that a person may feel affection toward a ticket stub from the first concert she attended, or 
toward the particular shade of blue of her childhood home, while not thinking these things good 
in any impersonal sense. On a full elaboration of these claims, she need only think that that stub, 
or that colour, are valuable to her. Second, these claims need not be committed to some 
particular positive attitude or negative attitude that it is appropriate to have toward the good and 
the bad. For example, while some fitting-attitude theorists refer to desire or love when 
considering the attitudes fitting to have toward goodness, we should read these claims as 
inclusive of other positive attitudes such as admiration, respect, or interest132, as well as attitudes 
connected to practical stances such as preservation, promotion, and protection.133 Third, such 
claims should be understood as claims about value, understood broadly – not just, for example, 
moral value.  
But important questions remain that will take a bit more discussion to demonstrate the 
relevance of. There are at least two major ambiguities that must be addressed when considering 
whether these really are basic truths about goodness and badness. First, we must determine what 
sense of “fit” such claims are committed to. Second, we must determine whether there is one 
coherent way to distinguish between those of our attitudes that are “positive”, and those that are 
“negative”, such that the claims that we fittingly feel the “positive” ones toward objects of 
goodness and “negative” ones toward objects of badness are not merely stipulative.  
                                                      
132 Brentano uses “love”, while Sidgwick uses “desire”. Elizabeth Anderson and T.M. Scanlon emphasize the 
importance of including a wide variety of value-centered attitudes – both see this as the only way to accommodate a 
wide enough pluralism about value. I do not think that that argument is sound, but I will not discuss it here.  
 
133 Though Scanlon does discuss some emotional responses that could in principle be felt independently of action, he 
places a heavy emphasis on attitudes more closely connected to action. 
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First Ambiguity: “Fit”? 
The language that philosophers have used when characterizing this fit ranges widely: 
some use the prescriptive “ought”, “should”, or “right”, but others use the weaker, “appropriate”, 
or even the weakest, “make sense”.134 This casual slide masks an issue that must be addressed, as 
different senses of “fit” will yield claims that are distinct in content and plausibility.  
To illustrate the importance of making sure we know what “fit” we’re after, consider, for 
example, this interpretation: that those things that it is morally appropriate to have positive 
attitudes toward are those things that are good. As Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson have 
argued, this thought involves a conflation of a moral sense of fit with a non-moral, but 
nonetheless important, sense of fit.135 To illustrate, they note that Elizabeth Anderson shifts 
between these senses when she writes:  
  
A person may laugh at a racist joke, but be embarrassed by her laughter. Her embarrassment 
reflects a judgment that her amusement was not an appropriate response to the joke. The joke was 
not genuinely good or funny: it did not merit laughter.136 
 
As D’Arms and Jacobson point out in their response to Anderson, though there are no 
doubt connections137 between them, standards of humour are not identical to moral standards. 
                                                      
134 Sidgwick, Moore, and Brentano use “ought”; Scanlon uses the language of having a reason to feel or do 
something; Anderson varies between “ought”, “appropriate” and “makes sense”.  
 
135 D'Arms, J, and D Jacobson. "The Moralistic Fallacy."  
 
136 Value in Ethics and Economics, p. 2. 
 
137 Some comedians, for example, think that comedy should “punch up, not down”. Moreover, there do seem to be 
jokes that are not funny precisely because of how morally bad they are, or because of the morally bad attitude that 
underlies them. But the important point, consistent with these, is that there are cases in which the norms of humour 
and the norms of morality may genuinely conflict with one another.  
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There are things that are genuinely funny and so appropriate, in some sense, to laugh at, even 
though they may not be morally appropriate to laugh at. 
One general lesson we can draw from their discussion of Anderson that is germane to the 
topic here is that although it may seem as if we can simply rely on some basic, intuitive sense of 
appropriateness when considering what we mean for a positive attitude to “fit” an object of 
positive value, this fit has a particular sort of character. We should not expect this kind of 
appropriateness to have the same character as moral appropriateness, or prudential 
appropriateness: this would leave us with a realm of value that is stunted by the demands of 
morality or prudence, in the way that it seems as though Anderson’s discussion of a racist joke 
has conflated the funny with the morally good. Furthermore, the sense of fit we are after doesn’t 
seem to have the force of a prescription or a command.138 While I might think it fitting that you 
find funny a comedian that I think is funny, it would take quite unusual circumstances to think 
that you ought to find him funny, where we take this “ought” to signify anything like an 
obligation or a claim about your rationality. As D’Arms and Jacobson put the point, “…there is a 
crucial distinction between the question of whether some emotion is the right way to feel [i.e. 
morally right, prudentially right, all-things-considered right], and whether that feeling ‘gets it 
right’”.139 
D’Arms and Jacobson are exactly right to recognize this distinction – one that takes into 
consideration whether or not an attitude is one that it is appropriate to feel given some 
independent (moral or prudential or all-things-considered) requirement or consideration, and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
138 Perhaps an implicit commitment to a form of consequentialism has made it plausible to many fitting-attitude 
theorists that the “ought” here really is a moral ought. See, for example, Zimmerman (2011). If this is the case, then 
the arguments I present here should equally work as arguments against the form of consequentialism informing 
these analyses of value. 
 
139 “The Moralistic Fallacy”, p. 66, my emphasis. 
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whether it is appropriate to feel simply because it “gets it right”. Nonetheless, the idea of a 
feeling “getting it right” or wrong is itself ambiguous. Return again to the example of humour. 
We all know very young children who will laugh at anything having to do with the toilet. There 
is a genuine and important sense in which the statements or situations that could get these kids 
going are not funny. Their laughter, in a genuine and important sense, is unfitting.  
But there is another sense in which their laughter is fitting. Consider, for example, a 
child’s laughter at the words poop deck, used in nautical contexts. Compare your reaction to this 
with the reaction you would have toward a person who laughs at the fact that fingers are attached 
to hands, or that sometimes it rains. A person who laughed at these latter things isn’t simply 
laughing at something unfunny: he’s laughing at something we cannot find it intelligible to be 
amused by. This is unlike the way that toilet humour or staged pratfalls or terrible puns are 
intelligible for a person to laugh at without being, we might think, actually funny.140 Our reaction 
to somebody who laughs at the first set of things is unlike the reaction that we have to somebody 
who laughs at the second. While we might scold or criticize a child for his laughter (or rather, his 
parents might), we still understand why he is laughing.141 In contrast, we will be completely 
baffled by this other person: so much so that we may not know how to react to him, thinking 
instead that he is deranged or delusional.142 As I discussed in Chapter 3, this sort of reaction, and 
                                                      
140 To echo points that I made in chapter 3, the terminology we might use to mark this distinction is between the 
afunny, and things that are genuinely funny and things that are unfunny. The afunny is reflected in our responses to 
the different ways in which the responses are “unfitting”. There are some comedians that explore unfunniness, or 
anti-humour: Andy Kauffman, or Harris Wittels, for example.  
 
141 One might worry here that the sort of understanding we have of my nephew is too thin to mark the distinction I 
am after here: for example, some human behaviour might strike us as unintelligible, but we’ve simply gotten used to 
it. If this were right, then either things are afunny, or simply funny –things that are “unfunny” are either one or the 
other. I want to resist this collapse, however: it doesn’t seem to truly capture the thought that there are things that are 
distinctively unfunny – and that these differ from both things that are just “not funny enough” and things that are 
afunny.  
 
142 The director David Lynch is particularly good at creating this experience. In his short film, Rabbits, a laugh track 
is added to a disjointed and cryptic conversation among a family of anthropomorphized rabbits. Apropos nothing, 
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the fact that it is distinct from the sort of reaction we have the child who laughs at “poop deck”, 
for example, is important for us to recognize – I’ll come back to this point at the end of this 
section.  
Given this, there are two ways in which an attitude can “make sense” to have: there is the 
sense of fit in which laughing at a good joke is fitting and laughing at “poop deck” is not fitting, 
and another sense of fit – having to do with the intelligibility of the response – in which it is, for 
example, fitting to laugh at the words “poop deck”, but isn’t fitting to laugh at an unremarkable 
patch of pavement or a certain shade of yellow. We need to recognize that these two senses come 
apart from one another, otherwise we may illicitly rule out as simply unintelligible a large scope 
of reactions that do “make sense” for a person to have, even though they may not track the sort 
of value or disvalue taken to be central to that reaction. But insofar as we are trying to give an 
account of what is actually good (or actually funny), we cannot be interested in this second sense 
– it would declare too many things of actual value when they are not. So while other senses of 
“fit” like a moral fit or prudential fit seem too restrictive, there is at least one sense that is too 
permissive. 
Is there anything substantive we can we say about this goldilocks sense of fit we are 
after? What do we mean when we say that a person’s laughter is a fitting response to a good joke, 
but not a fitting response, in this same sense, to a bad one? Perhaps in this second case, the 
person has a mistaken belief: his laughter evinces his belief that what he laughs at is funny, when 
it isn’t. But imagine that as a child grows up, he eventually learns and endorses the thought that 
simply saying the words “poop deck” is not funny. Nonetheless, imagine that as an adult he 
might still find himself, from time to time, laughing at their use. He doesn’t have a false belief, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
members of the family state things such as, “Don’t forget that today is Friday”, or “What time is it?” and the “studio 
audience” laughs uproariously. The whole thing is just really unsettling. 
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his response doesn’t seem insane, nor does he seem in any obvious sense irrational. A similar 
point can be made for other cases in which a person forms positive attitudes toward things that 
they know are bad, or negative attitudes toward things that they know are good: while there is a 
sense in which this reaction may be “unfitting”, it isn’t a sense of unfittingness that seems easily 
identifiable with a form of irrationality or unintelligibility. That a person loves or desires to 
watch what she believes is a bad television show, or hates a movie she believes is good need be 
no mark against her rationality. 
We might begin to wonder whether the difficulty in determining the sense of fit invoked 
by the claims under discussion should be enough to raise doubt about whether they can be 
interpreted as both contentful and plausibly true. At the same time, perhaps this line of 
questioning is bordering dangerously on the pedantic or the obtuse. After all, there seems to be a 
commonsense way in which, when something isn’t funny, it isn’t fitting to laugh at it in the way 
that it is fitting to laugh at things that really are funny. It is the same sense of fit, we might think, 
that we can use in cases in which a person is scared of something that is actually dangerous or 
struck by awe by something that is actually awesome. While we don’t think people are obligated 
to be afraid of things that are genuinely dangerous, we nonetheless judge that a person’s felt fear 
in response to a dangerous thing is “fitting” simply given the fact that the thing is actually 
dangerous – no other sort of consideration needs to be used to justify her response. I’ll call this 
kind of fit the fit of veridicality.143 So we can now interpret the bi-conditionals I started with, 
keeping in mind that the relevant sort of fit is this fit of veridicality.  
                                                      
143 This result poses a difficulty for fitting-attitude theories of value that, on pain of circularity, must avoid relying 
on evaluative properties when providing content to the sense of fit they rely on in their analysans. As Ross writes in 
The Foundation of Ethics of the attempt to provide an analysis of the attitude of admiration: 
 
Admiration is not a mere emotion; it is an emotion accompanied by the thought that that which is admired 
is good. And if we ask on what ground a thing is worthy of being thought to be good, only one answer is 
possible, namely that it is good. It would be absurd to say that a thing is good only in the sense that it is 
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Second Ambiguity: “Positive” and “Negative”? 
Consider now the second ambiguity in how to interpret the two bi-conditionals I started 
this section with: how should we determine which of our attitudes count as “positive”, and which 
count as “negative”? For ease of discussion, it would be best to focus on the right-to-left 
conditionals of the two bi-conditionals I started with, focusing just on the two conditional claims 
that if x is a fitting object of a positive or pro-attitude, x is good; and if x is a fitting object of a 
negative or con-attitude, x is bad. 
In determining how to understand what it is for an attitude to be “positive” or “negative”, 
perhaps we should focus on attitudes that are either phenomenologically “positive” 144 in some 
way, or are closely connected to “positive” practical stances, such as pursuit, promotion, or 
protection. Natural candidates for positive attitudes might be desire, admiration, respect, love, 
and fascination; candidates for negative attitudes might be aversion, fear, hatred, disrespect and 
disinterest. 
The worry is that these emotions and motivations can be regimented such that those that 
are “positive” and “negative” in the sense specified are also those attitudes that are best 
understood as what I will call “value-centric”: that is, veridical when directed toward goodness 
and badness, respectively.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
worthy of being thought to be good, for our definition of ‘good’ would then include the very word ‘good’ 
which we were seeking to define (pp. 278-279). 
 
It is not clear how many contemporary philosophers have (or should have) the sort of ambition of reduction, for 
which this circularity would be a problem. Moreover, even if we cannot vindicate those theories, we might 
nonetheless arrive at an informative illumination of the connection between value and our responses: goodness and 
badness is whatever our positive and negative attitudes pick out when those attitudes are veridical.  
 
144 I hope the idea of being phenomenologically “positive” is intuitive enough, without attaching this either to beliefs 
about goodness, or with pleasure. For example, respecting an object might be phenomenologically “positive” in this 
way, without being pleasant. Both Scanlon and Anderson seem to understand positive and negative here either in 
terms of phenomenology, or connection to “positive” actions, but neither elaborate on this point.  
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Consider again, for example, the contrasting attitudes of interest and boredom. On this 
understanding of which attitudes count as “positive”, being interested in something or finding it 
fascinating would be a paradigm of a positive attitude. We might think that it just feels good to be 
interested in something: this is especially salient in comparison to the way that boredom feels. 
Furthermore, interest bears a connection to certain “positive” actions: we’re likely to seek out 
and attend to things that we find interesting, and perhaps even promote or protect them. 
Conversely, we’re disposed to avoid things that we find boring, and it is difficult to attend to 
them.  
But why think that interest is best understood as veridical when directed toward things of 
value, or the good aspects of an object, rather than other features it may have? A person’s 
positive interest in something may simply be a response to the fact that the thing in question is 
interesting, or novel, not that it is good. And likewise, as I argued in chapter 3, a person’s 
boredom in something may simply be a response to the fact that the thing in question is boring, 
or repetitive, not that it is bad. While it is not a genuinely Chinese curse to wish on somebody 
that he or she live in interesting times, it is a genuine curse.  
Other “positive” and “negative” attitudes have a similar structure, as well. As I argued in 
Chapter 1, desire – taken to be a paradigmatically positive attitude – need not be understood as 
necessarily possessed under the guise of the good. There are objects of desire that are not just 
intelligible to desire, but we might think veridical for human beings to desire, but which need not 
be good: things that are merely attractive, or fun, or exciting, or convenient, for example, but 
also things like domination or violence. By taking our positive and negative attitudes to be value-
centric in general, we distort those that are not, and fail to see the sorts of considerations they 
may actually be sensitive to, instead.  
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 To further elaborate on this point, I want now to discuss a familiar objection that has been 
raised to fitting attitude theories of value. This objection runs as follows: notice that there can be 
good reasons for a person to have a certain attitude toward something that don’t seem to make 
reference to the qualities of that object. So, for example, one might have reason to laugh at an 
unfunny joke made by one’s boss, perhaps knowing that he eventually fires every one who works 
for him except for toadies and doormats. And so though it is fitting for his employees to laugh at 
a joke that he makes, it isn’t fitting because of the funniness of the joke – it’s fitting because his 
employees have prudential reason to laugh at it.  
In response to this worry, some fitting attitude theorists have relied on a distinction 
between what Derek Parfit has called “state-given” and “object-given” reasons.145 The reasons 
that fitting-attitude theorists are interested in are reasons that one has given the properties of the 
object in question, and not given the other considerations that speak in favour of one possessing 
the attitude, or mental state, in question. A successful analysis will focus on the fact that even 
though one might have a prudential reason to laugh at one’s boss’ joke, this is the “wrong” 
reason for a fitting-attitude theory because it is not “object-given”.146 
 I take no stand on whether this response to the “wrong kinds of reasons problem” is 
successful independently of the point I am making here, or whether it simply begs the question. 
Nonetheless, it is a helpful way to frame the point I am making here: that there are features or 
properties of objects that need not reflect the goodness or badness of those objects, but which 
fully explain the positive and negative responses we have toward them. Consider the following 
case: 
                                                      
145 On What Matters, Chapter 2. 
 
146 For a recent elaboration of how this distinction might be used by fitting-attitude theorists to defend their position, 
see Jonas Olsen, “Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons”. 
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Jones Jr. learns that his father, Jones Sr., wants to come by his apartment this afternoon and have 
a heart to heart with him. When Jones Jr. was a child, Jones Sr. seemed to have only two modes 
of engage: he was either cold and withholding, or angry and frustrated. In the last few decades, 
Jones Sr. has sought treatment and therapy, and has come to see the damage that he did to Jones 
Jr., and wants to apologize. Jones Jr., being a particularly forgiving person (and also having gone 
through some therapy himself), believes that at this point in time, it would be good for them to 
have this conversation. It would be good for him, for his father, and for their relationship – he 
believes that his father has changed, and he is ready to forgive him. As the hour of Jones Sr.’s 
visit approaches, Jones Jr. finds himself growing more and more anxious and distressed by the 
thought of conversing with his father. He experiences the desire to call the whole thing off. 
 
Jones Jr.’s negative emotions need not be justified in terms of non-object-given reasons, 
in the way that a person’s laughter at his boss’s joke might be. Instead, his reaction fits this 
conversation with his father because of salient features of that object. It will no doubt be difficult 
and awkward, painful – and these are properties of it that not just explain, but justify why Jones 
Jr. is so averse to having this conversation. His negative reactions are “getting it right”, given 
those features. But it does not seem right to conclude from these observations about the 
fittingness of these negative responses that this conversation would be something bad – and we 
do not need to think that Jones Jr. believes that it is bad, or that these features make it bad, in any 
way, in order to understand his reaction. In fact, it seems coherent and sensible that Jones Jr. 
thinks that having this conversation would be good, in spite of his also having these justified 
negative reactions toward it.  
On the proposal that I am offering, the properties that it is fitting to have different 
attitudes toward are heterogeneous: distinct from one another, and in principle distinct from the 
goodness or badness of the object in question. Somebody’s anxiety toward a situation may be 
fitting simply because the situation is one that involves a serious or life-altering change, for 
example, not because it is or is believed to be bad. Think, for example, of break-ups or divorces 
between people who know that it would be best for them to call things off and what little comfort 
they might get from staying together isn’t anything that amounts to something valuable about 
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doing so. Likewise, somebody’s annoyance with something may be fitting simply because that 
thing is disturbing a pleasant peacefulness, not because it is bad. Think, for example, of 
somebody who is woken up every morning by his cat pawing at his face. He need not be 
annoyed because he believes or perceives this early morning greeting as something bad – indeed, 
he might look forward to this daily annoyance, and reminisce about it when he reflects on what 
he loves about his cat. To summarize the deeper point that underlies the possibility of these 
examples: to think that positive attitudes, understood as phenomenologically pleasant or positive, 
are themselves built to pick up on goodness must be assuming a closer connection between 
goodness and pleasure or action than I think is justified.147  
Two responses seem natural at this point. One might claim that the properties that I am 
referring to just are, or perhaps supervene with, properties of goodness and badness. Something’s 
being interesting, for example, just is a way for it to be good; something’s being boring or 
frightening just is a way for it to be bad. Or consider this line of thought: those things that it is 
fitting to hate are just those things that are worth hating. And only genuinely bad things are worth 
hating. And this is why hatred, being a negative attitude, is properly responsive to things that are 
bad.  
Though there are many circumstances in which claims of this sort seem cogent, we 
should be careful not to generalize these observations. This view about the connection between 
value and these other properties is controversial, and needs to be argued for, not simply settled or 
presupposed by the claims under discussion here. And here’s just one reason why we might resist 
such conclusions: whether or not a thing’s boringness, or difficulty, or painfulness constitutes a 
bad feature of it presumably depends on the particularities of the object in question, and the other 
                                                      
147 This point will get reinforced in the next section. But it is a theme of the dissertation that we should think more 
seriously about the relationship between goodness and our positive responses – we have assumed that the 
relationship is far more simple than it is.  
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standards that we might use to evaluate objects of that kind. Aesthetic objects like paintings and 
films are often frightening or disturbing, when the very features which make those things 
frightening or disturbing is exactly what adds to the value of those objects.  
Moreover, by introducing the notion of “worth” when we ask whether it would be worth 
having a certain response to something, we must be careful that we are not illicitly moving 
between senses of fit, once again. One way of posing the question can’t help but stress the 
relevant prudential and moral considerations, for example, such as when someone claims that 
though a particular person’s obnoxiousness would be fitting to get angry at, that it isn’t worth 
getting angry at; or when someone claims that though certain video games might be entertaining, 
they are not worth one’s attention or engagement.  
A second response might return to the thought that the relevant sense of fit here is not 
what I have been calling the fit of veridicality, but instead has something to do with rationality, 
understood in a particular way. While of course we can understand and explain why Jones Jr. has 
these negative attitudes toward reconciling with his father, this is not of central importance. The 
important question is whether he justified in having them, and it is commonly thought that in 
order to be justified, one must have a justifying reason – that is, something that speaks to the 
goodness of holding the attitude in question. 
Note that Jones Jr. in fact seems well attuned and sensitive to the features of his 
circumstances. The nature of the demand that we might make of him to not be distressed or 
anxious about this conversation seems more like an expression that might help calm his nerves, 
rather than anything approaching a rational injunction or a claim about how well or badly he is 
thinking. Moreover, even if sense could be made of this claim as a rational injunction, we’d have 
reasons to be skeptical of the importance of the conception of rationality it presupposes. First, 
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this conception would seem to demand of us that our attitudes match our judgments of 
something’s goodness or badness in a way that encourages insensitivity to the other properties of 
the object in question. Second, we’d have to claim that many rather mundane instances of a 
person’s reaction to something – though out of step with her evaluative judgments – are instances 
of her irrationality. Again, laughing at a joke you know is not funny, or loving a film that you 
know is bad, for example, would count as a rational failing. Both of these commitments, I think, 
render this conception of rationality to be of limited importance. 
I want to address one assumption of this last objection head on: the thought that the 
question worth pursuing here is whether a person is justified in reacting to the world in the way 
he does, in a sense of “justification” that is clearly distinct from, and more normatively 
significant than, a sense of “explanation”. As I’ve suggested, I think that the responses I’ve 
discussed – of Jones Jr., for example – are justified, in the sense that they are appropriately 
sensitive to the features of his situation: his anxiety, for example, is veridical. But even if there 
were an important sense of justification that I am giving short shrift to, according to which he 
(and others whose responses diverge from their evaluative judgments given the other features of 
their situation) should be considered unjustified or less than fully justified, it’s nonetheless 
important to recognize the sense of fit in which our emotional responses need not be responsive 
to considerations of goodness and badness, but may still be appropriately held.148 This is because 
we need the resources to distinguish the variety of distinct ways in which a person’s responses 
can be fitting, or ill-fitting. We need to mark the difference between my nephew laughing at a 
                                                      
148 The question of justification leads us back to the ambiguity that I first discussed. Justified, in what sense? 
Rational justification, and even talk of reasons, can seem a bit misplaced when it comes to some of the cases that 
I’ve discussed. Is it rational to be sad about a painful but necessary divorce with sadness? Would it be irrational not 
to be sad? It seems to involve a category error to even ask, let alone answer, these sorts of question. The 
awkwardness in assessing many of these cases in terms of either justificatory or (mere) explanatory reasons suggests 
to me that this dichotomy is one that we should resist, or at least amend: it isn’t as helpful or illuminating as many 
have claimed.  
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fart joke, and him laughing at every acute angle he sees. And we need to mark the difference 
between someone’s attitudes when they are intelligible but non-veridical from cases in which his 
attitudes are veridical. Even if Jones Jr. is criticizable (in some, not yet fully spelled out sense) 
for having negative attitudes toward something that he believes is good, we still need the 
resources to distinguish him from somebody who is made anxious by, for example, his teenager 
being a few minutes late for curfew or his spouse’s not answering her cellphone, where in these 
latter cases there may be nothing that would make one’s anxiety veridical, but the response is 
nonetheless intelligible. The importance of these features of our evaluative lives is overlooked 
and minimized by positions that assume that too sharp a distinction between the justified and the 
explained, and relegate all of these cases to the merely explained.  
 
III. THE OTHER DIRECTION 
 
I have so far argued against the claims that when it is fitting (in the sense of veridical) to 
have a positive or negative attitude toward x, x is good or bad, respectively. Many of our positive 
and negative attitudes, when fitting in the sense settled on, are fitting because of features of their 
objects that should not be understood as identical to or exactly supervenient on the goodness and 
badness of those objects, nor are they necessarily relevant when determining whether those 
objects are good or bad. And in Chapter 3, I argued that we can understand desire such that we 
can make sense of why there are things that are intelligible for a person to be attracted to, even 
when those things are bad – even morally bad – but because of other features of those things. 
Moreover, these things may not simply be intelligible for a person to desire, but even veridical to 
desire. 
I will now focus on the other direction of the bi-conditionals stated at the beginning of the 
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paper. In particular, I will focus on the claim that if x is good then it is fitting to have a positive 
attitude toward x, leaving aside the parallel claim about badness. I will turn my attention away 
from discussing what it is that our desires or other positives attitudes might be responsive to, to 
questions about how it may be fitting to react to objects of goodness.  
In particular, I will discuss three cases in which it seems possible to entertain the thought 
that something is good, while also not knowing how it would be fitting for a person to react to 
such a thing, or while also knowing that it would be fitting to have a negative attitude toward it, 
in regards to the very same feature of the object that makes it something good. Perhaps 
complicating this discussion is that I don’t take myself to show, decisively, that the things under 
discussion here really are good. But the important question here is about the coherence and 
sensibility of maintaining, or entertaining such claims in the first place, and the philosophical 
questions that are fully intelligible once we see that certain claims about the goodness of 
something can be settled without that settling the question of how to respond to such things.  
 
The Shape of One’s Life 
 In The Possibility of Practical Reason, David Velleman objects to a standard conception 
of wellbeing according to which it is just the quantity of wellbeing accrued over a person’s 
lifetime that determines the goodness of that life. He notes, for example, that we are more likely 
to think that a life in which one transitions from rags to riches is a better life than one in which 
one transitions from riches to rags, even if the amount of wellbeing in both lives is the same. And 
this, he suggests, is because of the importance of the narrative significance of one’s life.  
Let’s entertain the thought that it is good for a person’s life to have a good narrative arc. 
Now, imagine, for example, a person who is deliberating about a significant practical decision 
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that will effect how his life goes: should he propose to his childhood sweetheart, or not? Imagine 
that he takes into consideration things such as their compatibility, what it is that she wants out of 
life, and whether he is ready to settle down. Now, while mulling this over with a friend, imagine 
his friend states: Well, it would make for a great story! 
While we can imagine the first man accepting this claim as well as the claim that it is 
good for a person’s life to have a good narrative arc, we might think it strange for this fact to 
weigh with him, at all. It should not inform his deliberation, and it should not be something that 
makes the prospect of marrying his childhood sweetheart more attractive. One’s own good 
narrative arc, though good, seems to not be the sort of thing that gives one reason to feel or do 
much of anything; or, if that claim is too strong: it would not only make sense, but may even be 
sensible, for one to recognize that one’s narrative arc is good while at the same time having no 
positive attitudes toward it, whatsoever. 
 
Hardship 
It seems reasonable to think that hardship is good for human beings. We might think of 
how children who don’t experience any hardship may grow up spoiled and unappreciative, or of 
how enduring struggle can develop one’s character. Writer Alice Walker proposes the idea that it 
is only under certain forms of hardship – in particular, those that involve social ostracization and 
isolation – that a person can develop a valuable epistemic standpoint that is partly constituted by 
having experienced a life of hardship. She writes of her experience as a bullied child, “ugly” and 
“blind in one eye”: 
 
…it was from this period – from my solitary, lonely position, the position of an outcast – that I 
began really to see people and things, really to notice relationships… the gift of loneliness is 
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sometimes a radical vision of society or one’s people that has not previously been taken into 
account.149  
 
Nonetheless, given what hardship is actually like – it’s hard, after all – we might think 
that it is fitting that a person would seek to avoid it, have a host of negative attitudes toward it, 
feel depressed or unhappy about it, and – except under controlled circumstances – be averse to 
seeking it out for those whom she loves. While it might be somewhat comforting for someone 
who is experiencing the hardship of poverty or alienation, for example, to be reminded that such 
hardship can be good, it wouldn’t be unreasonable for her to find that this provides no emotional 
solace whatsoever. Alice Walker herself, reflecting on her difficult childhood, might be justified 
in feeling sorrow or bitterness, even though she recognizes that it was good for her to undergo it. 
And importantly, there seems to be no straightforward way to separate off the goodness of 
hardship from the features of it that make it something appropriately feared or avoided: it is the 
very fact that hardship is difficult and painful that makes it something valuable and something 
that it would be fitting to be averse to. Of course, this makes it a hard question to know to what 
extent hardship is good for a human being: while we see it as perhaps necessary for a good 
human life that a person undergo some hardship, we feel averse to letting our children and loved 
ones suffer from it at the same time. But this is a question that is left open for philosophical 
investigation should we see that settling that it is good is not enough to settle what to do about it.  
 
Death 
The final case I want to consider is from Bernard Williams’ discussion of death in his 
article, “The Makropolus Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality”. There, Williams 
argues that death is something that gives meaning to life. I won’t assess the argument that he 
gives for this conclusion. Instead, I want to remark on some of the surrounding comments he 
                                                      
149 In Search of Our Mother’s Gardens, p. 264. 
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makes. He writes: 
 
…death gives the meaning to life. That does not mean that we should not fear death (whatever 
force that injunction might be taken to have, anyway). Indeed, there are several very different 
ways in which it could be true at once that death gave the meaning to life and that death was, 
other things being equal, something to be feared… Considering whether death can reasonably be 
regarded as an evil is in fact as near as I shall get to considering whether it should be feared: they 
are not quite the same question.150  
 
 Notice two of Williams’ claims here. First, he notes that it could be possible that death is 
both something that gives meaning to life (that is, that it is something of quite deep value) and 
that – other things being equal – it is something to be feared. Second, he suggests that even if we 
were to conclude that death is an evil, this would still not settle the question of whether it should 
be feared. He is at pains to point out that these are different questions. Unsurprisingly, I think 
that Williams is right to distinguish them: questions about whether something is valuable should 
be separable from questions about how it would be reasonable to feel about it. Again, my 
suggestion is that this is because the features that make something a fitting object for certain 
attitudes need not be properties that are related to the value of those things. And lest we think 
that Williams’ claims are intelligible only because he is focusing on different aspects of death – 
some that make it bad, and some that make it good – this need not be the case: the very thing that 
makes death valuable and important according to Williams (the annihilation of one’s self) is the 
very thing that may make it something worth fearing.  
 Is it because we must think of death, or the cessation of the self, as both good and bad to 
generate this reaction? Even this does not have to be the case. Think for example, of the 
experience, referenced in countless films and books, of a person who is ready to die – who may 
even, because of a long illness, or as a noble sacrifice, or perhaps simply having lived a long, 
                                                      
150 “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality”, p. 83. 
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good life, believes that it would be good for him to die – but who expresses fear or reservation 
about his own death. This fear, we might think, is fitting given what death is, even though his 
thinking his own death something good is also appropriate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
When considering what we should conclude about a good narrative, death, and hardship, 
it seems to me that it would be fitting for a person to both entertain the thought that the object in 
question is something good without also having a positive attitude toward it. By this, not only do 
I mean that this would be an intelligible or permissible response; I also mean that it may be a 
sensible, or perceptive one. This is because, as I argued in the first part of this paper, many of our 
emotional and motivational responses are intelligent, but not value-centric. Furthermore, it seems 
to involve a sort of insight or acumen should a person recognize that hardship, for example, is 
something that can be good but nonetheless worth dreading, or that his dread, should he feel it, is 
no evidence that this hardship is genuinely bad in some respect, after all.  
Perhaps at this point, a defender might grant that the claims cannot be as general as they 
are typically presented. This in itself would be something worth recognizing, given how often 
such claims are taken to be axiomatic! But it is worth considering how they might be altered to 
be made more plausible. 
 There are two different ways that we might interpret them, such that they are not subject 
to the worries that I have raised. The first is to limit the relevant positive and negative attitudes to 
a particular range of attitudes, more plausibly value-centric than those that I have discussed. The 
second is to limit the sense in which an object is said to have value, given that it would be fitting 
to have a positive or negative attitude toward it. We could formulate both claims in this fashion: 
 
x is good iff x is a fitting object of a limited range of positive or pro-attitudes 
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(x is bad iff x is a fitting object of a limited range of negative or con-attitudes) 
 
x is good in some respect iff x is a fitting object of a positive or con-attitude 
(x is bad in some respect iff x is a fitting object of a negative or con-attitude) 
 
A retreat to these interpretations, however, leaves us with claims too thin to be of much 
philosophical interest, if any. Let’s consider the first. As we’ve seen, if this set includes the many 
attitudes that are typically thought of as positive or negative, this claim cannot be true. But which 
range of attitudes could we limit such claims to, such that the claim is vindicated? At first glance, 
we might think that some attitudes like admiration or contempt have this value-centric 
dimension. Then again, we might wonder whether it really is impossible to have contempt for 
somebody or something that one doesn’t think of as bad, in any respect other than the thin, and 
already posited sense that one finds it fitting to have contempt for him. In any case, our 
investigation would best proceed in a piecemeal fashion – focusing on particular attitudes, and 
their particular veridicality conditions – rather than being granted by this general conceptual 
claim. But perhaps the more important point is this: Whatever the attitudes that populate this 
limited set, they will be so conceptually tied to the thought that the object is good that it becomes 
difficult to see how this claim could be asserting anything substantive about the relationship 
between value and our emotional and motivational lives.  
Let’s consider the second interpretation. In what respect is a thing good, given that it is a 
fitting object of a positive attitude? Of course, we should not conclude that it is all things 
considered good, for example. Perhaps it is just good to some limited extent. So, for example, we 
might judge it fitting for a scientist to find the ebola virus fascinating. So, we might conclude – 
not that the ebola virus is good – but that it is good to the extent that it is a good object of 
scientific interest. But again, this claim is too thin to be of much philosophical interest: it 
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amounts to no more than the very same point we’ve already made: that it would be fitting for a 
scientist to find ebola interesting.  
Here is the dilemma for defenders of such claims: either such claims are to be read as 
including substantive judgments of value, or substantive positive and negative attitudes – in 
which case, as I’ve argued, they are sufficiently ambitious, but false: to think that something is 
good is not necessarily to be under any perceptual or normative or rational pressure to feel a 
substantive positive attitude toward it; nor does it imply the unfittingness of a variety of 
substantive negative attitudes. Or such views must retreat to versions of such claims that – while 
true – are trivially so.  
 The points I have made here highlight that there are at least three dimensions of third-
personal evaluations that are overlooked or distorted when we render our emotions and 
motivations more value-centric than they really are. First, as I’ve already claimed, we are 
sensitive to when our responses are intelligible, even though they may not be veridical. Second, 
we are sensitive to the difference between a person’s response being not only intelligible, but 
veridical – and we recognize that a response is often veridical, without being made so by the 
value of disvalue of its objects. And finally: there may even be virtues constituted by a person’s 
disposition to experience her emotions in a non-value-centric way. Not only will we be able to 
arrive at more accurate understandings of our emotions by rejecting the two bi-conditionals I 
began with, we’ll arrive at more accurate understandings of the evaluations that we make of one 
another in light of those emotions and motivations. 
Furthermore, by refusing to limit our conceptions of value to our understandings of when 
it is and isn’t appropriate for us to feel positively and negatively about things, we are able to 
expand our imaginations when it comes to investigating possible objects of goodness and 
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badness. This allows for us to consider the possibility of goods and bads, or evils, that we may 
otherwise lose sight of, and which – if we look exclusively to the objects of our appropriately 
held emotions and motivations – we may never fully recognize or attend to. For example, we 
should be able to question whether or not a person’s death is good or bad, even after we’ve 
settled how to feel about it.  
Finally, by rejecting the dogma I’ve focused on here, we are able to take into more 
serious consideration a certain understanding of value that allows for goodness and badness to 
exist, at least in principle, independently of our positive or negative feelings toward it, even 
when those feelings are appropriately held. Take, for example, Robert Adam’s discussion of 
transcendent goodness. Adams writes: 
 
The idea of the Holy… 
 
is an idea of something that is wonderful in a way that escapes both 
human understanding and human purposes… the Holy is love… but ‘nice’ is definitely not the 
word for it. From a human point of view, the Holy has rough edges. It screams with the hawk and 
laughs with the hyenas. We cannot comprehend it. It is fearful to us, and in some ways 
dangerous. All of this, on the theistic view that I favor, is true of the Good itself. We are not the 
measure of all things, and have at best a very imperfect appreciation of the full dimensions of the 
good.151 
 
Like the previous examples I discussed above, Adams’ discussion of goodness depends upon an 
alternative way of thinking about what goodness could be, one that is ruled out by the claims that 
I have here argued against. This alternative allows the Good is something that it may be fitting 
for us to have certain negative attitudes toward, in spite of our recognition that those things are 
good: goodness really is transcendent of us, and of even our justifiably felt attitudes. And it is an 
alternative that is worth exploring, and may be particularly well suited to capture the ways in 
which we experience the good and the bad while also leaving room for more accurate 
understandings of human emotion and motivation than more limited frameworks can provide. It 
                                                      
151 Finite and Infinite Goods, p. 52. 
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should, at any rate, not be something ruled out as conceptually confused or incoherent on the 
basis of two abstract claims that – though funding many interesting and ambitious theoretical 
projects – do so at the cost of distorting the nature of our emotions, and our relationship to 
goodness.  
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6 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
My dissertation has responded to a picture of human psychology according to which our 
judgments or beliefs about value on the one hand, and our motivations and emotions on the 
other, are best made harmonious with one another. According to the simplest version of this 
picture – one that I described as a descriptive, rather than a normative or ethical claim – to judge 
or believe that something is good just is to respond to it with a positive response such as 
attraction, desire, love, or promotion. This thought is coupled with a parallel claim about 
judgments that something is bad, and negative responses like repulsion, aversion, or hatred.  
As I have illustrated throughout, this basic position and its variants are widespread and 
maintained by what are otherwise vastly different philosophical views. For example, though a 
particularly robust unification is commonly associated with a champion of the intellect, Socrates, 
this unity is also a core commitment of views that deny that sincerely held evaluative beliefs or 
judgments can exist independently of a person’s desires and emotions. Hare’s prescriptivism 
commits to a form of unification by insisting that no sincere avowal of an evaluative judgment 
can be made without some congruent desire, or emotion, since such a claim amounts to stating an 
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imperative.152 And forms of expressivism or quasi-realism, too, must maintain that there is a 
close connection between our evaluative judgments and our feelings.153   
The motivations for these two latter positions are meta-ethical, having to do with the 
metaphysical and epistemological consequences of treating evaluative knowledge just like 
knowledge in other domains. But one might find such a unification compelling for more familiar, 
everyday reasons. While there are numerous interpretations of why it is that Socrates defended 
his intellectualism, one reason was ethical, or moral in nature: he wanted to emphasize the 
importance of evaluative knowledge in living a good life. For Socrates, possessing genuine 
knowledge about the value of things is not only necessary, but is also sufficient for, doing the 
right things and feeling the rights sorts of ways. This old idea has re-emerged in contemporary 
philosophical literature, maintained by those who defend the thought that moral virtue just is 
moral knowledge, of a sort. To truly know the good is to love it; to act badly or wrongly is to 
demonstrate that one’s grasp of the good is only partial, hazy, superficial, or distorted.154  
While there may be a very particular sense in which knowledge of the good guarantees 
this emotional or motivational response – a sense that would capture at least some of our 
thoughts about why some people fail to act or respond in the ways we’d hope – there are 
nonetheless familiar ways in which a person can be fully aware of what is good or bad, while 
experiencing less harmonious emotions or motivations in response. Not only is this sort of 
response possible, I’ve argued that depending on the particularities of that disharmony, it may 
even reflect something good about the person who experiences it. So I, too, have hoped to 
discuss the intersection at which these psychological claims overlap and interact with moral, and 
                                                      
152 R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason. 
 
153 Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.  
154 For example, see John McDowell, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?”, Martha Nussbaum, 
"The Discernment of Perception: an Aristotelian Conception of Private and Public Rationality," in Love’s 
Knowledge: Essays in Philosophy and Literature, and David McNaughton, Moral Vision.  
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more broadly ethical, questions. I will now conclude this investigation by elaborating on some of 
the conclusions that I have hoped to argue toward, making explicit their connections to other 
positions and approaches in moral psychology and ethics.  
 
II. AN ADEQUATELY COMPLEX PSYCHOLOGY 
 
In chapter 3, I challenged the unification thesis by arguing against one of its most 
minimal, and so most plausible, variations – the guise of the good thesis. But even showing that 
this claim is false leaves open another which I think should also be rejected: one according to 
which it is possible to knowingly desire or love the bad and hate or be uninterested in the good, 
but that this occurs, necessarily, as a failure in rational agency. 
There are, of course, various ways to understand what being a “rational agent” amounts 
to. Sometimes this claim results simply from overstating the importance of psychic coherence in 
and of itself as an essential aspect of being rational.155 But this thought is also bolstered by 
substantive psychological views with substantive understandings of rationality.  
These views characterize such disunities as best understood as, for example, (i) 
necessarily a matter of one’s reason being overcome or overwhelmed by a passion, (ii) 
necessarily a matter of one’s emotions or motivations undermining or distorting one’s 
understanding or perception at the time of action, or (iii) necessarily resulting in psychological 
states and actions that cannot be understood as one’s own.  
                                                      
155 There are probably particular forms of coherence that are important for rationality, but it is often treated as a self-
evident, blanket truth that the more all of a person’s mental states cohere with one another, the more rational she is. 
Even Nomy Arpaly, who has argued for the rationality of acting against one’s better judgment, nonetheless also 
accepts that in general, the more coherent your desires are with one another, the more rational you are. But this 
claim needs to be spelled out more precisely, if it is to be plausible: it doesn’t strike me as necessarily irrational, for 
example, to both want and not want something, even for the very same reason; nor does it strike me as irrational to 
find oneself wanting something very badly in spite of its conflicting with the other desires that one has – such as 
wanting very badly to quit one’s job and start over, even though one would also like to succeed at one’s job. If 
coherence is important, it will be particular forms of coherence that will need to be distinguished from other, less 
important forms. 
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As an example of the first sort of view (according to which disunities are best understood 
as a matter of one’s reason being overcome or overwhelmed by passion), take Gary Watson’s 
preferred picture of the soul, which he takes to be roughly Platonic. Watson writes,  
 
Plato was calling attention to the fact that it is one thing to think a state of affairs good, worth while, 
or worthy of promotion, and another simply to desire or want the state of affairs to obtain. Since the 
notion of value is tied to (cannot be understood independently of) those of the good and worthy, it is 
one thing to value (think good) a state of affairs, and another to desire that it obtain. However, to 
think a thing good is at the same thing to desire it (or its promotion). Reason is thus an original spring 
of action. It is because valuing is essentially related to thinking or judging good that it is appropriate 
to speak of the wants that are (or perhaps arise from) evaluations as belonging to, or originating in, 
the rational (that is, judging) part of the soul; values provide reasons for action. The contrast is with 
desires, whose objects may not be thought good and which are thus, in a natural sense, blind or 
irrational.156  
 
 Though Watson suggests that it is impossible to think a thing good without desiring it or 
its promotion, he does allow for disunity in the other direction: it is possible to desire something 
without thinking it good. To illustrate, he provides cases in which (he proposes) a person desires 
something that she does not believe good – “a woman who has a sudden urge to drown her baby 
in the bath; the case of a squash player, who, while suffering an ignominious defeat, desires to 
smash his opponent in the face with a racquet.”157 For Watson, pure or simple desires – 
uninformed by Reason and so uninformed by considerations of value – are “blind” or 
“irrational”, and as his selection of examples suggest, we can be overcome by such desires. 158  
As an example of second kind of picture (according to which akratic disunities are a 
matter of one’s emotions or motivations undermining or distorting one’s understanding or 
                                                      
156 "Free Agency," p. 208. 
 
157 ibid. 210. 
 
158 There are actually two separate issues here that one might think are essential to making a desire “rational”: one is 
to think that it must be sensitive to value, another is to think that it must be sensitive to the agent’s own judgments, 
or deliberation. I did not discuss this second claim, but I don’t think that it is true – an agent can act rationally, or 
intelligently, without deliberating.  
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perception at the time of action), take Richard Kraut’s discussion of how Aristotle understands 
the possibility of akrasia. According to Kraut’s reading, the akratic agent, given that her desires 
or emotions motivate her against what she knows would be best, does not fully grasp what would 
be best to do at the time in which she is motivated to do what would not be best. Kraut writes, 
 
Aristotle [compares] akrasia to the condition of other people who might be described as knowing in a 
way, but not in an unqualified way. His examples are people who are asleep, mad, or drunk; he also 
compares the akratic to a student who has just begun to learn a subject, or an actor on the stage 
(1147a10–24). All of these people, he says, can utter the very words used by those who have 
knowledge; but their talk does not prove that they really have knowledge, strictly speaking… The 
akratic says, at the time of action, that he ought not to indulge in this particular pleasure at this time. 
But does he know or even believe that he should refrain? Aristotle might be taken to reply: yes and 
no. He has some degree of recognition that he must not do this now, but not full recognition. His 
feeling, even if it is weak, has to some degree prevented him from completely grasping or affirming 
the point that he should not do this… When reason remains unimpaired and unclouded, its dictates 
will carry us all the way to action, so long as we are able to act.159 
 
On this basic picture, the best metaphors for disunity in the soul are not those of mutiny or 
overthrow by one’s passions, but instead of one’s emotions and desires clouding or distorting 
reason so that while there is a sense in which we know what would be better to do, it is not 
enough to “carry us all the way to action”. Particular attractions obscure or undermine our grasp 
of something’s true value: in Watson’s example, my anger at my squash opponent for calling 
another let clouds my knowledge or awareness of the fact that I ought not strike him with my 
racquet, even though I “know” I ought not. Such aspects of our psychology should be understood 
then, as necessarily adverse to our rationality, at least at the time of akratic action.  
Finally, as an example of the third kind of picture, (according to which akratic 
disharmonies necessarily give rise to actions that cannot be understood as one’s own, or as 
resulting form psychological states that cannot be understood as one’s own) take Sarah Buss’s 
                                                      
159 Richard Kraut, “Aristotle’s Ethics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, April 2014. Jessica Moss has also 
defended this understanding of akrasia, both as a reading of Aristotle and Plato, and as itself a good understanding of 
the phenomenon. 
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neo-Kantian account of the constraints on genuinely intentional action. According to Buss, an 
agent’s evaluative beliefs must play a direct role in an agent’s action if we are to understand it as 
resulting from reasons that are “her own”. According to Buss, intentional agents “must endorse 
their actions [as good or worth performing] in addition to desiring to perform them”, where non-
intentional actions, in being unconditioned by such evaluative beliefs, are in an important sense 
external to the agent.160 If I don’t endorse my attack as good in some way, it wasn’t really me 
performing the action – my anger has compromised my ability to perform full-fledged actions.  
I think that these alternatives, though allowing for certain kinds of disunity, nonetheless 
give us an incomplete picture. To be clear, I am not denying that each of these views describe 
genuine psychological phenomena. We can be overcome by certain parts of our psychology, 
when we are overcome we are sometimes irrational because of this; our desires and feelings can 
cloud our judgment of how valuable something is; and there are aspects of our psychologies that 
are best understood as not being truly our own – including, in some cases, the desires or 
attractions that we have toward things we simultaneously think of as worthless, or bad.  
The worry, however, is that by adopting these views of human psychology, we too 
quickly conclude that having one’s emotions and motivations diverge from one’s evaluative 
judgments or beliefs is necessarily irrational or compromising of one’s agency – and it is this 
conclusion that I’ve argued is mistaken.  It is a mistake that I think can be explained by one 
widespread assumption that our emotions and desires are what I called value-centric – 
appropriately or rationally held only when directed toward apparent goodness or badness.161 We 
                                                      
160 Buss, “What Practical Reason Must Be If We Act For Our Own Reasons”, p. 412. Buss writes, “The claim is… 
that if qua deliberator, the agent is against performing her action [that is, if she believes that what she is doing is not 
good to do] then, qua deliberator, i.e., qua initiator of her own action, she has no motivation to perform it.” 
 
161 As Jessica Moss has put this point in her reading of Plato, “All passions (desires, emotions, pleasures and pains)
 
are responses to things qua valuable, but only calculation can grasp what is truly good or bad, as opposed to what 
merely appears so,” “Appearances and Calculations: Plato’s Division of the Soul”, p. 7. 
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have a tendency to think that our motivations and emotions must either be value-centric, or they 
must be “blind” as Watson suggests. In contrast to both of these conclusions, it seems that our 
desires and many of our emotions can be understood as responses to features of an agent’s 
circumstances that should not be understood as identical to features of value or disvalue. And 
when we assess those desires or emotions as “fitting” or not, we are sometimes only interested in 
whether they are sensitive to those features – it’s a further question whether or not they are 
sensitive to what is good, or bad. For example, as I discussed in Chapter 4, being interested in 
something is a paradigmatically positive response, but is not exclusively sensitive to 
considerations of positive value. One’s interest then, can be justified or veridical, as long as the 
object that sustains interest is, in fact, interesting. We might then ask: would it be appropriate for 
one to be interested by this object? For example, is it good to be interested in the car crash down 
the street? This sort of question presupposes the thought that one’s interest might not be 
appropriate, given the badness of the event. But importantly, this thought brings with it a 
different sense of “fit”, or “appropriateness”, that is distinct from the first.   
Once we see that there are many emotions that this alternative sort of justification or fit is 
apt, we begin to lose the sense that something has necessarily gone wrong at the level of clear 
thought and perception when they are not congruent with our judgments or experiences of value. 
The rubbernecker might be morbid or inconsiderate, but not “irrational”. Moreover, this allows 
us to see that such attitudes may be recalcitrant to considerations of value, without this being 
evidence of irrationality – they appear to be recalcitrant because they are not exclusively 
sensitive to those considerations to begin with. To ask Glory, for example, to reflect again on the 
badness of her brother’s character, or to present to her with more evidence of its badness, may 
not change her attitude toward him – not because her love is irrational or arational – but because 
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it is not exclusively informed by considerations of goodness and badness of its object, but 
something else.  
Given these considerations, we should also lose at least some of the motivation we have 
for immediately disowning, or externalizing, these attitudes as not properly part of a person’s 
self. Part of what makes these attitudes easy to disown is that they seem so difficult to square 
with what we think makes us rational, intelligent, and responsive agents. But when we see that 
our conclusions have resulted from a misunderstanding of their nature, they become more 
familiar as properly internal aspects of our psychology even when their objects are not good.  
 
III. PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VIRTUES 
 
The psychological claims I’ve defended are reinforced and more fully illustrated once we 
move to the more explicitly ethical questions that arise when considering cases of psychological 
division. I’ve argued that depending on the way in which a person’s psychology is divided, such 
a division may constitute or be otherwise inseparable from virtues that we are more likely to 
overlook by venerating the unified mind.162  
I’ve challenged the idea that harmony is essential to being a good person – arguing that 
there are a number of virtues which are partly constituted or inseparable from a person’s 
motivations and emotions diverging from her evaluative judgments – depending on the particular 
way in which that division manifests itself. These virtues include a form of graciousness, self-
                                                      
162 It might now be easier to discuss how my conclusion differs from the one argued for by Nomy Arpaly in, for 
example, “On Acting Rationally Against One’s Better Judgment”. Our positions differ in at least three different 
respects. First, Arpaly is interested in assessing particular actions as either rational or irrational for a person to 
perform, whereas I am interested in defending a disposition to act against one’s better judgment. Second, her 
defense depends on the action’s being justified – though not to the agent’s knowledge at the time of the action, 
whereas I am arguing for the value of the disposition, even though it gives rise to particular actions that may not be 
justified according to the standard that she uses. Third, Arpaly accepts a broadly Humean picture of the mind, and 
action – one that I’ve opposed here. 
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esteem, humility, solidarity with one’s fellow human beings, vivacity, perspicacity, and particular 
forms of intelligence.  
Do I mean to deny that it is a mark of a good life that a person’s psychology is unified? In 
one sense, yes. Unification on its own may not be a mark of a good life if such unification comes 
at a cost of being adequately sensitive to one’s circumstances. Such unification harmonizes the 
interior life of an agent at the cost of her engagement with and perception of the world. It might 
also be partly explained by a person’s lack of the virtues I’ve described – a particularly arrogant 
person, for example, can maintain a constancy between his desires and his evaluative beliefs by 
simply taking the latter to be settled by the former.  
But of course, that sort of harmony is unlikely to be what Stocker, and others, meant to 
be highlighting as so important to living well. So we should recognize that it may be 
psychologically possible to remain unified even in spite of one’s full sensitivity to the features of 
one’s situation that would justify division instead, such as when the best thing for a person to do 
is also something exceedingly boring, or painful, or annoying to do. Rather than being an effort 
to always love the good and hate the bad, this sort of person’s responses might come quite easily 
to her. In fact, this is what it might take to be the truly virtuous agent on a broadly Aristotelian 
account.   
Such people – depending on the particular circumstances – might be exceptionally stoic, 
patient, exacting, or serious. I do not deny that should such psychologies be possible for human 
beings to possess, that these beings would possess certain important virtues. Nor do I deny that 
the people that I’ve picked out as examples of possessing the virtues of disunity might possess 
certain vices, or character traits that it would be reasonable to be ambivalent about. We might 
think that Sherlock Holmes’ intensity is a virtue of his, even if it comes at the cost of his being, 
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for example, more patient or sanguine. And Emma Woodhouse’s playfulness in conversation is 
something that leads easily to hurt feelings and misunderstandings.163  
But the point that I have tried to make here is that even so, given what the virtues that 
I’ve described are like, there may be no fact of the matter which sort of psychological state – 
harmonious or divided – is simply all things considered better than the other. Instead, the 
observations I’ve made suggest moving toward a model of the virtues that does not fit well with 
this tendency to rank them against one another – but instead appreciates them each as different, 
but nonetheless excellent, characteristics for a person to possess. There may simply be no answer 
to the question of whether Sherlock or Watson is, all things considered, the better person overall. 
This seems to me, to be a good result – one that rightly celebrates a diversity of human 
excellences.  
Now, one might wonder why it is that these virtues have been overlooked or 
overshadowed by those that more obviously depend on a unified psychology. One suggestion is 
not that we have privileged harmony too much, but instead, that we haven’t fully recognized the 
implications of a thoroughly pluralistic account of value. We might, for example, want to 
maintain the basic thought that genuine virtues are necessarily partly constituted by a person’s 
having a unified psychology, but pair this with the observation that there are more good things 
than philosophers are typically willing to recognize. 
While this conclusion would preserve the value of a unified psychology, the worry I 
raised is that by endorsing this alternative picture we risk distorting our substantive evaluations. 
There, I suggested that we have good reason for maintaining the thought that a human being’s 
“streak of malice” or “unaccountable vanity” are genuinely bad aspects of his character, even 
though there is something to be said for not solely lamenting or regretting these features of who 
                                                      
163 “Badly done, indeed!” 
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he is. Furthermore, we also have good reason to keep distinct genuine excellences as excellences 
– ones that are importantly different from aspects of human nature that, though able to inspire 
affection, may not be all that good. That there is something good about people who knowingly 
love sentimental kitsch gives us little reason to elevate the evaluative status of velvet portraits of 
Elvis or porcelain statuettes of saucer-eyed puppies. 
 Moreover, we might again fall into the mistake of treating our positive and negative 
emotional responses as more value-centric than they really are – and this would encourage a 
distortion of those attitudes. And finally, as I discussed in my final chapter, I think that allowing 
for a more flexible understanding of the appropriate responses to things both good and bad, 
rather than a more flexible understanding of what sorts of things are good or bad, will better 
accommodate the phenomenology of at least some experiences of both.  
So although I think we ought to be flexible when considering what things are of genuine 
value, this sort of pluralism must also be supplemented by another: a pluralism of virtue. This is 
not just a denial of one way of understanding the unity of the virtues – it is not, for example, to 
simply point out the possibility that a person might be brave without being generous, or kind 
without being prudent. Rather, the thought is that not only is it possible to possess certain virtues 
without possessing the others, there may be some that genuinely conflict with one another. It may 
not be possible to possess all of the virtues that are partly constituted by loving the good, while 
possessing those that are partly constituted by loving the bad. There may not be just one, 
maximally good or excellent way to be. And again, this seems to me to be a good result. 
 
IV. VIRTUES & THE IMPORTANCE OF EVALUATIVE KNOWLEDGE 
 
At this point, one might wonder whether I’ve established the result that there are virtues 
that are partially constituted by psychic disharmony by antecedently committing to a picture of 
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the virtues as good or attractive but relatively minimal qualities of a person’s character.164 For 
example, according to Hume, virtues are simply those mental qualities that are either 
immediately agreeable to or useful for their possessors, or for others. Given some of the 
examples I’ve used, it may seem that is precisely the sort of account I’ve assumed. My 
discussion of David Chang, for example, was predicated on the observation that there is – at least 
for some of us – something immediately appealing, or attractive, about the way in which his 
desires are not aligned with his evaluative knowledge. 
Or take, for example, Julia Driver’s consequentialist conception of the virtues, according 
to which a virtue is simply, ‘‘a character trait ... which, generally speaking, produces good 
consequences for others”; a vice is simply a trait that, ‘‘generally speaking ... leads to bad 
effects.”165 When compared to a standard Aristotelian understanding of the virtues, these 
alternative understandings de-emphasize the internal life of the virtuous agent. They focus our 
attention instead on the effects of such states. Because of this, they accommodate a number of 
traits that more stringent accounts wouldn’t count as genuine virtues, or vices. This “thinness” is 
precisely why some philosophers, such as Rosalind Hursthouse166 and Robert Adams167, have 
been adamant in maintaining that genuine virtues must be psychologically deeper, and more 
complex, than the qualities that Hume and Driver would allow.  
I think that both Hume and Driver are right for highlighting the psychologically thinner 
dispositions that we enjoy and love in one another – and which are likely to be much more 
important in our lives than many philosophers may be willing to grant. We do rightly appreciate 
                                                      
164 One might also be waiting for me to provide a complete account what it is for a quality to be a virtue – but I 
won’t be doing so here.  
 
165 Julia Driver, Uneasy Virtue, pp. 123–124.   
 
166 Rosalind Hursthouse, "Are Virtues the Proper Starting Point for Morality?". 
 
167 Robert M. Adams, A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good.  
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that a person has perfect pitch, or the ability to load the dishwasher perfectly. Nonetheless, I 
want to finish my discussion here by emphasizing how my conclusions are not, in fact, all that 
friendly to these more minimalistic accounts of virtue. One rather small point is that I am 
skeptical of the ability of either of these alternative accounts to capture at least some of the 
virtues that I am interested in, given their focus on qualities that are appealing, or pleasant, or 
useful, or generally have good consequences. Some of the features I’ve picked out do not strike 
me as necessarily benefitting or being useful for others or for their possessors. Moreover, one 
would be justified in finding at least some of these qualities quite annoying, frustrating, or 
abrasive – though nonetheless good. 
But suppose that these views can accommodate such virtues, after all. Nonetheless, there 
does seem to be an important difference between the positive qualities of character that Hume 
and Driver would insist are genuine virtues, and the kinds of quality of character that Aristotle 
and others are interested in picking out. These latter qualities are psychologically more 
demanding, and because of this, reveal to us more about the agent’s inner life as well as her 
experience of the world. I think that this is an important quality to preserve as distinct and 
distinctively important. So while a disagreement about what is essential to virtue might strike 
some as an uninteresting terminological dispute, it’s important to notice that there are substantive 
differences between the kind of qualities that Hursthouse and Adams are interested in, and the 
kind of qualities that Hume and Driver are willing to count as virtues. 
And the qualities that I hope to have picked out do, I think, have this depth to them. In 
particular, it was important for my conclusions that the people I’ve discussed do have the 
relevant sort of evaluative knowledge and perception. This is what marks them out as different 
from those who possess similarly valenced desires and emotions, but do so either in evaluative 
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ignorance, evaluative arrogance, or without consideration about the value of the relevant things. 
For example, as I discussed in Chapter 4, a person’s susceptibility to boredom is something we 
appreciate more when we are convinced that her boredom is accompanied by her awareness of 
the value of the things around her – otherwise we may suspect she is being inattentive, or 
shallow, or ungrateful. Part of one’s appreciation of Chang’s response is that we know that he 
knows what sorts of food are excellent and why, but that he just doesn’t care all that much about 
eating only excellent food. And the sort of love I discussed in Chapter 2 is, like with other 
excellent forms of love, a love that isn’t blind to the bad qualities in its objects: it is one that is 
exercised with discernment and sensitivity. So in all of the cases I’ve discussed, there is 
something that would be lost should we fail to see how it is that the person sees the world, and 
her emotions and motivations as expressions of her particular stance within it.  
And so, although I began in stark disagreement with one old Socratic claim, I’ve reinforced 
another: the importance of evaluative knowledge. Importantly, we shouldn’t take this to mean 
that such knowledge is sufficient to guarantee a harmonious psychology, or that it will be clear 
what to do or how to feel once we have it, nor should we think that this lack of guarantee is 
something regrettable. It is within this diversity of responses to the good and the bad that we will 
find and recognize particular patterns of response worth exploring – and perhaps more 
importantly, celebrating. 
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